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Abstract 
Using large-company panel data, this thesis empirically analyses investment 
decisions in major European countries. We particularly concentrate on three 
issues: the taxation of capital in the EU, the role of agency costs of debt on 
investment decisions, and the empirical analyses of the investment-uncertainty 
relationship. First, based on a dynamic system in capital and Tobin's q ratio, some 
simplified analytical results are derived to simulate various tax policy effects on 
investment. Also, for a single investment project, a model is developed to consider 
jointly the role of uncertainty· arid irreversibility in the taxation of capital. The 
simulation results cast doubt on the tax competition view for the domestic 
investment case. Second, using a Euler equation approach, an investment equation 
is derived to test the possible effects of agency/financial distress costs of debt on 
investment for UK, German and French finns. The results reveal that the 
agency/fmancial distress cost of debt does matter for the highly leveraged finns. 
Further, an alternative model is derived in a q theory framework to test this 
negative effect. The model is tested for the UK firms, and similar results are 
obtained. Third, by considering the product structure of finns, the firm-level 
investment-uncertainty relationship is tested for UK firms. Unlike previous 
empirical findings, the results support the two opposing views in this field. 
Additionally, using vector autoregression analysis, a statistical account of the 
aggregate investment-uncertainty relation is given for the UK. An important 
observation is that although the exchange rate uncertainty has negative effects on 
machinery and equipment investment, it has no effect on construction investment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis empirically studies various aspects of incremental capital investment 
decisions from a firm's perspective. Capital investment involves formation of 
tangible capital assets such as machinery, equipment or buildings. Investment 
decisions are crucial for firms because capital investments affect future profits and 
cash flows both as sources and uses. The durability of capital affects the health 
and environment of a furn for the remainder of the asset's life. For the economy, 
aggregate investment determines aggregate demand and the level of employment. 
In the longer-term it determines production capacity and growth of living 
standards. Moreover, the volatility of investment greatly affects economic cycles. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the investment decisions and the 
implications of various policies for it. 
.. -· - ---- . Sfudying--incrernentar-mve-strrieiiCdecisions-fioiii. a-firm'speisiiective -require-s---
analysing complex decision processes. One has to consider many things including 
profit expectations, cost of funds, availability of funds, various forms of 
uncertainty, irreversibility of investment decisions, corporate and personal 
taxation, inflation, interactions with fmancial capital structure decisions and 
dividend decisions, employment of working capital and intangible assets, the 
structure of factor and product markets and industry, managerial problems, etc. In 
a modelling process, one has to consider the durability of capital and the forward-
looking nature of investment decisions. Also, immediate completion of an 
investment project takes time or becomes costly. Thus, an explicit adjustment 
mechanism becomes an integral part of a formulation. Moreover, since firms 
make investment decisions according to their future expectations, these 
expectations should be properly treated. The first chapter of this study gives a 
review of the theory of investment at both theoretical and empirical levels. The 
first two sections present the modem literature on investment: the neo-classical 
theory originated by Dale Jorgenson, and the q theory developed by James Tobin. 
Later sections of this chapter present the theoretical and empirical studies relevant to 
taxation, financing conditions and uncertainty and irreversibility. 
The motivation behind this empirical study is to concentrate on some of the topics 
that exhibit controversy and to make a contribution to the empirical literature on 
these topics. Particularly, the focus is on three issues: the taxation of capital in the 
European Union (EU) and harmonisation of corporate tax rules, the role of incentive 
problems and agency/fmancial-distress -costs of debt on iiivesfriient decisions,and ----
the empirical analyses of the investment-uncertainty relationship. 
Many studies investigating vanous aspects of capital investment decisions 
include large numbers of small firms in their samples. Although including all 
available individual data results in a better approximation of aggregate data and 
reduces selection biases and increases degrees of freedom, in some cases it might 
be misleading. For instance, if a study is testing the effects of financing 
constraints on investment decisions of firms, a significant result for small furns 
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may not have very important implications for the whole economy since it will be 
the larger firms that constitute a very large fraction of aggregate investment. In 
this thesis we study the investment behaviour of large industrial firms. Thus, the 
empirical results obtained are not subject to the above-mentioned small firm 
biases. This is certainly the case throughout chapters 4-6 in which we analyse the 
effects of financing conditions and fum-level uncertainty. 
On the other hand, using only large-company data greatly reduces the available 
number of observations. Moreover, fum-level data is generally available on a 
yearly basis. Considering these restrictions, we employ firm-level panel data 
throughout chapters 2-6. Employing panel data increases the degrees of freedom 
and gives more information, increasing the efficiency of estimates and easing 
making inferences. Moreover, it has the certain advantage of allowing for 
heterogeneity either through time or across firms that could not be modelled using 
cross-section and time-series data. It also has the advantage - of reducing-
collinearity since the cross-section dimension adds a lot of variability. Throughout 
the chapters, we give explanations about the econometric methodology employed. 
The data are collected for the companies that are gathered under the general 
industries classification of Datastream. The general industries classification 
includes engineering, chemicals, electronic and electrical equipment, engineering 
vehicle components, house building and other construction, building materials and 
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merchants, diversified industries, paper printing and packaging, and textiles, 
clothing and footwear as sub-industries. 
Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the impacts of the harmonisation of basic corporate tax 
rules in Europe. The analyses concentrate on the UK, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Harmonisation of tax rules in the EU has been an important 
argument. Some studies argued in favour of independent tax systems for demand 
management and economic stabilisation and adjustment. On the other hand, some 
argued in favour of harmonisation to prevent discrimination and distortion in 
investment decisions which will result in inefficient location decisions. Based on 
the q theory of investment, chapter 2 simulates the effects of various tax policy 
shocks in a dynamic partial equilibrium framework. Instead of measuring the tax 
burden as in a static case, the dynamic analysis tells us the effects of various 
policy changes on investment decisions. We admit the results will be limited to 
the extent that the q theory explains the investment behaviour. However, it has the 
advantage of treating expectations. Simulation results reveal that tax policies can 
be used to affect investment decisions. It is found that investment is more 
sensitive to investment tax credit changes relative to other policy effects. 
Substantial differences are observed for the tax policy effects on investment 
between the UK and France, Germany, and the Netherlands as a group, and also 
differences within this group in terms of different policy effects. Among the 
countries, investment is found least sensitive to all policy shock effects in the UK. 
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More importantly, the hannonisation of the corporate tax rules reduces the 
observed asymmetry only by a limited amount. 
Many studies investigating the effects of taxation on capital investment apply 
effective tax rates. Effective tax rates are commonly employed to reveal the role 
of a tax system on investment decisions. However, the traditional measures 
assume a perfectly certain environment and ignore the irreversibility risk 
governing investment decisions. In chapter 3, a model is constructed to include 
the joint effects of income uncertainty and irreversibility risk into the domestic 
marginal effective tax rate measures. Considering a zero loss offset income tax 
case, it is shown that this joint effect greatly increases the tax distortion 
measures. Also, the effects of hannonising the corporate tax rules are analysed. 
When the joint risk is incorporated, the reduction in the observed asymmetry is far 
less than the reduction in the case of certainty and reversibility. Within the context 
- - -
of the models employed in chapters 2 and 3, we conclude that the obtained results 
cast doubt on the tax competition view in the EU for the domestic investment 
case. Thus, hannonising corporate tax rules may mean the loss of a fiscal tool 
which can be used for adjustments of asymmetric shocks or for national demand 
management and economic stabilisation of the member economies. 
In the literature, many studies proposed that information and incentive problems 
may create frictions in financial capital markets. The imperfect" substitution 
between internally generated and externally raised funds due to imperfect 
5 
information and incentive problems can create an external fmancing premium. 
Moreover, some firms might be under fmancial distress, or even credit rationed. 
Thus, fmancing conditions may have important implications for investment 
decisions. Studies testing the possible relations between investment and financing 
decisions mostly documented cash flow and liquidity effects. However, existing 
empirical studies about the effects of incentive problems on investment decisions 
are not numerous and find controversial results, showing that more empirical 
investigations of these effects are required. 
Thus, in chapter 4, using a Euler equation approach and based on the 
agency/financial distress costs of debt, an investment equation is derived to test 
the role of debt financing conditions on investment decisions. In the model, we 
also consider the possible beneficiary role of working capital on the asset side of 
the balance sheet to smooth these costs and pressures. The study covers large UK, 
German and French firms. The estimation results reveal that the perfect financial 
capital markets hypotheses are not acceptable. According to the developed model, 
the agency/financial distress costs of debt are important so that debt fmancing has 
a significant role in management's investment decisions. However, to some 
extent, fmns have the ability to smooth these costs and alleviate pressures through 
their working capital policy on the asset side of their balance sheets. Further 
analyses reveal that the agency/financial distress cost of debt does matter for the 
high-leverage groups, whereas it is not significant for the low-leverage groups. 
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The findings of this chapter imply important effects for the three economies as the 
increments in corporate leverage may increase the economy-wide costs and risk. 
In chapter 5, we derive an alternative model in a q theory framework to test the 
role of agency/fmancial distress costs of debt on investment. In this formulation, 
the investment equation includes the debt-capital ratio under the hypothesis of 
incentive problems of debt and capital market imperfections. We test this 
alternative model for the UK firms. Similar to the findings in chapter 4, the 
estimation results reveal that the agency/frnancial distress costs of debt have a 
significant negative role in investment decisions of highly leveraged firms. To 
some extent, those firms have the ability to smooth these costs through their 
working capital policy. 
Chapter 6 empirically examines the sign of the short-run investment-uncertainty 
relationship for large UK industrial companies. At a firm level analysis, the 
theoretical work on the investment-uncertainty relationship suggests that the 
direction of this sign depends on the degree of competition faced by a firm and/or 
the assumption about the· technology that the firm adapts. A small number of 
studies examined the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship at the firm level 
and found mostly negative effects. We particularly consider the product market 
structure while studying this relation via the product specialisation criteria. The 
chapter does not attempt to develop a fully specified structural model, however, to 
test the robustness of the findings, two different models and two different measures 
of uncertainty are employed. The fmdings reveal that consideration of the product 
market structure confirms the predictions of both theoretical works, and this result 
is robust under different model specifications. Moreover, it is observed that one 
should be careful about the employed uncertainty measure before reaching a 
conclusion about the nature of this relationship. 
Finally, usmg impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decomposition analyses of the vector autoregression methodology, chapter 7 gives 
a statistical account of the aggregate investment-uncertainty relation in the UK. 
We analyse the effects of interest rate uncertainty, exchange rate uncertainty and 
inflation uncertainty. Although they are not large, negative effects of exchange 
rate and inflation uncertainty are observed on the total investment. Further 
analyses reveal stronger negative effects of exchange rate uncertainty on the 
machinery and equipment investment. However, it has no effect on the 
construction investment. 
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CHAPTER! 
A REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT 
Section 1.1 Introduction 
Because of its importance, there have been many studies to understand the 
investment behaviour and the factors determining it. For instance, in an early study 
Clark (1917) models net investment as a proportional change in desired capital 
stock. The model is known as the accelerator model in which the desired capital is 
proportional to output. As an alternative to the accelerator model, Tinbergen (1939) 
proposes a model in which the investment decision depends on the level of profit 
which is developed later by K.lein (1951). In the model, the investment decision is 
governed by expected profits and realised profits are used as a measure of expected 
profits. Later, the unitary adjustment coefficient of the simple accelerator model was 
rejected by many empirical studies. To model the adjustment mechanism, Chenery 
(1952) and Koyck (1954) introduce the flexible accelerator model. In this model, 
·' 
attention is focused on the time structure of the investment process, and the desired 
capital stock is determined by long-run considerations. Instead of an adjustment 
coefficient with unity, the changes in the desired capital are transformed into actual 
investment expenditures by a geometric distributed lag function. In another study, 
Meyer and Kuh ( 1957) stress the importance of the availability of sources to fmance 
the investment, and they consider the effects of liquidity and internal funds to 
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determine investment behaviour. Eisner and Strotz (1963), Bischoff (f971) and 
Jorgenson (1971) give extensive surveys of these early models. 
Besides the studies mentioned above, the modem literature on investment stems 
primarily from two equivalent sources: the neo-classical theory originated by Dale 
Jorgenson, and the q theory developed by James Tobin. The starting point in the 
earlier neo-classical approach developed by Jorgenson (1963) is the firm's 
optimisation behaviour. The objective of the firm is to maximise the present 
discounted value of net cash flows subject to technological constraints summarised 
by the production function. In the model, the desired capital is determined by the 
equality between the marginal revenue product of capital and the user cost of 
capital. In the other formulation suggested by Tobin (1969), investment is a function 
of q, which is the ratio of the capitalised value of the marginal investment to its 
replacement cost. According to this model, net investment would be undertaken by 
the firm and the capital stock would be increased if the q ratio is greater than unity, 
otherwise the reverse would apply. 
In the following section of this chapter the neo-classical model is presented in detail 
and its empirical drawbacks are discussed. In section 1.3 the adjustment cost 
literature is summarised which rationalises the theoretical shortcomings of the neo-
classical model. Later, the q theory of investment is derived from this augmented 
neo-classical theory of investment to present that in fact the two theories are 
equivalent. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 present the investment models in a tax-free world 
10 
'· 
under certainty and reversibility assumptions without attention to fmancing 
decisions. Considering the enormous literature written on the topic, in the rest of the 
chapter the aim is to summarise and give the basic intuition behind the important 
studies relevant to taxation, financing conditions, and uncertainty and irreversibility 
issues. In section 1.4 the effects of corporate taxes are presented, discussing the 
effects of the corporate tax rate, depreciation deductions and investment tax credit. 
Also, personal taxation and the effects of inflation via depreciation deductions are 
considered. Section 1.5 first discusses the theoretical literature about the effects of 
financing constraints due to credit rationing or more expensive external funding on 
investment decisions which might occur because of informational and incentive 
problems. After that, empirical evidence about these effects on investment 
behaviour is presented. Section 1.6 releases the certainty and reversibility 
assumptions and discusses the important theoretical and empirical literature for 
investment behaviour under uncertainty and irreversibility assumptioas. Section 1. 7 
presents the final concluding remarks. 
Section 1.2 The Neo-classical Model 
1t 1s impossible to reconcile the theory of econometric 
literature on investment with the neo-classical theory of optimal 
capital accumulation. The central feature of the neo-classical 
theory is the response of the demand for capital to changes in 
relative factor prices or the ratio of factor prices to the price of 
output. This feature is entirely absent from the econometric 
literature on investment. 
(D. Jorgenson 1963, p. 247) 
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In the well-known accelerator theory of investment, capital is tied to output in a 
fixed ratio. However, in the neo-classical theory of investment, substitution between 
the inputs of production the function is allowed, and this is the most important 
difference between the two theories. In the above quotation, Jorgenson is stressing 
the missing feature of the neo-classical investment theory and arguing that there is 
ignorance of the substitution parameters in the econometric literature. 
To overcome the above mentioned problem, Jorgenson (1963) develops a model. 
Generally, his model can be viewed as a demand-side oriented model in which the 
aim is to determine the desired capital stock position and then to identifY the 
adjustment mechanism from the current capital stock position to the desired 
position. The desired capital stock is determined from the profit maximisation 
behaviour of the firm. The short-run determination of investment behaviour depends 
on the time form of lagged response to changes in the demand for capital and the 
form of lagged response is assumed to be fixed 
Maximising Behaviour and the Desired Capital Stock 
In the model, the demand for capital stock is determined so as to maximise the net 
worth of the firm, and the net worth is the discounted sum of net revenues. The net 
revenue can be simply defined as the current revenue less the current and capital 
account expenditures. Assuming labour and capital as the two factors of production, 
the net revenue for each point in time by excluding the taxes can be written as 
12 
R= pF(K,L)- wL- p 1 I (1) 
where p, F, w, K, L, /and I represent the price of output, quantity of output, wage 
of labour, capital stock, quantity of labour, price of the investment good and fixed 
investment, respectively. The constant returns-to-scale production function F(K, L) 
is assumed to be twice differentiable and accompanied by the a.Ssumption of 
diminishing marginal products. 
Under the assumptions of certainty, costless reversibility, and perfect capital, output 
and factor markets, the objective of the competitive firm, maximising the present 
value of the net worth, can be written in continuous time t as 
"' 
NW= max J exp( -rt)R(t)dt. 
0 
(2) 
The firm faces two constraints in the maximisation process. First, the capital stock 
identity, which is equal to investment less depreciation, where the replacement is 
assumed to be proportional to capital stock. This can be written as 
K=I-t5K (3) 
where the dot denotes the time derivative, and the term t5 represents the economic 
depreciation rate. Stated another way, investment can be decomposed as the 
investment for capital expansion and the investment for r~placement. The second 
constraint that the fmn faces is the technological constraint, summarised by the 
production function. 
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Obviously, in this dynamic optimisation problem, the aim is to find the optimal time 
paths of the state variables capital and labour which will maximise the present value 
of the net worth. The optimal paths of K and L give the desired K• and L ·, hence, 
the· desired investment path can be derived from the desired capital path. From the 
fundamental lemma of calculus of variations, the necessary Euler equations for 
capital and labour satisfy the maximisation of the objective functional. Considering 
the equality constraint for investment in equation (3) and inserting it into the 
integrand directly, instead of using the Lagrange form, the objective functional can 
be expressed as 
"' 
NW=max fexp(-rt)[pF(K,L)-wL- p 1(K +bK)]dt. (4) 
0 
Hence, the necessary Euler equation for labour will be 
exp( -rt)[p8F(K,L) I b'L- w] = 0 (5) 
and from here 
8F(K,L)/8L=wl p (6) 
which means that the fmn will hire labour at each point of time up to where the 
marginal product oflabour is equal to the real wage rate. 
The Euler equation for capital can be derived as 
exp(-rt)[p8F(K,L)/8K-op 1 -rp 1 +p 1 ]=0 (7) 
and rearranging the above equation gives 
14 
ilF(K,L)_p 1(r+o-jJ 1 !p1 ) c 
IlK p p 
(8) 
which means, similarly, that the capital will be employed at each point of time up to 
where the marginal product of capital equals the cost of capital. The right~hand side 
of equation (8) is the user cost of capital that Jorgenson defines in his original 
model. Since/ is the flow price of capital for each time period, /r and/ o would 
be the interest charge on the price of capital and the depreciation charge on a unit of 
capital in each period, respectively. The last term (jJ 1 I p 1 ) can be interpreted as 
the reduction in the cost of capital due to increase in the price of a unit of capital, 
meaning a capital gain for the firm. 
Although the aim in this dynamic optimisation problem is to find the optimum paths 
for the state variables, the Euler equations just lead through the marginal 
productivity conditions of these variables. In that case, it is interesting that the 
optimisation problem loses its dynamic nature and collapses to a static case, except 
that the marginal productivity conditions which are determined by the Euler 
equations are supposed to hold at every point in time. Normally, in mathematical 
terms, the Euler equations can also be expressed in the form of differential equations 
and the solutions of these equations give the necessary optimal paths for the state 
variables. However, respectively, the linear character and the absence of the fust 
derivatives of the capital and labour variables in the integrand in equation (4) do not 
permit the Euler equations to be in differential forms and reduces the problem into a 
static context. 
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Adjustment Mechanism 
Having determined the output and the desired level of labour and capital from the 
hypothesised production function and the marginal productivity conditions, if there 
is no Jag in the completion of investment projects, the level of investment can easily 
be found from the constraint defined in equation (3). However, as implied earlier, an 
instantaneous adjustment mechanism is not realistic, and identification of it 
complements the other part of the problem. 
For the adjustment mechanism, Jorgenson introduces the delivery lags. He divides 
the investment process into several stages and derives the actual investment 
expenditure for capital expansion as a distributed Jag function of the change in 
desired capital stock. To grasp that mechanism, two things need to be understood. 
The frrst one is the distributed Jag relationship between investment expenditures and 
the new investment projects, and the second one is the intuition behind the initiation 
of new projects. 
For the frrst issue, let IE and IN represent the investment expenditures in new 
projects and the level of starts of new projects. Since the completion of new 
projects takes time, by assuming that the distribution of completion of new projects 
is fixed, Jorgenson defmes the investment for capital expansion for each time as a 
weighted average of the level of projects initiated in all previous periods. This can 
be presented in the Jag operator as 
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IE(t) = W(S)IN(t) = W(O)IN(t) + W(l)IN(t -1)+ ...... (9) 
Here, W(O), W(1), W(2) . .. is a power series which represents the distribution of 
completion over time. It is also assumed to be a sequence of nonnegative numbers 
adding up to unity. 
For the second issue, in each period the firm will be stimulated to initialise new 
projects until the backlog of uncompleted projects at the beginning of the period is 
equal to the difference between desired and actual capital stock. Assuming that the 
firm initiates the necessary new project at time t-1 to satisfy the level of desired 
capital stock at time t-1, new project initiations at the current period can also be 
presented as the difference between the current and previous levels of the desired 
capital stock: 
* * IN(t)= K (t)-K (t-1). (10) 
Using equations (9) and (1 0), and assuming that the replacement investment is 
proportional to capital stock, investment expenditure can be expressed as 
* * IE(t) = W(S)(K (t)- K (t -1)) + oK . 
I -I 
(11) 
Empirical Issues and Critics 
To implement the theory, two issues should be identified. The former is the 
technology, or more precisely, the type of production function to determine the level 
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of the desired capital stock, and the latter IS the distributed lag function m 
equation (11) for the adjustment mechanism. 
For the type of the technology, Jorgenson chooses a Cobb-Douglas production 
function (F(K,L) = AK"Li) where the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour is unity. If a shows the elasticity of output with respect to capital, the 
marginal productivity condition for capital can be written as 
OF(K,L) F(K,L) 
=a 
oK K 
(12) 
Then, by utilising the marginal productivity condition of capital in equation (8), 
equation (12) can be rearranged for the level of desired capital stock as 
' pF K =a-. 
c 
(13) 
Clearly, this exposition serves Jorgenson's aim, which is mentioned earlier, since 
the level of desired capital stock includes the relative price of output and capital 
within itself. 
For the adjustment mechanism, Jorgenson applies a rational distributed lag function 
as described in Jorgenson (1966). Assuming that the W(k) of coefficients has a 
rational generating function, the rational distributed lag function for any arbitrary 
distributed lag function Y(t) = W(O)X(t)+W(l)X(t-1)+W(2)X(t-2)+ ..... is expressed as 
Y(t) = g(S) X(t) 
h(S) 
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(14) 
where g(S) and h(S) are polynomials inS 
g(S)= g + g S + g S 2 + ...... +g sm 
0 1 2 m 
h(S)=h +hS+h S2 + ....... +h sn 
0 1 2 n 
in which the tenns g0 and h0 are nonnalised to unity. This general function, 
respectively, for g(S) = (1-A.), h(S) = (1-A.S) and for g(S) = (1-A.)', h(S) = (1-A.S)', 
also covers the geometric distributed Jag function (1- A.S)Y(t) = (1-A.)X(t) of Koyck 
(1954) and the Pascal Jag distribution (1-A.S)'Y(t) = (1- A.)'X(t) ofSolow (1960) as 
special cases. 
Hence, from equations (13) and (14), equation (11) can be rewritten as 
_ g(S) [ p(t)F(t) p(t -1)F(t -1)] 
I(t)- h(S) a ( ) -a + 8K(t -1) 
c t c(t -1) (15) 
which is the final fonn that Jorgenson and his associates use in their empirical 
applications. Using the above equation, Jorgenson (1963, 1965) and Jorgenson and 
Stephenson (1967) study the investment behaviour for the United States economy. 
They propose that the neo-classical theory provides a highly satisfactory explanation 
of investment behaviour, and they find substantial short-run responses of investment 
with respect to the price of output, price of capital, interest rate an\1 various tax 
effects. 
However, Eisner and Nadiri (1968) test the theory and reject their fmdings. The 
important point in their criticism is the unitary elasticity of capital with respect to 
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output and relative prices, which is implicitly assumed in the model by using a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. They suggest that, if these elasticity are different 
from one, constraining the response of investment to different effects to be of equal 
magnitude via equation (15) would be misleading. For that purpose, with the same 
data, Eisner and Nadiri estimate equation (15) by shifting it to a logarithmic form to 
measure the output and relative price elasticity of capital separately. They find that 
these two elasticity measures are far less than unity, and they also report contra-
evidence for the constraints which are imposed upon the Jag distribution. 
To understand the main point in these criticisms, take the general production 
function of Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow (1961). The constant elasticity of 
substitution production function, which permits the elasticity of substitution to take 
any positive value for the constant returns-to-scale case is 
(16) 
where y>O, 0< ,;<1 and tp>-1. In this function, ydenotes the efficiency parameter that 
shifts the whole production function, .; is a distribution parameter that permits the 
relative importance of labour and capital to vary, and rp is the substitution parameter. 
From equation (16), by taking the partial derivative of output with respect to 
capital, the marginal productivity condition for capital can be expressed as 
iJF(K, L) = J: -lp F(l+~p) K-(l+lf'). 
iJK .,y (17) 
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Using the marginal productivity condition found in equation (8), equation (17) can 
be rearranged for the desired level of capital stock as 
(18) 
where a denotes the elasticity of substitution, which is equal to (I +cp)"1 for the 
constant returns-to-scale case for that general production function. For the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, taking the elasticity of substitution parameter a 
as one, the equation (18) simply reduces to equation (13). However, if the elasticity 
of substitution is less than unity, the effect of the relative price ratio as well as the 
interest rate and various tax effects via the user cost of capital will be miscalculated 
because of the imposed restriction. 
Section 1.3 Adjustment Costs and Tobin's q 
Jorgenson's model can be viewed as a successful step towards a theory of 
investment, because it considers the durability of capital explicitly with its forward-
looking nature, even if it is under static expectations of the firm. Also, the structural 
form of the model provides a suitable base to study various policy analyses. 
However, in addition to the empirical criticisms stated in section 1.2, the model has 
some important theoretical shortcomings. In this stock-oriented model, the desired 
capital stock is derived from the comparative static profit miDI.irnisation 
considerations which is then used together with a distributed lag function to 
determine the investment. Actually, the model cannot determin~ the rate of 
investment by itself because it relies on an ad hoc stock adjustment mechanism by 
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which the adjustment costs are introduced implicitly. Moreover, the desired capital 
stock is derived without regard to this auxiliary adjustment mechanism. The 
investment path is actually a decision that affects variables like sales or profit, which 
in turn play an important role in determining the level of desired capital stock. 
From a theoretical perspective (e.g. as in Keynes 1936, p.l36) the marginal 
efficiency of capital slopes downwards as a function of the rate of investment 
because of the rising supply price of capital goods. Since the marginal efficiency of 
capital is supposed to equal the interest rate, investment will be a decreasing 
function of the interest rate. In his model, Jorgenson ignores the role of this rising 
supply curve of new capital goods in determining the rate of investment. 
Adjustment Costs and the Modified Neo-classical Theory 
Later on, to justify the stock adjustment mechanism defined by Jorgenson, various 
studies apply a particular dynamic adjustment mechanism by introducing the 
concept of the adjustment costs in the criterion functional. This can be thought of as 
a formal counterpart to the rising supply curve of capital goods. In this augmented 
approach, the firm faces adjustment costs as an increasing convex function of the 
investment rate when it is altering its investment. This new formulation provides a 
rationale for the lags in the adjustment of capital. 
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Two types of adjustment costs have been identified for the theory of investment: 
internal adjustment costs such as in Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967) and 
Gould (1968) that arise from the internal activities of the firm, and external 
adjustment costs as in Witte (1963) and Foley and Sidrauski (1970) which occur 
because of market forces external to the firm. Internal adjustment costs can be 
thought of as a loss in output or in revenue of the fmn when it diverts its resources 
from production to investment, occurring from planning or installation costs. This 
happens because new investment plans require new administrative activities, new 
research and development, or new capital installations need to train some human 
power or alter production activities. External adjustment costs can be viewed as 
firm-specific costs or a kind of premium that the firm has to pay in the form of 
higher prices when its investment rate .is larger in any period of time. So, the more -
capital the fmn demands, the higher prices it pays, creating a rising supply price of 
capital goods. Clearly, external adjustment costs are more in line with Keynesian 
short-run analysis; however, internal adjustment costs are more common in the 
literature. As Mussa (1977) shows, these two approaches are not alternatives, but 
they each form an important part of the theory of investment function. 
The neo-classical model of Jorgenson has a static nature, the production factors 
are perfectly variable, and the dynamics are implicit. Obviously, adjustment costs 
help to introduce the dynamic elements explicitly into the theory and to give the 
capital a quasi-fixed character. This provides a rigorous basis for the optimal rate of 
capital accumulation and rationalises the flexible accelerator models of investment 
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behaviour. However, as Rothschild (1971) points out, in many cases the weak 
theoretical foundations of the convexity assumptions may cause difficulties. The 
convexity assumption forces the firm to look ahead to the future because if the firm 
accumulates slowly it may lose profit. On the other hand, rapid accumulation costs 
more. Alternatively, if the firm faces concave or linear adjustment costs, it can 
immediately close the necessary gap between the actual and the desired capital 
stock. 1bis implies that at this point the investment will be undefined and the lagged 
adjustment will disappear. In addition to this criticism, a more crucial frailty of the 
model is the treatment of expectations. The neo-classical model augmented by the 
idea of adjustment costs assumes that fmns have perfect foresight so the decisions 
are based on the explicit inter-temporal optimisation. With static expectations as in 
Gould (1968), the model reduces to a simple case where there is nothing left 
to be estimated. 
Tobin's q Theory: An Equivalent Approach 
But the daily revaluations of the Stock Exchange, though they 
are primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investments 
between one individual and another, inevitably exert a decisive 
influence on the rate of current investment. For there is no sense 
in building up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at 
which a similar existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst there 
is an inducement to spend on a new project what may seem an 
extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on the Stock Exchange at 
an immediate profit. 
(J. M. Keynes 1936, p.!Sl) 
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James Tobin (1969) illustrates a very general and flexible basic framework for 
monetary analysis. In his framework, it is possible to realise the spirit of Keynes 
(see especially Keynes 1936, chapter 12), which can be illustrated via the above 
quoted passage. According to his approach, the aggregate demand is affected by 
various policies and events principally by changing the valuations of physical assets 
relative to their replacement costs. He defines a key variable q within this 
framework, which is the ratio of the market value of installed capital to its 
replacement cost. In general equilibrium, where IS and LM curves cut each other, 
the q ratio is equal to one. More importantly, investment is an increasing function 
of the q ratio. If an additional unit of installed capital would raise the market value 
of the firm by more than the cost of replacing the capital, the firm proceeds with this 
new investment, which happens when q is greater than one. So, the greater the 
difference between q and one, the greater is the incentive to invest. Alternatively, if 
q is less than one, then the gain that the furn would make is less than the 
replacement value of capital, in which case the firm does not make the investment. 
The most important advantage ofTobin's q approach over the neo-classical model is 
the treatment of expectations. The model is actually free of expectation problems 
because it relies on well-functioning asset markets. Since the numerator of the q 
ratio includes the market value, all relevant information and expectations about the 
future will be directly captured in this approach. However, the market value 
approach loses its ability to examine the policy effects through a structural model. 
Also, as Hayashi (1982) argues, some sort of ad hoc adjustment costs lie behind the 
theory, and moreover, the role of the production function is not clear. 
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Although the neo-classical model modified with adjustment costs and Tobin's q 
model look different, actually they constitute the demand and supply side of the 
same theory. This point was recognised in Lucas and Prescott (1971) and in Mussa 
(1977), and it was formally presented under the Cobb-Douglas technology by Abel 
(1979). The neo-classical model looks at the factors behind the market value by 
analysing the net revenue of the firm, whereas the q approach directly uses the 
market value in determining the optimal investment. The link between these two 
models can be presented by deriving the q approach from the neo-classical model 
starting with a firm's value maxirnisation problem. For simplicity, the economy will 
again be assumed tax-free. 
Let the net revenue of the firm be 
R = pF(K,L)- wL- p 1 I- pA(I,K). (19) 
Here, pF(K,L) represents gross sales, where wL and li are the cost of labour and 
the cost of investment goods to the furn. The last term on the right-hand side of 
equation (19) is the internal adjustment cost, which is supposed to be a loss in the 
firm's revenue function. Because the instalment costs depend on the size of 
investment relative to capital, the installation function A depends on capital as well 
as investment. This function is twice differentiable and an increasing convex 
function of investment, making the instalment cost per unit of investment greater, 
the greater the rate of investment for any given level of capital. Thus, (oA I t3I) > 0 
and (82 A I t3I 2 ) > 0. 
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The fum is considered as if it is trying to maximise the present value of its future 
net revenues: 
"" 
V(O) = max J exp( -rt)Rdt 
0 
(20) 
where r is the discount factor that discounts the net revenues at date t back to the 
current date. By using the equation of motion for the state variable capital stock 
K=l-8K (21) 
_ as a dynamic constraint in the maximising problem, the current value Hamiltonian 
can be written as 
H = pF(K,L)- wL- p 1 I- pA(l,K) +A.(/- 8K) (22) 
where A. is the current-value shadow price of capital._ Applying the Pontryagin's 
maximum principle to this control problem, the first order conditions for the control 
variables labour and investment can be written as 
ilF(K,L) w 
8L p 
(23) 
and 
oA(l,K) 1 A.=p 8/ +p. (24) 
Equation (23) is simply the marginal productivity condition of labour as in 
equation (6), and equation (24) states that the firm chooses the rate of investment so 
as to equate the value of an additional unit of newly installed capital to its purchase 
price plus the marginal adjustment cost. From the control theory, the equation of 
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motion for the costate variable should also satisfy .i - r A. = -iJH I 8K . From 
equation (22) this result can be presented as 
· 
8 
iJF(K,L) t1A(I,K) 
A. = (r + )A. - p 8K + p 8K . (25) 
Equation (25) is a differential equation which shows the optimality condition for the 
motion of the costate variable, or in economic terms, for the motion of shadow price 
of capital. Solving this differential equation yields 
"' A.= fexp(-(r+8)t)[piJF(K,L)I 8K- pt3A(I,K)I 8K]dt (26) 
0 
which shows the equality between the present discounted value of the marginal 
revenue attributable to a unit of installed capital and the shadow price of capital. 
The first term in the integral is simply the additional revenue which coines from the 
additional unit of capital. As mentioned earlier, the instalment costs depend on the 
size of investment relative to capital, thus the second term denotes the savings in the 
adjustment costs as the effect of an additiorial unit of installed capital. The discount 
factor also includes the depreciation rate 8 since the capital stock depreciates at 
this rate. 
Ignoring the adjustment costs from equation (24) for a moment makes the shadow 
value of capital A.= l. Inserting this result in equation (25) and rearranging gives 
c (27) 
p 
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which is Jorgenson's user cost of capital that is defined earlier in equation (8). The 
difference is the additional internal adjustment costs, which is the result of the 
augmented neo-classical model. Actually, this is the same condition derived under 
the control theory approach instead of using the classical calculus of variations as in 
Jorgenson's model. So, naturally we get the same results. 
However, the important point is that equation (24) can be manipulated as 
(28) 
By defining a certain quadratic adjustment cost function such as 
!3( I )2 A (I, K) = 2 K - a K (29) 
where f3 is the adjustment cost parameter and a is the normal rate of investment. 
Using equation (29), equation (28) can be rewritten as 
!._=a+_!_[~ -1) E!__. 
K f3 PI p _ (30) 
Since lt represents the shadow value of capital,_the term (lt I/) can be defined as the 
marginal q, which is the ratio of the marginal value of an additional unit of installed 
capital to its purchase price/. From here, equation (30) can be rewritten as 
I 1 PI 
-=a+-(q-1)-. 
K f3 p (31) 
Equation (31) is clearly the desired result, which shows that Tobin's q theory 
approach and the augmented neo-classical model are equivalent. 
29 
However, one important problem with the above exposition is the inequality of 
marginal q and average Q, because, in equation (31) investment is a function of 
marginal q, but in reality what one can observe is the average Q ratio, which is the 
ratio of the average market value of a unit of capital to its replacement cost. 
Fortunately, Hayashi (1982) shows that under the assumption of both a linearly 
homogenous production function and an adjustment cost function, marginal q would 
be equal to average Q. He also extends this important result for imperfect 
competition. In the case of imperfect competition, the Q ratio also includes the 
present value of expected revenues due to market power as an additional term. In 
the limiting case, the firm faces a flat demand curve and the additional term 
disappears, corresponding to the perfect competition case. 
Although the q model of investment is theoretically very appealing, empirically it 
has performed less successfully. Early applications of the model were carried out by 
von Furstenberg (1977), Abel (1980), Summers (1981), Blanchard and Wyplosz 
(1981) and Hayashi ( 1982). As also pointed out in an extensive survey by Chirinko 
(1993), three persistent empirical· problems appear with the q models of investment. 
First, according to equation (31 ), no other variables should have a l>YStematic 
relation with investment. lbis is because the market value in the numerator of the q 
ratio is already assumed to capture all relevant information. However, variables like 
output, profit, and liquidity frequently enter in the investment equation significantly, 
and the restricted form results in low R-square measures. Second, estimated 
adjustment cost parameters are unreasonably large which implies large adjustment 
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costs and very slow adjustments. Finally, specification tests indicate the presence of 
serial correlation in residuals, and lagged values of the q ratio and the investment-
capital ratio appear to be significant. 
In an extensive study, by using the US data and vector autoregression 01 AR) 
analysis, Abel and Blanchard (1986) carefully construct a series for marginal q to 
observe whether the divergence between marginal q and observed average Q is 
responsible for the poor empirical performance of the q models of investment. They 
find that the results are not improved and also report that the variations in their 
constructed series are due more to variations in the discount factor than to the 
variations in marginal profit. Poret and Torres (1989) compare the performance of 
the Q model with the flexible accelerator and profitability models for the US, Japan, 
Germany, France and Italy for aggregate-level investment. They conclude that in 
none of the five countries does the Q ratio explain the investment behaviour better 
than the two traditional models do. Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) analyse 
the effect of the Q ratio on US aggregate investment from 1900 to 1990. They 
conclude that, after controlling the profit rates, the Q ratio appears to play a limited 
role in affecting investment decisions. In two other aggregate-level studies, Kopcke 
(1985, 1993) compares the performance of the neo-classical and the Q model of 
investment with the accelerator, the cash flow, and the autoregressive models for the 
US capital investment series. In many cases, the simple traditional models perform 
as well as and/or outperform the other two models. 
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Unlike the aggregate data, studies using panel data mostly estimate less serial 
correlation, or find robust results for common factor restriction such as in a UK 
panel study by Blundell et al (1992). Using US firm-level panel data, Schaller 
(1990) also shows evidence that aggregation is responsible for upward bias in 
estimated adjustment costs as well as for observed serial correlation. By employing 
aggregate UK data, but based on imperfect competition, Schiantarelli and 
Georgoutsos (1987) obtain better empirical results. Generally, although employing 
panel data improves the performance of the Q model of investment and reduces the 
observed autocorrelation and the adjustment costs, empirically, the results are still at 
unsatisfactory levels. 
Section 1.4 Taxes and Inflation 
The investment models were derived under the assumption of a tax-free world in the 
previous sections. However, in reality the incentive to invest is influenced by tax 
codes, and the role of the tax environment has been an important research area. 
Generally, corporate taxes have been the major issues. The three popular aspects of 
the corporate tax code that have been investigated are the corporate tax rate, the 
investment tax credit and the depreciation allowance. Additionally, the effects of 
personal taxation and inflation have also been considered. 
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Investment and Corporate Taxation 
In its simplest form, investment tax credit and the depreciation allowance are 
positively related to investment decisions since they reduce the price of investment 
goods. On the other hand, the corporate tax rate is negatively related to investment 
because it reduces after-tax profit. However, it does also have a positive relation to 
investment since it increases the present value of tax savings due to depreciation 
deductions, and the overall effect of it depends on the tax codes and the magnitudes 
of the related variables. 
For the neo-classical model, considering the tax factors, the revenue function given 
in equation (1) can be rewritten as 
R = (1- u)pF(K,L}- wL- (1- k- uz)p 1 I. (32) 
From the profit maximisation problem in equation (4), considering these corporate 
tax factors and taking the frrst-order condition for capital, the user cost of capital 
derived in equation (8) can be altered as 
c p 1(r+8-j/ I p 1 )(l-k-uz) 
-
p p (1- u) (33) 
Here, u, k and z, respectively, represent the corporate tax rate, investment tax credit 
and the present value of the depreciation deductions. As can be seen from equation 
(33), if k + uz = u, then the tax effects would be neutral. The numerator of the 
additional tax factor comes from the reduction of the price of investment goods and 
the denominator denotes the taxation of profits. Hall and Jorgenson (1967), based 
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on the neo-classical theory of investment and by employing US aggregate data, 
investigate the effects of various tax codes for the postwar period, and they report 
an important relationship between the tax policy and investment expenditures. 
For the q theory of investment derived in the previous section, after incorporating 
the corporate tax factors, the ftrst-order condition for capital which is derived in 
equation (24) can be presented as 
8A 1 2=(1-u)p 
81 
+(1-k-uz)p . (34) 
From here, by also considering the tax factors, the investment equation derived in 
equation (31) can be written as a function of the observable q ratio as 
1)[(1- k- uz)p 1 ]. (1- u)p (35) 
Here, the ratio in the ftrst parenthesis denotes the average Q ratio. In the numerator 
of this ratio, G represents the tax savings due to depreciation deductions on existing 
capital which is subtracted from the market value srnce it does not have anything to 
do with new investment decisions. In the denominator of the average Q ratio, the 
replacement cost of capital is simply adjusted for the tax factors that reduce the price 
of the investment good. These factors are, respectively, the investment tax credit and 
the tax savings due to depreciation deductions on the installed capital. The second 
parenthesis denotes the additional tax factors and the relative price effect. Summer 
(1981) estimates the investment equation for US annual data which is based on the q 
theory of investment both with and without tax effects. He shows econometric 
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evidence that the inclusion of tax factors greatly improves the empirical 
performance of the investment equation. Based on the tax adjusted q theory of 
investment, Salinger and Surruners (1983) examine the impacts of alternative tax 
reforms on the investment decisions of individual manufacturing firms for the 
United States. They report that the empirical results are promising. Using UK firm-
level panel data for manufacturing companies for the period 1968-1986, Blundell et 
al. (1992) report that although it is small, the tax-adjusted observable Q ratio has a 
statistically significant effect on the investment decisions of the firms under 
investigation. 
By employing three different models of investment based on the real net rate of 
return, the rate of return over cost and the flexible capital stock adjustment, 
Feldstein (1982) presents econometric evidence on the effect of tax incentives in the 
US for the period 1953-1978. He concludes that the interaction of existing tax rules 
and inflation has contributed substantially to the decline of business investment after 
the late 1960s. In a survey study, Morgan (1992) examines the effects of the 1984 
tax reform on the investment decisions of large UK firms. The main changes in the 
UK corporate tax system for the period 1984-1987 were the reduction of the 
corporate tax rate from 50% to 35%, and the abolishment of 100% and 75% first 
year allowance, respectively, for investment in plant and machinery, and industrial 
buildings. The survey results reveal that the level of the investment of most firms 
would be insensitive to tax policy changes. However, of the tax regime sensitive 
cases, more fmns would have cut back their investment than would have increased. 
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In another study, based on the Euler equation that they derive, Auerbach and Hassett 
(1992) report that taxes have played an independent role in affecting US investment 
behaviour of the postwar period (1954-1988), particularly for investment in 
machinery and equipment. Unlike the other models based on the optimising 
behaviour of rational agents, their model provides direct estimates of the effects of 
tax policy variables on investment and permits a structural interpretation. 
Because of the explicit inter-temporal nature of the q theory of investment, there 
have also been various studies about the dynamic effects of tax policies on 
investment decisions by employing q models. In a partial equilibrium framework, 
using the q theory approach, Abel (1982) analyses the dynamic effects of permanent 
and temporary tax policies on investment by graphical analysis. A partial 
equilibrium system consisting of two differential equations in capital and marginal q 
can be constructed from the inter-temporal optirnising firms including the convex 
costs of adjustment. Abel shows that a temporary investment tax credit need not be 
more expansionary .than a permanent investment tax credit. By using numerical. __ 
methods, Summers (1981) simulates the dynamic effects of changes in inflation, 
investment tax credit, corporate tax rate and personal taxation on investment for the 
US economy. Similarly, Dinenis (1989) analyses the dynamic effects of various tax 
policies for the UK economy by using numerical methods. 
In a general equilibrium context, Judd (1985) examines the short-run dynamic 
impacts of current and future changes in fiscal policies on investment for the US 
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economy by applying analytical techniques. Although in a partial equilibrium 
framework, again by using analytical techniques, Auerbach (1989) simulates the 
effects of various tax reforms introduced in the US. Auerbach's model also includes 
the adjustment costs and has a richer tax characterisation than Judd (1985). 
Effects of Personal Taxation and Inflation 
Besides the corporate tax effects, personal taxes can also affect the investment 
behaviour of firms. Under the classical system, shareholders are subject to double 
taxation. This is because, the company pays the corporate tax for its profits, and the 
shareholders pay the personal tax for the distributed profits. Under the imputation 
system, the shareholders receive credit for the corporate tax paid by the company on 
distributed profits. Personal taxation can be sununarised by the ratio 
p = _:_(1_-_d"--) /-'(_I -_m-=-) 
(1- g) (36) 
where d, g, and m denote the personal tax rate on dividend, tax rate on capital gains, 
and the imputation rate. Under the classical system, m is equal to zero. This ratio 
determines the relative tax advantage of dividends against retained earnings. If 
P = 1, then investors will receive the same after-tax return from the distributions and 
retained earnings. If P > 1, the after-tax value of dividends become greater than the 
after-tax capital gain. In this case the shareholders should prefer dividends. In a 
dynamic setting, King (1974) analyses the effect of personal taxation together with 
corporate taxation on both the firm's choice of fmancial policy and investment 
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decisions. He shows that the optimal financial policy of firms will be influenced by 
personal taxation. This in turn alters the Jorgenson's cost of capital, hence the flrm's 
investment decision. 
When a firm or a project is financed by a mixture of debt and equity, the valuation 
formula or the cost of capital measure should consider both corporate and personal 
taxation. For instance, Ashton (1989) analyses the cost of capital under an 
imputations tax system in a mean-variance equilibrium framework. Taggart (1991) 
gives cost of capital measures under personal and corporate taxation. O'Brien 
(1991) analyses the constant growth model with personal taxation for a one-year 
shareholding period. Recently, Pointon (1996) extends his model to include an 
imputation system, more than a year shaerholding period, and indexation for 
inflation. For empirical findings about the effects of personal taxation on the 
valuation of dividends, see Poterba and Summers (1984), Chui et al. (1992) and the 
studies cited there, for instance. 
Because effective tax rates on corporate distributions vary substantially in the 
postwar period for the UK, the UK data offer more potential for the examination of 
tax effects on investment decisions. Using UK aggregate data for the period 1950-
1980, Poterba and Summers (1983) test the effect personal taxation has on 
investment behaviour in a q theory framework. Their results reject the hypothesis 
that by raising the cost of paying out funds to shareholders, dividend taxes 
encourage investment through retentions. Their findings support that dividend taxes 
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discourage corporate investment. The mam reason for this finding is that 
corporations act as if marginal investment is financed through new equity issues. 
Thus, changes in dividend taxation alter the cost of capital and effect the investment 
behaviour. They argue that their findings suggest the importance of including 
variables reflecting personal taxes in investment specifications. 
Together with tax effects, the effect of inflation on investment behaviour has also 
been considered in the literature. For instance, from the neo-classical theory, if the 
depreciation allowances are based on the nominal historical cost of a piece of 
capital rather than on its replacement cost, an increase in inflation will reduce the 
present value of real depreciation deductions. Obviously, as can be seen from 
equation (33), this would cause an increase in the user cost of capital and, by that 
way, a reduction in the investment. For a discussion of this effect, see Shoven and 
Blow (1975) for instance. 
Additionally, because different capital categories have different durability, 
in the presence of historical cost depreciation, inflation may distort the choice 
between different types of capital. Using a general equilibrium model, Auerbach 
(1979) analyses the effect of inflation on the choice of asset durability. In his 
model, consumption is determined by a proportional savings function. His 
simulation results reveal that higher inflation leads firms to choose more durable 
capital. However, Abel (1981) modifies Auerbach's model by incorporating 
adjustment costs into the model and also by making consumption decisions based 
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on inter-temporal utility maximisation. Abel generalises Auerbach's findings, and 
he shows that depending on the depreciation rate and on the nominal interest rate, an 
increase in the rate of inflation can either decrease or increase the degree of 
durability of capital chosen by firms. 
Depending on the tax codes, inflation may also have some other effects. For 
instance, the taxation of nominal rather than real capital gains can increase the cost 
of equity capital, and the cost of debt may increase or decrease depending on 
whether the loss from paying taxes on the inflation premium at the personal level 
exceeds the gain from its deductibility at the corporate level. For a discussion of 
these and some other points, see Feldstein (1976), Auerbach (1983), and Coulthurst 
(1986) for instance. 
Section 1.5 The Effects of Financing Conditions 
In the previous sections it was implicitly assumed that financing and investment 
decisions of firms were independent, which is also in line with Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). Modigliani and Miller propose that in the absence of taxes and under 
the assumptions of competitive markets and perfect information, real economic 
decisions would depend on factors such as consumer tastes, input and technology, 
but not on how the ownership claims to the firm happen to be labelled. Later, 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest that there will be a corporate tax advantage 
to debt fmancing, but this will also increase the probability of bankruptcy. In 
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another study, Stiglitz (1972) argues that firms will choose an optimal debt policy 
trading off the tax benefits of issuing debt with the related bankruptcy costs. 
Bankruptcy costs include costs such as legal fees and lost profits during 
reorganisation or liquidation. Nevertheless, Miller (1977) argues that the 
bankruptcy costs are trivial, and the corporate tax advantage will be offset by the 
personal tax disadvantage. In another study, for firms facing future return 
uncertainty, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) consider the tax loss effect and show 
that the optimum leverage can exist since the firm will be trading off the tax 
deductibility benefits with the cost of losing tax write-offs if it is in a no tax 
paying situation. With regard to the bankruptcy argument, Webb (1983) shows 
that one can restore the Modigliani-Miller argument by allowing for personal 
bankruptcy costs that offset the bankruptcy costs at the corporate level. However, 
apart from the arbitrage and trade off arguments, as discussed in Myers (1984), the 
capital structure decisions of firms can also depend on the ranking of the cost of 
funds, resulting from informational and incentive problems. For more discussion 
and empirical tests of capital structure decisions, see Mackie-Mason (1990), 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Bennett and Donnely (1993) for instance. 
As implied by the pecking order argument of Myers (1984), the investment 
decisions of firms might well be affected by the availability of funds to finance their 
investments. Some firms might be credit rationed. This happens if they cannot 
obtain external funding while apparently identical ones can, although they are 
willing to pay exactly the same rate. Additionally, firms might be subject to an 
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external fmancing prerniwn which is the cost between external and internal 
financing. As Gertler (1988) points out in an excellent survey, although there are 
various studies about the effects of fmancial factors on real economic activity in the 
early literature such as Fisher (1933), Gurley and Shaw (1955), and Kuh and Meyer 
(1957), they are mostly overshadowed by influential studies like the irrelevance 
result of Modigliani and Miller (1958), and the monetarist views of Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963). However in the 1970s, the effects of financial factors on real 
economic decisions comes back to the agenda with some path breaking studies, 
especially in the field of information economics and corporate fmance. 
Incentive and Informational Problems 
In an important theoretical study, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the result 
of Modigliani and Miller will disappear under imperfect information. Unlike 
Modigliani-Miller's irrelevance result, according to Jensen and Meckling, different 
ownership of capital in a furn will create different problems and additional costs. 
For instance, suppose that agents, or in other terms insiders or managers and 
directors, own a small percentage of equity. If the firm is highly leveraged, and if 
the bankruptcy penalties are not too discouraging, then the agents may take 
excessively risky actions or undertake risky investment to increase their part from 
the retention of profits. In the case of a failure, most of the burden will be on debt 
holders. Alternatively, if the firm is mostly equity fmanced, then asswning that the 
principals, or in other terms outside shareholders, carmot monitor their actions 
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effectively, agents may also have less incentive to achieve better since their portion 
of profit will be quite low. 
Jensen and Meckling point out that under imperfect information, both the external 
debt and external equity finance would create inevitable agency costs for ftrms. 
Agency costs, which may occur because of incentive problems due to external 
finance, will create an additional financing premium. Hence, in terms of investment, 
from the firms which operate with identical opportunities, the ones with more 
internal fmance funding facilities may be more willing to undertake investments. In 
another influential study, Myers (1977) shows that a high level of indebtedness can 
even restrict a value maximising firm to raise funds for financing positive net 
present value projects, since the return from such an investment project will be 
distributed to debt holders. 
In a seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) discusses the consequences of asymmetric 
information in a used car market. In his example, in a typical situation the seller 
knows more about the car that is being sold than the potential buyer does. Akerlof 
argues that in a market like that, even if the price falls, the demand might not 
increase because with existing prices the owners of the good quality cars will not be 
willing to sell their cars. In that case, buyers may realise that the lower the prevailing 
prices, only the owners of the bad quality cars, in other terms the owners of 
'lemons', will be willing to sell their cars. Moreover, in the extreme case the 
market collapses. 
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Similar to Akerlofs basic idea that the lemons problem might distort economic 
behaviour, Jaffee and Russell (1976) explain how unobserved differences in the 
quality of loan demanders can induce credit rationing in their analyses of the 
economics ofbank lending to consumers. Also, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explicitly 
show that informational asymmetries in loan markets may create credit rationing 
where the market denies funding borrowers with characteristics identical to the 
firms that receive loans. In their model, the borrower knows the expected return and 
risk of his project, whereas the lender knows only the expected return and risk of the 
average project in the economy. If the lender raises the interest rate, his revenue 
does not necessarily increase since the probability of default may also rise with 
rising interest rates. Thus, the lender may fmd it in his interest to lower the interest 
rate to the point where his receipts are maximised, and this may not be the market 
clearing rate. In this case, demand for credit would exceed the supply and credit 
rationing will occur. There are two basic reasons why the relationship between the 
interest rate and the expected receipts of the lender may not be monotonic. First, as 
the interest rate increases, debt may increase the risk-taking of borrowers, which is 
known as the adverse incentive effect. Second, as the interest rate rises it will affect 
safer borrowers who anticipate they will always repay the loan more than it does the 
riskier borrowers. Hence, safer borrowers may even drop out of the market and this 
is known as the adverse selection effect. 
The idea of asymmetric information was also applied to the problem of equity 
finance by Meyers and Majluf (1984). In their model, external investors cannot 
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distinguish the differences between good and bad firms because of informational 
problems. Thus, they demand a premium to purchase the shares of relatively good 
firms to offset the losses that will arise from funding the lemons. This, in turn, will 
raise the cost of equity fmance and increase the importance of internal funding as a 
determinant of investment. Also, in his pecking order theory, Myers (1984) 
discusses that firms will first prefer cheaper internally generated funds, and then 
debt, and fmally equity financing. 
Under different financial regimes, Hayashi (1985) theoretically analyses a value 
maximising firm in which the financial and investment decisions are determined 
simultaneously. He shows that if the profit-investment ratio is small, the firm 
chooses to finance a constant fraction of new investment by debt and the rest by 
retention. Alternatively, if the profit-investment ratio is large, then the firm finances 
a constant fraction of new investment by debt and the rest from new equity issues. 
In the model, only in these two regimes a relation between the Q ratio and 
investment can be derived, and in any other regime the relation disappears. 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism and Aggregate Investment 
As discussed earlier, the neo-classical theory of investment relies on an ad hoc 
adjustment mechanism. Although the model considers the durability of capital, it 
suffers from the expectations problem. Thus, it is difficult to interpret the 
estimated coefficients since the distributed lags might be representing either the 
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expectations or the delivery lags. On the other hand, as discussed in section 1.3, 
although the q model is theoretically consistent, empirically it has performed less 
successfully. Moreover, the traditional models easily outperform these two 
structural models. Many economists started to question the smoothly functioning 
financial system presumption and to reconsider the possible links between the 
financial system and real activity. The idea of capital market friction also became 
an important issue in the analysis of transmission of monetary policy. The external 
financing premium, the difference in cost between internally generated and 
externally raised funds and/or credit rationing, could help to explain the weak cost 
of capital and Q ratio effects on aggregate investment behaviour. However, this 
was not an alternative to the classical monetary transmission mechanism, but an 
enhancement channel. 
Two aspects have received extensive attention, namely, the borrowers' balance-
sheet channel and the bank lending channel. The balance-sheet channel argues that 
the external financing premium depends on the quality of borrowers' balance-
sheets which can affect their investment behaviour. The balance-sheet channel 
arises because monetary policy changes affect not only the interest rates but also 
the borrowers' fmancial positions. For example, an increase in interest rates will 
increase the interest expenses, reduce the net cash flows, and weaken the financial 
condition of a firm. Moreover, it will also cause a reduction in the asset prices and 
shrink the value of the firm's collateral. In the literature, this phenomenon has 
been called the financial accelerator which can amplify and propagate business 
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cycles. For instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop a simple neo-classical 
model in which business downturns weaken borrowers' net worth, increase the 
agency costs of fmancing real capital investments, and amplify downturns. 
The bank lending channel focuses on the effects of monetary policy changes on 
the supply of loans by depository institutions. According to this view, if the loans 
and non-bank sources are imperfect substitutes for firms on the liability side of 
their balance-sheets, and if the monetary authorities can affect the supply of inter-
mediated loans by the banking system, then a lending channel which enhances the 
role of the conventional money channel can exist. Thus, the price of the loans and 
the quantity of the loans can change, and affect the investment behaviour. For 
instance, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) suggest that tighter monetary policy 
can reduce loan supply which leads to a shift in firms' mix of external fmancing, 
and affect investment spending. For an extensive review of the channels of 
monetary transmission mechanism, see for instance, Bernanke (1993), Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). 
Financing Conditions and Empirical Evidence 
To test the significance of incentive and informational problems, most studies 
incorporate the cash flow or the financial leverage ratios into the standard Q 
model or the Euler equation version with adjustment cost. As Schiantarelli (1996) 
points out in an extensive survey, the basic strategy in these studies is to test the 
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importance of these imperfections for different groups of firms based on criteria 
such as size, age, dividend behaviour, ownership structure and association with 
banks. 
For instance, to test whether fmancial constraints and cash flow conditions affect 
investment behaviour, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) split US 
manufacturing firms according to their dividend behaviour. They estimate 
investment functions based on the Q theory approach as depicted in equation (31) 
by also using the cash flow-capital ratio as an additional variable. They report that 
financial effects are generally important for investment in all firms. However, 
their fmdings consistently indicate a substantially greater sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow and liquidity in firms that have low-dividend payout ratios, which are 
generally smaller, younger and faster growing ones. They also report that the 
statistically and economically significant difference between the groups is robust 
to a wide variety of model specification and estimation teclmiques. The firms that 
pay lower dividends represent the group of firms that exhaust nearly all of their 
cheaper internal funds and show more sensitivity to fluctuations in their cash flow 
than the firms that pay high dividends. Also, liquidity has a greater effect on 
investment for low-dividend ones. 
In a study of Japanese firms, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) investigate 
the effects of informational problems on investment behaviour. In Japan, many 
firms are affiliated with industry groups, and firms within a particular group also 
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benefit from the close relationship of the group's main bank which may help to 
overcome informational problems. Using manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange over the period 1965-1986, Hoshi et al. perform regressions in a 
Q model framework. Their results indicate that investment spending of 
independent firms are more sensitive to changes in internal cash flow and liquidity 
compared to the group members that have easier access to external funds. In 
another study, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) use US panel data to examine the 
role of cash flow by controlling the investment decisions by average Q and sales 
ratios. Their results confirm the role of internal fmance for the research and 
development expenditures of small firms in high-tech industries. Using Canadian 
firm-level panel data, Chirinko and Schaller (1995) test the significance of 
liquidity effects in a Q theory framework. They sort the sample according to 
maturity, managerial ownership structure and group membership criteria. Their 
results indicate significant informational problems for firms belonging to young, 
less concentrated ownership and independent groups. 
For US manufacturing sector panel data, Whited (1992) uses the Euler equation 
method, and based on the test of over-identifying restrictions, shows that the 
liquidity constraint appears to be stronger for highly leveraged firms as well as for 
firms that do not participate in the corporate bond markets. The Euler equation 
method is based on the elimination of the shadow value of capital by substitution 
in the discrete version of the value maxirnisation problem in which the Q ratio 
disappears. The borrowing condition can be incorporated into the Euler equation 
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as an exogenous constraint. Then, after parameterising the constraint by using the 
appropriate cash flow or liquidity instruments, the validity of the constraint can be 
tested by the orthogonality condition of the instruments and the error terms of the 
econometric equation. Using the Euler equation method, for US panel data, 
Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) produce similar results for low-dividend 
payout firms. 
Similarly, based on the Euler equation method, Bond and Meghir (1994) 
empirically investigate the effect of financial policy on the investment behaviour 
for UK manufacturing sector panel data over the period 1974-1986, also 
employing the hierarchy of finance approach. Their results suggest that there are 
significant differences in the investment behaviour of subsamples of firms 
allocated according to their financial policies. Exclusion of firms with low-
dividend payments significantly reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
and other financial variables. 
Although a strong relation between investment spending and cash flow does exist, it 
is actually difficult to establish the causal connection between them since shocks to 
profitability affect both cash flow and investment. For instance, a survey by Pike 
(1983) covering large UK companies reveals that many firms impose internal 
constraints due to lower profitability prospects and uncertainty. To overcome such a 
criticism, Calomiris and Hubbard (1993) use the tax policy changes in the US in 
1936-1937 as a natural experiment. More specifically, they analyse how firm-level 
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investment reacted to changes in the taxation of undistributed profits relative to 
dividends. Holding constant investment opportunities, if external and internal funds 
are perfect substitutes, investment should not react to tax changes. However, they 
find that the investment of high surtax-margin firms was sensitive to shifts in cash 
flow. To investigate the effect of internal finance on investment behaviour in a more 
evident circumstance, Lamont (1997) focuses on the 1986 oil price shock and the 
effects of it on the non-oil investment of oil companies for US data. By 
concentrating on segments of the firms, Larnont shows the importance of oil cash 
flows for non-oil investment spending. 
Based on informational problems, cash flow and liquidity effects are well 
documented. On the other hand, as explained above, the theoretical developments 
in the corporate fmance side concentrate on incentive problems and possible 
relations between financial capital structure and investment decisions. However, 
unlike the empirical evidence for cash flow and liquidity variables, the empirical 
studies for the leverage effects are not numerous, and they fmd controversial 
results. 
For instance, by employing US firm-level panel data for the period 1968-1987, 
Cantor (1990) investigates the effect of leverage on investment and employment 
patterns of firms with different levels of leverage ratios. The motivation behind the 
study is that a highly leveraged firm with a small average cash flow will cut its 
investment sharply when it suffers from lack of internal funds. On the other hand, it 
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will be more apt to increase investment when its revenues and internal funds 
improve. Therefore, the highly leveraged finn is likely to exhibit greater variability 
in its investment over time. Confirming his argument, Cantor's results show a 
significant positive relation between the leverage and volatility of investment and 
employment of highly leveraged firms. Using a Q model, a Euler equation model 
and an unrestricted investment model, Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994) 
test possible effects of agency costs of debt on investment decisions for Italian 
panel data. Their results provide support for a significant departure from the 
hypothesis of perfect substitutability between internal and external sources. 
On the other side, in another US panel data study, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) 
investigate the sources of financing hierarchy for investment. They test the effect 
of asymmetric information, agency costs, and transaction costs. For that purpose, 
they run reduced-form regressions including the Q ratio, sales ratio, and cash 
flow ratio. For the asymmetric information effect, they split the sample according 
to maturity and insider trading criteria. For the transaction cost effect they use the 
size variable. To capture the agency cost of equity effect, they use information 
about the outstanding common stock controlled by the firm's board of directors. 
They find significant effects of asymmetric information and insignificant results 
for the agency costs and transaction costs effects. Using US firm-level data and 
after performing reduced-form regressions, Kopcke and Howrey (1994) report that 
their fmdings do not support the view that companies with more debt invest less 
than their sales and cash flows would warrant. In another study, using US firm-
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level panel data and after performing reduced-form regressions, Lang et al. (1996) 
find that fmancial leverage negatively affects growth of the firms. However, this 
result only holds for the firms with low Tobin's Q ratio. Optimal capital structure 
theories based on managerial discretion as in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) 
show that leverage reduces the agency costs of managerial discretion by reason of 
the control role of debt. Thus, Lang et al. argue that the negative relation between 
leverage and investment could be due to the restrictive role of debt on managers 
of firms with poor investment opportunities. 
Also, studies employing aggregate data have conflicting results. For instance, 
Chirinko (1987) incorporates the equation of motion of debt as a constraint into the 
maxirnisation problem to derive a relation between investment and Q ratio in the 
presence of an endogenous fmancial policy. Chirinko shows that the relation 
between the average Q and the marginal q would be different under the endogenous 
financial policy case, and he translates his theoretical model into an econometric 
equation to estimate the structural parameters. He uses US aggregate data for the 
period 1950-1981 to test the model. However, he reports that problems such as high 
adjustment cost, serially correlated residuals and low explanatory power still remain. 
On the other hand, using an error correction model and cointegration technique, 
Cuthbertson and Gasparro (1995) obtain satisfactory results for UK aggregate 
data when they include the capital gearing ratio in their investment model in a Q 
theory framework. 
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Section 1.6 Uncertainty and Irreversibility 
In sections 1.2 and 1.3, the models were developed under the certainty assumption, 
and the investment was implicitly supposed to be reversible. Of course, one cannot 
expect a firm's investment behaviour to be the same in a certain and uncertain 
environment, or for a reversible and irreversible investment decision. There are two 
dimensions of the uncertainty effect on investment at a firm-level analysis. The first 
one is based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which compares a firm 
with the other firms and emphasises covariances in the returns between the 
investment projects. According to the CAPM, risk and return are positively related, 
and the risk of an investment project is measured by the covariance of the return of 
this project with the market as a whole. As the covariance increases, the required 
rate of return increases, creating a negative investment-uncertainty relationship. 
Along this argument, Craine (1989) shows this negative relation in a general 
equilibrium where an increase in exogenous risk reallocates resources towards less 
risky business. 
The second line of argument looks at the furn in isolation from the other furns and 
concentrates on the variances while studying the uncertainty effect on investment 
decisions. For the variance effect argument, there are mainly two opposing 
theoretical views. The former view hypothesises a positive relation, whereas the 
other considers the irreversibility of investment decisions and predicts a negative 
effect. This section will concentrate on the second line of argument, and the 
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neglected role of uncertainty and irreversibility on investment decisions will be 
considered. The two opposing views will be discussed and contrasted theoretically. 
Empirical studies will also be presented, including the aggregate-level ones. 
Theoretical Aspects 
In a theoretical study, Hartrnan (1972) studies the effect of increased uncertainty in 
future output prices, wage rates, and investment costs on the quantity of investment 
undertaken by a risk-neutral competitive firm. In his model, the fmn maximises the 
expected value of the sum of discounted cash flows independently of its fmancial 
activities under increasing marginal costs of investment and produces under the 
Cobb-Douglas technology. Hartrnan concludes that current investment does not 
decrease with increased uncertainty in future output prices and wage rates, and it is 
invariant to increased uncertainty in future investment costs. 
For a risk-neutral value maximising competitive fmn, Abel (1983) explicitly shows 
that increased uncertainty in the price of output causes an increase in the investment 
undertaken by the firm, which also verifies Hartrnan's earlier conclusion. In Abel's 
model, the price of the output jJ follows a random walk as 
(37) 
where, 0' is the variance parameter and dz is a Wiener process with zero mean and 
unit variance. The firm produces under Cobb-Douglas technology as 
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F(K L ) - CL a K(l-a) 
I' I - t I (38) 
and F, L, K and a denote the output, labour, capital stock and the labour elasticity 
of output. The term C denotes the scale parameter, and for simplicity it will be 
assumed one. When the firm undertakes investment, it incurs convex costs of 
adjustment. The firm's revenue and the cost of investment at timet can be written as 
(39) 
A(l,)=ri/ (40) 
where w is the wage rate, y is a positive coefficient and fJ > 1. For simplicity, the 
price of capital is assumed one. The firm maximises its value at time t as 
"' 
V(K" p,) = max E, f[n(Ku, Lu)- ritJexp( -r(u- t))du (41) 
I 
subject to the usual capital accumulation equation 
(42) 
where r and t5 represent the constant required rate of return and the economic 
depreciation rate. From the no-arbitrage condition, the total return expected by the 
owners of the firm can be written as 
(43) 
which consists of the cash flow and the expected capital gain. Using Ita's Lemma 
and equations (37) and (42), the expected capital gain can be expressed as 
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Note that, while deriving equation (44) we make use of E(dz)=(dti=(dz)(dt)=O. 
Hence, the optimality condition in equation (43) can be rearranged by substituting 
the result in equations (44) as 
From here, the optimal rate of investment can be obtained as 
(OV I 8K) = yf3It1 (46) 
which says that the marginal cost of investment equals the marginal value. Under 
the model assumptions, also by using the optirnality condition for labour, the 
marginal revenue product of capital equals the average revenue product of capital: 
iJn(K,L)I OK=;r(K,L)I K. (47) 
Finally, by using equations (46) and (47), equation (45) can be rewritten as 
Equations (46) and (48) can be expressed as a non-linear second-order partial 
differential equation. In Abel (1983), the explicit solution to this problem is given as 
It =(xI fJy)li(P-ll (49) 
where 
&loK 
x = r + 8- 0.5aa2 I (1 - a i · 
The marginal revenue product of capital can be expressed as 
iJn I iJK = (1- a)pLa K-a. (50) 
Moreover, using the optirnality condition of labour from equation (45) and the 
production function given in equation (38), the labour can be expressed as 
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L = (w I pa) 11(a-1) K. (51) 
Using equation (51), equation (50) can be rewritten as 
iJ7r I OK= (1- a)(a I wt1<1-a) pll(l-a). (52) 
The important thing in equation (52) is that the marginal revenue product of capital 
becomes a convex function of the output price. Moreover, it is also independent of 
the capital stock. Observe from equation ( 49) that this makes x and also the 
investment decision at time t independent of the capital stock. Abel also shows that 
the expected marginal revenue product of capital can be written as 
Considering that the capital depreciates, using the result in equation (53), the 
expected present value of marginal revenue products of capital can be expressed as 
~ ~ fE1 (07r I OK)u exp(-(r + o)(u-t))du= fo- a)(a I w)a1<1-al p~l(l-a) 
I I 
exp[-(r +8)(u- t)+ 0.5aa 2 (u- t)l (1- a) 2 ]du (54) 
which is obviously equal to the term x given in equation ( 49). Thus, investment 
becomes the function of the present value of expected marginal revenue products of 
capital. As can be seen, when the marginal revenue product of capital is a strictly 
convex function of the price of output, increased uncertainty about the future price 
of output increases the expected future marginal revenue product of capital, and 
hence the term x and investment. 
For the uncertainty effects of the output price and the input costs, the results of both 
Hartman and Abel depend on the assumption that the marginal revenue product of 
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capital is a convex function of the price of output and the input costs. This is 
because, an increase in the variances of the output price and costs also implies an 
increase in the expected present value of marginal revenue product of capital, which 
in turn implies an increase in the optimal rate of investment. Abel (1984, 1985) also 
extends the effects of uncertainty in a stochastic q theory of investment framework. 
In an early study, Arrow (1968) discusses the implications of irreversibility in a 
certain environment. Irreversibility usually arises if the capital employed by a firm is 
industry-specific and/or firm-specific. If a firm can not disinvest, the investment 
decision would be irreversible and the investment expenditures would be sunk costs. 
Unlike a reversible investment decision, the firm should consider the value of not 
undertaking the project. Thus, for an irreversible investment decision, in an 
uncertain environment, the value maximising firm should consider the value in 
waiting since the investment expenditures could be treated as sunk costs once the 
investment is undertaken. Mcdonald and Siege! (1986) analyse the optimal timing of 
investment in an irreversible single project in which both the benefits and costs of 
the project are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. Because the future 
values of the benefits of the investment are unknown, there is an opportunity cost of 
investing today. In their analysis, Mcdonald and Siege! explore the importance of 
the value in waiting to invest. Based on their numerical sirnulations, they conclude 
that timing considerations are quantitatively important. Instead of a discrete project 
as in Mcdonald and Siege!, Pindyck (1988) analyses the effect of irreversibility 
together with uncertainty for incremental investment. In his model, unlike Abel and 
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Hartman, Pindyck ignores the adjustment costs and studies the effects of demand 
uncertainty on investment decisions. In the model, the fmn tries to maximise its 
value and faces a stochastically shifting downward sloping demand curve. 
Investment expenditure involves exercising of an option which represents the 
resources that can be productively invested at any time in the future. The model 
accounts for the value of the lost option as an additional cost of the new investment, 
and uncertainty affects investment decisions through the options that the fmn holds. 
Pip.dyck's results suggest that firms should hold less capacity in markets with 
volatile and unpredictable demand than they would if future demands were 
predictable or investments were reversible. For irreversible investment decisions 
under uncertainty, Dixit and Pindyck {1994) demonstrate how to obtain the optimal 
investment rules for a variety of models including discrete and incremental 
investment decisions by using dynamic programming techniques and contingent 
claim analyses. 
In his model, Pindyck shows that increases in uncertainty will lower the investment 
whereas Hartman and Abel conclude the opposite. In Abel and Hartman, 
investment is reversible and the adjustment costs are symmetric. This means that the 
opportunity cost of investing is zero in terms of Pindyck's model. On the other 
hand, the irreversible investment model of Pindyck implies a kind of asymmetric 
adjustment costs case when compared to the models of Abel and Hartman since the 
investment expenditures would be sunk costs. To investigate the opposite findings 
of the cited studies and some others about the sign of the investment-uncertainty 
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relationship, Caballero (1991) develops a model with a cost of adjustment 
mechanism general enough to consider both the symmetric-convexity and the 
irreversibility as special cases. However, he also points out the hidden role of the 
assumptions about the markets and the production functions in these studies. Abel 
and Hartman mainly assume perfect competition and a constant returns-to-scale type 
of production function, whereas the irreversibility literature assumes either 
imperfect competition or decreasing returns-to-scale, or both. In Caballero's general 
model, risk-neutrality is assumed and the fmn's technology is described by a 
homogenous Cobb-Douglas production function as 
(55) 
where rp represents the returns-to-scale parameter. Equation (55) reduces to the 
constant returns-to-scale case as in equation (38) when rp is one. The firms faces a 
general demand function as 
(56) 
where Z is a stochastic term described by a lognormal random-walk process as 
zl = zt-l exp(s/) (57) 
and sis normally distributed with variance d and mean -0.5d. In equation (56), the 
term 1.f1 represents the markup coefficient which is greater than or equal to one. Note 
that for a perfectly competitive firm, since the elasticity of demand is infinite, the 
markup coefficient will take the value of l. Thus, the price process described by 
equations (56) and (57) reduces to a similar case given in equation (37). When 1.f1 is 
1, the fmns faces a flat demand curve which corresponds to the perfectly 
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competitive firm case as in Abel and Hartman. On the other hand, the bigger the 
markup coefficient, the smaller the elasticity of demand will be, which will increase 
the degree of imperfect competition and will create a stochastically shifting 
downward sloping demand function as in Pindyck (1988). Under these conditions, 
the profit function can be written as 
(58) 
where 
and 
1 and u = ( 1 - a )tp I If/ <_ 1. TJ = > 1, ,.. 1- (acp I If!) 1- (acp I If/) 
Observe that, under the asswnptions of perfect competition, the constant returns-to-
scale case and C = 1, the terms TJ = 11(1-a) and f.J = 1, thus the profit function given 
in equation (58) will be exactly the same as in Abel (1983) which can be confirmed 
from the marginal revenue product of capital given in equation (52). Otherwise it 
corresponds to a similar case described in Pindyck (1988). Finally, the cost of 
investment is given by the general function 
(59) 
where YJ and Y2 are two nonnegative parameters and fJ :?:1, and price of capital is 
asswned as unity. This general case corresponds to the symmetric-convex 
adjustment cost case of Abel (1983) when fJ > 1 and the two parameters YJ and Y2 
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are positive. On the other hand, when fJ =I, YJ = 0 and y2 = co, the irreversibility case 
ofPindyck (1988) is obtained. 
For the perfect competition case under constant returns-to-scale type of technology, 
Caballero derives the investment equation at time t = I considering a two-period 
optimisation problem as 
1/(ft-1) ) 1/(ft-1) X-1 I-X 
11 = (--) for 11 > 0, and 11 = (-- for 11 < 0 
r1fJ r2fJ 
(60) 
where 
X= hZt" (I+ exp(O.S77(77 -I)a 2 ). 
Clearly, investment is independent of the capital stock, and the positive investment-
uncertainty relationship is obtained as in Abel and Hartman. However, as can be 
seen from equation (60), the asymmetry of the adjustment costs has nothing to do 
with the sign of the response of investment to increases in uncertainty. The results 
of Abel and Hartman continue to hold in the presence of asymmetric adjustment 
costs which typically correspond to the effect of the irreversibility argument in the 
literature. When there is imperfect competition, there is no closed-form solution for 
the investment function. Thus, Caballero ( l99I) makes some numerical simulations 
for the imperfect competition case. Retaining the symmetric adjustment costs but 
varying the degree of imperfect competition via the markup parameter creates a 
negative investment-uncertainty relationship. Also, once the degree of competition 
is significantly imperfect, the investment-uncertainty relationship becomes more 
negative as the asymmetry of the adjustment costs, in other words the irreversibility 
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effect, becomes larger. Moreover, creating decreasing returns-to-scale by altering 
the returns-to-scale parameter rp makes a negative investment-uncertainty 
relationship more likely. 
Overall, the results of Caballero (1991) show the importance of the effects of the 
asswnptions of the two theoretical views on the sign of the investment-uncertainty 
relationship. Despite the ineffectiveness of asymmetric adjustment costs, or in other 
words the irreversibility for the results of Abel and Hartman, the imperfect 
competition and the decreasing returns-to-scale asswnptions tend to change the sign 
of the investment uncertainty relationship towards negativity. 
For a risk-neutral competitive value maximising furn under the constant returns-to-
scale asswnption, Abel and Eberly (1994) show the effect of price uncertainty on 
investment decisions in a q theory framework also considering the potential 
irreversibility of investment. They define an augmented adjustment cost function 
which includes the traditional convex adjustment costs as well as the possibility of 
fixed costs and the possibility that the resale price of capital goods is below their 
purchase price, and may even be zero. According to their model, investment is a 
non-decreasing function of the variance of the price for a given price level, which is 
consistent with the line of argwnent in Caballero (1991). Moreover, Abel and 
Eberly (1997) present a parametric example of a competitive furn with a constant 
returns-to-scale production function facing convex costs of adjustment and 
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irreversibility and provide closed-fonn solutions for the investment and the value of 
the firm in a q theory framework. 
When uncertainty increases, better and worse news become more likely. However, 
it is optimal to increase the protection from costly irreversibility by investing less 
since the resale price of capital is likely to be less than the current acquisition price. 
When the firm invests, it loses the option to invest in the future which increases 
the cost of investment and reduces the firm's incentive to invest. On the other hand, 
the firm can continue to invest later, but the future acquisition price of the capital 
may be higher than its current acquisition price, making expandability costly. In 
other words, waiting to invest will have an additional cost if the price of capital is 
expected to increase. Thus, the two options will have opposite effects on the 
investment decision of the flnn. In a theoretical work, Abel, Dixit, Eberly and 
Pindyck (1996) study the interactions of these two options to determine the net 
effect of expandability and reversibility and the net effect of uncertainty on the 
optimal capital stock in a q theory framework. Since the values of both options 
increase with uncertainty and the two options have opposing effects on the incentive 
to invest, they conclude that the net effect of uncertainty will be ambiguous. 
Empirical Studies 
In the literature, only recently have various studies examined uncertainty and 
irreversibility effects on investment decisions empirically. Given the difficulty of 
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obtaining an estimable structural model, most of these studies incorporate some 
form of proxy measures for uncertainty into the traditional investment models, and 
many of them examine the investment-uncertainty relationship at an aggregate level. 
In an early study, Brainard, Shaven and Weiss (1980) investigate the relation 
between investment and uncertainty. They employ firm-level US data for I 87 firms 
and assess the effects of CAPM-based risk measures on investment via average Q. 
They perform cross-section regressions and report both positive and negative 
effects, only some of which are significant. In a more recent study, using US large-
company panel data, Driver et al. (1996) examine the effect of demand uncertainty 
on company investment decisions. They use market share turbulence as a measure 
of demand uncertainty where turbulence is measured as the dispersion in movement 
between a firm's and its two main competitors' market shares. They incorporate 
demand uncertainty into a standard investment equation. Although weak, their 
estimation results show evidence that increased demand uncertainty may reduce the 
incentive to invest. ~oreover, this negative_ relationship_ appears to ~e .!ll~r:.e 
- ----~--·--·-· 
significant in highly-integrated plants where firms have better protection from 
competition. 
Leahy and Whited (1996) examine both the covariance and variance effects using q 
models of investment for US fmn-Ievel panel data. To construct the measures of 
uncertainty, they employ share price returns. Moreover, to examine the two 
opposing theoretical views for the variance effect, they split the sample according to 
the substitutability of labour for capital and the magnitude of the labour-capital ratio 
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because the ability to substitute labour for capital increases the convexity of the 
marginal product of capital, making the positive investment-uncertainty relationship 
more likely. Also, the higher is the labour's share, the greater is the convexity in 
returns induced by varying the firm's labour input. They also split their sample 
according to the low-beta and high-beta firms for the covariance effect because the 
greater the covariance, the greater the beta becomes, making uncertainty less 
desirable since the sensitivity of a firm's investment depends on its beta coefficient 
via the required return. Their results indicate that an increase in uncertainty 
decreases investment primarily through its effect on average Q. Moreover, they find 
no evidence for the covariance effect or for the positive effect by the channel of the 
convexity of the marginal product of capital. 
Using the model developed in Abel and Eberly (1994), Eberly (1997) presents a q 
model of investment considering the irreversibility of investment decisions. In the 
traditional q model, investment becomes a linear function of the q ratio because of 
the symmetric convexity assumption. In this model, fixed, linear and convex (not 
necessarily quadratic) adjustment costs are considered, and investment becomes a 
non-linear function of the q ratio. Using firm-level panel data for 11 countries, 
Eberly (1997) presents evidence that a non-linear form of investment equations 
performs better when compared to the linear case. 
Using aggregate-level data, Caballero and Pindyck (1992) investigate the effect of 
uncertainty on irreversible investment decisions for 20 US manufacturing industries. 
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In the case of a single firm, while analysing the irreversibility effect, the opportunity 
to wait and its value do not depend on the frrm's competitors. However, in the case 
of an industry-wide analysis one needs to consider the possible entry of new 
competitors and/or possible expansion of existing ones. The price cannot be taken as 
exogenous since it becomes an endogenous variable of the industry equilibrium. 
Moreover, the sources of uncertainty at aggregate-level and firm-level should be 
distinguished and the ways they effect investment should be identified. In a 
competitive industry with free entry and constant returns-to-scale technology, 
Caballero and Pindyck (1992) derive an expression for the required return to trigger 
irreversible investment. In the model, although the distribution of the future 
marginal profitability of capital for any single firm is independent of its current 
investment, this distribution depends on industry-wide investment. Idiosyncratic 
shocks affect only an individual firm and do not induce entry and/or expansion. On 
the other hand, positive industry-wide shocks are accompanied by the entry of new 
firms and/or expansion of existing ones placing a limit on the price, whereas 
negative aggregate shocks reduce the market price. Since negative shocks reduce 
profits more than positive shocks increase them, this asymmetry causes a reduction 
in irreversible investment. To test the model, Caballero and Pindyck use the extreme 
values of the marginal profitability of capital as a proxy for the trigger point 
(required return). They present evidence for the positive dependence of these proxy 
measures on the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital, implying an 
indirect negative investment-uncertainty relationship analysed at industry-level. 
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Pindyck and Solimano (1993) employ a similar version of the model developed in 
Caballero and Pindyck (1992). They examine the relationship between aggregate 
investment and volatility across three decades. Their panel regressions for 29 
countries indicate a negative relationship which is in greater magnitude for 
developing countries. Note that in Caballero and Pindyck (1992), as the 
competitiveness of the industry increases, the negative effect of aggregate 
uncertainty also increases on the industry-wide investment level since the entry and 
expansion becomes easier, increasing the asymmetry. To test their hypothesis, 
Ghosal and Loungani (1996) employ data for US manufacturing industries. To 
control the extent of the product market competition, they partition their sample 
according to the seller concentration ratio. In their reduced-form panel regressions, 
they find that the effect of price uncertainty is negative and statistically significant 
for the highly competitive firms. On the other hand, the results for the industries 
with high levels of seller concentration appear to be small and not significantly 
different from zero. 
Using US aggregate data, Ferderer (1993) explores the empirical relationship 
between uncertainty and aggregate investment spending. Unlike other studies, he 
uses the risk premium embedded in the term structure of interest rates to measure 
the uncertainty about interest rates and other macroeconomic variables. He 
concludes that uncertainty has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
investment decisions which is also larger in impact when compared to the cost of 
capital and average Q ratios. In another aggregate-level study, Bell and Campa 
69 
(1997) investigate the effects of three different sources of volatility on irreversible 
investment decisions of the chemical industries in the United States and Europe. 
They report a significant negative effect of exchange rate volatility in Europe, but 
they find that input prices and product demand volatility do not appear to have a 
significant effect in any of the regions. 
Section 1. 7 Concluding Remarks 
The early investment models rely purely on reduced form relations and ad hoc 
adjustment mechanisms. With its forward-looking nature, the neo-classical model 
takes a structural approach to consider the durability of capital and derives the long-
run desired level of capital from the value maximisation problem. However, it still 
relies on an ad hoc stock adjustment mechanism by which the adjustment costs (and 
by implication, the investment rate) are introduced implicitly. Moreover, the desired 
capital stock is derived without regard to this auxiliary adjustment mechanism. 
From an empirical perspective, it is difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients 
since the distributed lags might be representing either the expectations or the 
delivery lags. To justify the adjustment mechanism of the neo-classical model, 
various studies apply a particular dynamic adjustment mechanism by introducing the 
concept of adjustment costs in the criterion functional. Although this new 
formulation provides a rigorous basis for the optimal rate of capital accumulation 
and rationalises the flexible accelerator models of investment behaviour, the 
measurement of expectations still has important problems. More recent 
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contributions point out the equivalence between the neo-classical model and the q 
theory of investment. In fact, the neo-classical model and the q model constitute the 
demand and supply side of the same theory, respectively. The neo-classical model 
looks at the factors behind the market value by analysing the net revenue of the firm, 
whereas the q approach uses the market value directly in determining the optimal 
investment. Moreover, the q theory is in principle free of the expectations problem 
since the market value purports to summarise all the relevant information and 
expectations. Although the q model of investment is theoretically very appealing, 
empirically it has performed less successfully. Moreover, the traditional models 
easily outperform these two structural models. 
The more general the investment models, the less realistic they become. It is 
difficult to construct and estimate consistent structural models, but, the structural 
approach is to be preferred over the ad hoc models. To make the structural 
investment models more realistic and to improve their empirical performance, the 
theoretical literature considers the other determinants of investment such as 
taxation, financing conditions and uncertainty and irreversibility. It is also widely 
recognised that the differences between groups of firms require different modeling 
requirements. On the empirical side, with the growing availability of data, more 
studies employ panel data to consider the heterogeneity of firms and to overcome 
aggregation problems. 
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The tax environment is one of the most important aspects influencing the 
incentive to invest. Empirical studies show strong evidence that taxes, both at the 
corporate and personal levels, play a significant role in determining investment 
decisions. Apart from the effects of actual rates of taxes themselves, the structure 
of corporate and personal taxation has complex effects on investment through the 
other determinants of investment, such as cost of capital and inflation. Future 
studies should give more emphasis to these complex effects through factors such 
as uncertainty, .irreversibility, capital structure and incentive and informational 
·problems: indeed cost of capital, capital structure, uncertainty and irreversibility 
issues are addressed in chapters 2 and 3. 
Both the neo-classical and q models of investment assume perfect capital markets 
and rely on the irrelevance result of Modigliani and Miller. However, many 
theoretical studies posit that informational and incentive problems may create 
frictions in financial capital markets. The imperfect substitution between 
internally generated and externally raised funds owing to imperfect information 
and incentive problems can create an external financing premium. Moreover, 
some firms might be under financial distress, or even credit rationed. Thus, 
financing conditions may have important implications for investment decisions 
and proxies for this factor may also improve the empirical performance of the 
employed models. Studies testing the possible relationship between investment 
and fmancing decisions document cash flow and liquidity effects. However, 
existing empirical studies about the effects of incentive problems on investment 
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decisions are not nwnerous and produce controversial results. Given the 
inconclusive nature of the empirical studies and their contradictory results, the 
role of incentive problems certainly deserves further investigation and more 
empirical studies. These issues are addressed in chapters 4 and 5. 
Theoretical studies incorporated the effect of uncertainty into the standard neo-
classical and q models of investment. However, two opposing theoretical views 
exist as to the effect of uncertainty. The first view hypothesises a positive relation, 
whereas the other considers the irreversibility of investment decisions and predicts a 
negative effect. Extended theoretical works suggest that the sign of the investment-
uncertainty relationship depends on the degree of competition faced by a firm 
and/or the asswnption about the technology that the firm adopts. The technology 
to estimate stochastic structural models which treat time and uncertainty explicitly 
is developing. However, computational requirements still remain formidable. 
Given the problems of estimating stochastic structural models, empirical studies 
use reduced form investment equations and incorporate proxy measures of 
uncertainty in an ad hoc way. However, the existing empirical studies are limited 
in nwnber and none of them consider the joint impacts of market structure while 
investigating the sign of this relationship. Thus, further empirical studies are 
required in this field to consider the role of the market structure and other 
asswnptions embedded in the models. In chapter 6, we make an in depth 
investigation of these issues by using the UK firm-level panel data, 
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In the rest of the thesis, using large-company panel data for the major European 
countries, we study the effects of corporate taxation, financing conditions, and 
uncertainty on investment decisions, and aim to make a contribution to the literature 
on the topics that exhibit controversy. In chapters 2 and 3, while studying the 
corporate tax effects on investment behaviour, we analyse particularly the possible 
consequences of the harmonisation of corporate tax rules in Europe. In the literature 
there have been arguments over this issue. Some authors argue in favour of 
harmonised tax rules mainly to prevent discrimination and distortion in investment 
decisions. On the other hand, some authors defend independent tax systems for 
national demand management and stabilisation. The ultimate aim in chapters 2 and 
3 is to study whether the asymmetric effects of corporate taxes on investment 
decisions can be eliminated by harmonising the corporate tax rules. 
Empirical studies employ static measures such as effective tax rates and cost of 
capital to compare the effects of the tax systems. In chapter 2, instead of employing 
such a methodology, we conduct a dynamic tax simulation analysis based on the q 
theory approach. This study is the first of its type applied in this context. Instead of 
revealing the existing tax burden as in static measures case, the dynamic analysis 
has the advantage of studying the responses of investment to tax policy changes. We 
derive some original formulae so as to decompose the asymmetric tax policy 
responses of investment owing to corporate tax rules and other variables related to 
investment decisions. This approach lets us measure the true effects of the 
differences in the corporate tax systems on the observed asymmetries. In the 
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modeling process, for simplicity, we assume quadratic adjustment costs, perfect 
certainty, costless reversibility and perfect fmancial and output markets. Even 
though analysing the tax effects quantitatively will be limited by the model 
assumptions and the explanatory power of the model, the analytical derivations and 
the resulting simulations allow us to make qualitative inferences concerning the tax 
harmonisation issues. For quantitatively more realistic results, the model 
assumptions can be relaxed and the empirical fit of the investment model can be 
improved. 
To complement the tax analysis of chapter 2, we conduct another tax study in 
chapter 3 by employing domestic effective tax rates. Previous studies employing 
effective tax rates and cost of capital measures for corporate tax analyses ignore the 
irreversibility of investment decisions. Using real option pricing techniques, we take 
a more realistic approach and develop an original model to incorporate the income 
uncertainty and irreversibility risk jointly into the traditional effective tax rate 
measures. As in chapter 2, we analyse the consequences of harmonising the tax rules 
and compare the observed asymmetries both for the certainty/uncertainty and 
irreversibility cases. In the modeling process, for ease ofanalysis, we assume a fully 
irreversible case, consider only the income uncertainty, and ignore the possible tax 
carry-forwards and carry-backs oflosses. For a more realistic case, the model can be 
altered to overcome some of these restrictive assumptions. 
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In chapter 4, based on the Euler equation approach, a model is developed to test 
the possible effects of agency/financial distress costs of debt by incorporating an 
external fmancing premium via the debt-capital ratio. Unlike cash flow and 
liquidity effects, this explicit incorporation provides a sharper test of the 
hypothesised relationship. Additionally, the model also considers the possible role 
of working capital as a source of finance to smooth the agency/fmancial distress 
costs of debt. The Euler equation approach adapted in chapter 4 eliminates the 
unobservable shadow value of capital via substitution. In chapter 5, we extend the 
analysis in a q theory framework and derive an original alternative model in which 
the unobservable shadow value of capital is converted to an observable one, again 
by considering the possible agency/financial distress costs of debt. For simplicity, 
the models employed in chapters 4 and 5 assume a tax-free world and costless 
reversibility. To analyse the effects of financing conditions on investment together 
with tax effects and irreversibility, the tax parameters can be incorporated into the 
models and linear costs can be introduced to capture the irreversibility effect. 
In chapter 6, we examine the sign of the short-run investment-uncertainty 
relationship for large UK industrial companies. Unlike previous empirical 
studies, we consider the market structure via product specialisation criteria. Given 
the difficulty of obtaining an estimable structural model, the uncertainty effect is 
incorporated into the investment equations in an ad hoc fashion. However, to test 
the robustness of the obtained results, two different investment models and two 
different measures of uncertainty are employed. As an extension to this study, 
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other reduced form models, uncertainty measures and splitting criteria can be 
considered. In the final chapter, the effects of inflation uncertainty, exchange rate 
uncertainty and interest rate uncertainty on aggregate investment are investigated 
in a vector autoregressive framework. Using impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition techniques we try to measure the sign and magnitude of 
these relationships in a reduced form model. We also investigate the uncertainty 
effects separately on different categories of investment which the previous 
literature has not considered before. This aggregate-level study can be further 
applied at the industry level to understand the role of different industry structures 
for the observed relationships. 
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CHAPTER2 
A DYNAMIC TAX SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
Section 2.1 Introduction 
There have been many studies about the effects of corporate taxation on 
investment decisions in the literature both at theoretical and empirical levels. 
Generally, as a corporate tax policy, a government alters the corporate tax rate, 
changes the depreciation rules for capital allowances, and gives or cancels 
investment tax credits. Obviously, the structure of the tax system is only one of 
the determinants of capital formation, but it is an important fiscal tool held by a 
government which may well have distortionary effects on investment behaviour, 
since an increase in the tax burden will lower the available resources to a firm and 
also increase the costs. Conversely, corporate tax policy may induce investment. 
Many studies investigating the effects of taxation on capital investment apply 
static measures like effective tax rates or an implied cost of capital to observe the 
existing tax burden. This will be addressed in the next chapter. As a first aim, this 
chapter will deal with the measurement of the dynamic effects of various 
permanent corporate tax policy changes. The analyses will concentrate on three 
major European countries in Europe: the United Kingdom, France and Germany. 
Additionally, the Netherlands will be included in the analyses for comparative 
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purposes. We will try to address questions like: how permanent changes in 
corporate tax rules affect the investment behaviour in a dynamic equilibrium; 
whether these tax effects are important or negligible; whether corporate tax policy 
changes the investment behaviour; which policy is more important for which 
country. For the theoretical framework, based on the q theory, a partial 
equilibrium model is derived. Partial equilibrium means that the multiplier effects 
of increased investment as well as the interest rate effects of variations in the 
government deficit are ignored. Although the q theory approach will limit the 
analyses to the extent that it explains the investment behaviour, it considers the 
role of expectations via the market value approach. Also, dynamic policy effects 
can be studied when the q theory is linked to the augmented neo-classical model. 
While doing so, a simplified numerical procedure is applied to study the effects of 
permanent changes in three corporate tax rules, namely the corporate tax rate, the 
depreciation rules and the investment tax credit. 
As a second aim, particular attention will be given to the tax competition 
argument via inter-country comparisons. This has important implications for the 
European Union because centralisation of fiscal policies, including the 
harmonisation of tax systems in Europe, has been an important argument. Moving 
towards a more united Europe, especially with the introduction of a Monetary 
Union and a European Central Bank, monetary authority will be abandoned at the 
national level. Hence, the use of domestic monetary policy and exchange rate 
adjustments for the purpose of national demand management and economic 
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stabilisation will be lost. Of course, the cost of forsaking monetary independence 
in a monetary union will depend on how much the monetary policy is capable of 
facilitating adjustments, and whether the shocks to the member economies are 
symmetric or asymmetric. If the monetary policy is effective for adjusting 
macroeconomic imbalances, and if the member economies are giving asymmetric 
responses to shocks, then the costs will be greater. For instance, in their study, 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) find that symmetric shocks are larger than asymmetric 
shocks in Europe. However, Bayowni and Eichengreen (1992) show that, unlike 
demand shocks, asymmetry in the supply side shocks may be highly pervasive in 
Europe. When the monetary policy is lost, factor mobility and price flexibility are 
vital mechanisms for adjustments in a monetary union. However, it is often 
discussed that the adjustments will probably be more difficult with limited factor 
mobility and price rigidity in Europe when compared to the United States. This 
implies that fiscal policies may need to work harder and more effectively to cover 
the effects of possible asymmetric shocks and for economic adjustments. For that 
reason, some authors such as Masson and Melitz (1990) and Hughes-Hallet and 
Scott (1993) argue in favour of fiscal autonomy and independent tax systems, or 
some in favour of fiscal coinsurance. On the other hand, some authors such as 
Emerson ( 1990) and Goodhart ( 1992, 1994) argue in favour of a fiscal co-
ordination. Mainly, two reasons can be cited for this view. The first and more 
important one is the international spill-over effects. Since one country's fiscal 
policies can affect the output and employment in other member countries, the co-
ordination of fiscal policies can eliminate these spill-over effects. The second one 
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is that the differences in tax systems can cause discrimination and distortion in 
investment decisions which will also result in inefficient location decisions. For 
an extensive review of the fiscal implications of the European Monetary Union in 
conjunction with other issues, see for instance, Eichengreen (1993), Kenen (1995) 
and Obstfeld(1997). 
Table 2.1 Corporate Tax Rules(%) 
UK FR BD NL 
Corporate Tax Rates 33 33.33 45 35 
Plant & Machinery 25(RB) 20(SL) 30(RB) 12.5(SL) 
Industrial Buildings 4(SL) 5(SL) 4(SL) 2.5(SL) 
Commercial Buildings 4(SL) 4(SL) 2.5(SL) 
Source: Yearly corporate tax guides of Price Waterhouse and Ems! & Young. 
1. RB stands for the reducing-balance method and SL represents the straight-line 
method. 
2. In Germany, companies also pay municipal tax on top of the 45%, which is 
deductible from the corporate tax rate. This rate varies approximately between I 0%-
20%, and with an average of 15% it increases the tax rate to 53.25%. 
3. In France and the Netherlands, the reducing-balance method is also allowed for plant 
and machinery. In table 2.1, 20% is the generally accepted rate for France, and, 
12.5% is the average ofS-10 years for the Netherlands. Also, straight-line method is 
allowed for plant and machinery in Germany. 
4. For France, 4% for commercial buildings, and for the Netherlands, 2.5% for 
industrial and commercial buildings are the average rates for typical ranges. 
To reveal the burden and the diversities of the corporate tax systems, table 2.1 
presents the corporate tax rules for the period 1995-1996 for four European 
countries: the UK, France, Gennany and the Netherlands. As can be seen, there is 
a considerable difference between the corporate tax rate in Gennany and the other 
three countries as well as differences between the countries for the treatment of 
the depreciation allowances, especially for the plant and machinery. Although the 
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tax rules for the depreciation allowances vary, the values in table 2.1 represent the 
most commonly used average values. 
Ruding (1992), the report by the European Community (EC) committee of 
independent experts, investigates the harmonisation of business taxation within 
the EC. The committee reports that there are important differences in the 
corporate tax systems and bases as well as in tax rates. However, there is also 
evidence of tax convergence through a general trend of a statutory tax rate cut. 
Among the findings of the committee is that the tax differences between the 
member states seriously affect locational decisions and also that withholding taxes 
causes bias against inward and outward investment. On the other hand, Devereux 
and Pearson (1995), for instance, analyse the impact of potential harmonisation of 
the taxation of income from capital on production efficiency in the EU. The 
production efficiency holds if total output cannot be reallocated across projects 
in such a way as to reduce total cost. Their simulation results suggest that, 
although there are important differences between the tax systems, neither 
harmonising all the corporate tax rates nor harmonising all the tax bases in the EU 
would lead to a significant convergence of costs of capital for transnational 
investment. Hence, there would only be a small gain in terms of production 
efficiency. 
As mentioned above, as a second aim, this chapter will deal with the tax 
competition argument side of the fiscal implications of the EMU for the domestic 
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investment case. However, instead of comparing static measures such as the cost 
of capital or some sort of effective tax rates, we will make comparisons between 
the dynamic responses of different economies to various tax policy changes. By 
that way, instead of a simple measure, the responses of investment decisions can 
be measured. Furthermore, the nature of the model also requires econometric 
estimation of the investment equations. We will address issues like: whether the 
economies are responding to policy shocks in very different ways; whether there is 
a wide dispersion; if there is, then whether the asymmetry can be reduced by 
harmonising the tax rules; and whether the overall asymmetry is due to factors 
other than the corporate tax rules. 
Starting from neo-classical intertemporal optimisation, and augmented with the 
external adjustment costs of capital, the next section of this chapter presents the 
basic investment behaviour of the fmn. Section 2.3 converts the results of section 
2.2 to a partial equilibrium system in capital and marginal q. Also, the resulting 
system and the beneficial tax policy effects are analysed graphically for qualitative 
demonstration purposes. Section 2.4 converts the unobservable marginal q to an 
observable variable for the estimation of the required adjustment cost parameters 
and for the sirnulations. Section 2.5 derives the permanent tax policy effects to 
make the desired sirnulations. Section 2.6 describes the data and the econometric 
methodology. Section 2.7 presents the estimation and the simulation results, and 
the final section concludes. 
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Section 2.2 The Basic Model 
In the model, the behaviour of all firms will be represented by a single 
representative firm. The representative firm will be a competitive one that seeks 
to maximise the market value of its equity. For simplicity, personal taxation will 
be ignored. Also, irreversibility and issues like capital market imperfections are 
not dealt with in the model. Hence, by solving the value of the firm forward, the 
objective of the firm can be written in continuous time as 
"" 
V(O) = max f e -rt [Div(t)- NE(t)}:it (I) 
0 
where the terms r, Div, and NE denote the after-tax nominal discount factor, the 
dividend and the new share issue, respectively. The firm maximises its market 
value under two constraints. The fust one is the motion of capital stock as 
K=l-JK (2) 
where K, I and J represent the capital stock, the investment and the depreciation 
rate, respectively. Throughout the chapter, the dot on the variables will denote the 
time derivative. Also, the time subscript will be suppressed for notational 
purposes. The factors of production are assumed perfectly variable except the 
capital stock; the firm will incur adjustment costs when it is changing its capital 
stock. 
The second constraint is for the definition of dividend which also includes the 
adjustment costs of capital. The profit function is defined as 
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n(K,N) = pF(K,N)- wN 
and the dividend as 
Div =[(1- c)n(K,N)-(1-k- fJ)p 1 (I+ A(I,K))- INT + B+ NE+ G]. (3) 
Here, n(K,N) represents the profit function, F(K,N) the linearly homogenous 
production function, A(I,K) the strictly convex external adjustment cost function, 
p the price of good, N the variable input vector, w the nominal price of variable 
input vector, c the corporate tax rate, k the investment tax credit, fJ the present 
value of tax savings due to depreciation deductions for a unit of investment, INT 
the after-tax nominal interest payments on existing debt, B the net borrowings, l 
the price of investment good. The final term G represents the value of writing 
down allowances on past investments that can be claimed in the present period. In 
equation (3), net changes in working capital and intangible assets are ignored for 
simplicity, however, they will be considered later. 
By ignoring the linear term, the quadratic external adjustment cost function can be 
introduced as 
<I>(/ )2 A(I,K)=2 K -a K (4) 
where <I> is the adjustment cost parameter and a is the normal rate of investment. 
As the fmn increases its investment, it has to pay additional adjustment costs. The 
function is assumed to be twice differentiable where first-order and second-order 
partial derivatives of function A with respect to investment are both greater than 
zero. 
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Letting A. be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the first constraint, and after 
inserting equation (3) into equation (1), the firm's maximisation problem can be 
rewritten as 
"' 
V(O)= max fe-'1[(1-c)n(K,N)-(1- k- fJ)p 1 (I+ A(I,K))- JNT + B 
0 
+ A.(I- oK- k)]dt + G(O). (S) 
In equation (5), the fmal term G(O) denotes the present value of writing down 
allowances on past investments that can be claimed in the present and future 
periods. The first-order conditions for investment and capital yield 
and 
1 1 oA A.= (1- k- fJ)p + (1- k- fJ)p -
.8! 
· 8tr 8A 
A.= (r + o)A.- (1- c) ilK+ (1- k- fJ)p 1 ilK. 
(6) 
(7) 
Equation (6) simply shows that the shadow value of capital will be equal to the 
tax adjusted price of investment good plus the additional adjustment cost. 
Equation (7) is the equation of motion of the constraint which describes the 
evolution of the shadow price of capital. For ease of interpretation, solving this 
differential equation yields 
"' A.= J[(l- c)& I ilK- (1- k- fJ)p 18A I IJK.)]e -(r+o)t dt. (8) 
0 
This shows the equality between the present discounted value of the marginal 
revenue attributable to a unit of installed capital and the shadow price of capital. 
The fust term in the integral is the additional revenue which comes from the 
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additional unit of capital. Since the adjustment costs depend on the size of 
investment to capital, the second term denotes the savings in the adjustment costs 
as the effect of an additional unit of installed capital. 
Section 2.3 The K-q Plane 
For a more fruitful analysis, the shadow value of capital can be eliminated and the 
above results can be transformed into a system of differential equations in capital 
and marginal q. First of all, the frrst-order condition for investment in equation (6) 
can be rearranged as 
oA A 
ill (1- k- fl)pl 
1. (9) 
If the ftrm's investment-capital ratio does not exceed the normal rate of 
investment, then in equilibrium, the shadow value of capital equals the cost. As 
can be seen from equation (8), the shadow value of capital would be the sum of 
expected marginal profitability of newly installed capital which is discounted by 
the cost of capital. From here, marginal q can be defined as 
A 
-----=q. (I 0) 
(l-k-fl)p 1 
For simplicity, assummg that the normal rate of investment equals the 
depreciation rate, the marginality conditions of investment and capital for the 
adjustment cost function can be written as 
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(11) 
oA = _ <l>((K + t5) 2 _ t5 2J 
oK 2 K . (12) 
By using equations (10) and (11), equation (9) can be modified as 
0 1 
K=-K(q-1) <l> 0 (13) 
Also from equation (10): 
(14) 
and 
i =in/ (1- k- /3) + qj/ (1- k- /3)- qp 1 (k + /J) 0 (15) 
Hence, by using equations (14) and (15), and after making the necessary 
adjustments, the first-order condition for capital in equation (7) can be rewritten 
as 
. I k . 
q=(r+li)q- (1-c) mr + oA -qL+q ( +/3) (16) 
(1-k-fJ)pl ilK ilK PI (l-k-{3) 
Equations (13) and (16), which are the modified versions of equations (6) and (7), 
describe the equations of motions for the capital and the marginal q, and they also 
form a non-linear system of differential equations. By inserting equation (13) into 
equation (12), and that result into equation (16), the system can be rewritten more 
explicitly and in a compact form as 
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. 1 
K=K(q-I)-
<1> 
. 1 ( 1)2 ( j/ (k+/J)) (1-c) i3tr s: q=-- q- + r--+ q- +u. 
2<1> PI (1- k- /3) (1- k- /])pi OK 
(17) 
(18) 
At the steady-state, since K = q = p1 = k = /J = 0, and q = 1, equation (17) 
indicates that the only investment is to recover the depreciation, and equation ( 18) 
shows the equality between the marginal product of capital and the cost of capital 
in equilibriwn. Because of non-linearity, the equations of motion cannot be solved 
explicitly. However this partial equilibriwn model can be linearised around its 
steady-state to investigate the local behaviour of K and marginal q close to that 
fixed point. By using the frrst-order Taylor expansion, the linearised system can 
be written in the matrix form as 
K. 1 
_!_K 
-(q -1) 
<l> ss <l> ss 
ss 
K-K 
= 
- (1- c)ifltr 1 jJ 1 k+/J "' 
(1- k- f3)p 1 OK 2 --(q -1)+r--+ q <l> ss I (1 - k - /]) 
ss p q-q ss 
If the terms jJ 1 , k and /J are ignored, the system reduces to an autonomous form 
and the eigenvalues of the system will be 
'Pt,2 = r + r 2 _ 4 iitr K.s(l- c) 
8IG/ <1>(1 - k - f3)p 1 
(19) 
o2tr 
If we asswne that --2 < 0, then there will be two real distinct eigenvalues as 8Kss 
('Pt < 0 < 'P2). This, in turn, implies that the fixed point is a saddle point and there 
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Figure 2.1 The Phase Diagram 
q 
K 
Figure 2.2 Permanent Unanticipated Beneficial Tax Policy Effects 
q 
K 
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is a unique equilibrium path which converges towards the equilibrium point in the 
K-q plane. Figure 2.1 shows the phase diagram of the system, and the demarcation 
curves illustrate the subset of points in the K-q plane where the capital and the 
marginal q are stationary. The unique equilibrium path SS1 converges towards the 
equilibrium point E1 which represents the steady state of the entire system. 
Because the fixed point is a saddle point, all other paths diverge from the 
equilibrium point. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the effects ofpermanent unanticipated beneficial tax policy 
effects on the steady-state capital stock. As can be seen from equations ( 17) and 
( 18), when the system is in equilibrium, a beneficial tax policy such as reducing 
the corporate tax rate or giving an investment tax credit does not affect the locus 
of the k1 = 0. However, it causes a shift in the q1 = 0 locus to the right. The 
steady state of the system moves from the equilibrium point El to the new 
equilibrium point E2. The new equilibrium path is denoted by SS2. The path of the 
adjustment towards the new steady state is composed of an initial jump from El to 
the point J, and a movement from J to the new equilibrium point E2 over time. 
With the permanent beneficial tax policy shock, the initial intertemporal 
equilibrium capital stock K1 * increases to the new steady-state level K2*. 
Similarly, adverse shocks would create a reduction in the steady-state level of the 
capital stock. 
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To obtain quantitative measures for the tax policy effects, the system described by 
equations (17) and (18) can be linearised around certain tax policy variables and 
then solved to derive exact analytical results as in Auerbach (1989). However, this 
approach requires actual parameter values for the production function. 
Alternatively, numerical simulation methods can be applied, as in Summers 
(1981) and Dinenis (1989), to analyse various policy effects. Numerically, to 
simulate various tax policy effects on investment, the entire system should be 
estimated simultaneously since the paths of the variables will be affected by these 
policy effects. First of all, one needs to assume that the system is already at a 
steady state at the current time and then reaches another one after making 
perturbations in certain policy parameters. For a proper calculation, the system can 
be solved as a two-point boundary problem by a shooting algorithm such as the 
one developed in Lipton et al. (1982). By this way, the adjustment paths of the 
variables can be traced between the two steady states. 
However, as Summers and Salinger (1983) show, since the response of 
investment to changes in q is not large, one can also directly calculate the policy 
effects on q and then on investment, where the approximation error involved in 
this procedure would be very small. In terms of figure 2.2, instead of calculating 
the policy shock effect with a movement over time towards the new equilibrium, 
we will be calculating the initial change in q and then the response in K to this 
change. Following Summer and Salinger, this simplified numerical procedure 
will be employed, and some easily interpretable analytical results will be derived 
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which will also include fundamental variables such as the profitability of capital 
and the capital structure together with the tax parameters. This derivation will 
• 
enable us to analyse the policy effects from the firm's point of view. More 
importantly, while comparing asymmetries due to shocks in tax policy variables 
between different major countries of Europe, we will be able to decompose the 
effects of shocks on investment into tax effects and other related variables. This 
will enable us to analyse the importance of the differences in corporate tax 
systems on the effects of these shocks. However, first we need to set up the 
relation between investment and the fundamental variables, in other words, set up 
the relation between marginal q and average Q which will also be employed to 
estimate the required adjustment cost parameters. 
Section 2.4 Marginal q and Average Q 
Following Hayashi (1982), and assuming in a restrictive way that both the 
production function and the adjustment cost function are linearly homogenous in 
their related variables, the external adjustment cost function can be expressed by 
the Euler's theorem as 
(20) 
The perfect competition and the linearly homogenous production function 
assumptions also allow the marginal net revenue product of capital to be written 
as the average net revenue product of capital: 
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OK K 
Next, the time derivative of the term }J(e -rt can be written as 
d I . . I 
-(}J(e-r ) = (}.]( + }.](- r}J()e-r 
dt 
From equations (2), (6) and (7) we have 
k=I-oK 
oA 
A.= (I+ Of )(1- k- fJ)pi 
. cm 1 oA A.= (r + o)A. -(1-c)- +(1- k- fl)p -. 
OK oK 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
Inserting (20), (21), (23), (24) and (25) into the right-hand side of(22) and making 
the necessary adjustments gives 
~(}J(e-'1 )= -[(1- c)tr(K,N) -(1- k- f3)p 1 (I+ A(J,K))]e-rt. (26) 
dt 
Integrating both sides of (26) from zero to infinity and adjusting yields 
"' 
A.(O)K(O)= j[e-'1 (1-c)tr(K,N)-(1- k- f3)p 1 (I+ A(I,K))]dt. (27) 
0 
While obtaining equation (27), the transversality condition lim }J(e -rt = 0 IS 
/-'>00 
imposed. From equation (5), we have 
"' 
V(O)= Je-'1[(1- c)tr(K,N)- (1- k- f3)p 1 (I+ A(I,K))]dt 
0 
<X> 
+ Je-'1 [-INT + B]dt + G(O). 
0 
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(28) 
The right-hand side of equation (27) can be expressed in terms of equation (28) as 
00 
V(O)- G(O) + f e -rt [INT- B]dt. 
0 
(29) 
Also, it is possible to proxy the last term in equation (29) by the stock of debt at 
the beginning of the period as 
00 
D(O) = f e-rt [INT- B]dt (30) 
0 
where D denotes the stock of debt. With these in hand, multiplying equation (27) 
by 11(1-k-fJ)/K(O) yields 
A.(O) V(O) + D(O)- G(O) 
= (31) 
(1- k- f3)p 1 (1- k- f3)p 1 K(O) 
Equation (31) shows the equality of marginal q defined in equation (I 0) and the 
average Q . Addition of the stock of debt D in the numerator of the Q ratio arises 
because, together with the equity capital, it is the stock of debt that is used to 
finance the asset side. However, note that the market value of equity and debt 
does not only reflect the value of capital, but the value of all assets. To consider 
the role of the other assets, one can add their replacement value to the 
denominator or simply subtract them from the numerator. The present value of 
writing down allowances on past investments is not related to the new capital, and 
the subtraction of the term G(O) in the numerator reflects this fact. Finally, by 
using equations ( 4) and (9), and the result derived in equation (31 ), the relation 
between investment and the observable average Q can also be expressed as 
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_!_ = + _!_(V(O) + D(O)- G(O) -l). 
K a <I> (1- k- f3)p 1 K(O) (32) 
The simplicity of the investment function comes from the assumption that the 
average Q is assumed to capture all the information relevant to investment 
decisions via the market value. Moreover, the model is not subject to a direct 
rational expectation criticism since the model parameters a and <I> are 
technological parameters. 
Section 2.5 Tax Policy Effects 
In the previous section, the equality of marginal q and average Q was derived 
under some assumptions. As can be seen from equation (31 ), the problem of 
calculating the tax effects comes from the difficulty of calculating the policy 
effects on the market value. For this purpose, it will be assumed that the expected 
future growth of the furn will not be affected by policy changes and variables such 
as the discount rate and prices remain stable. 
Hence, using equations (28), (29) and (30), Q can also be written in terms of the 
model variables as 
00 
Je-r1 [(1- c)rr(K,N)-(1- k- f3)p 1 (I+ A(J,K))]dt 
Q=~o ______________________________ _ 
(1- k- f3)p 1 K(O) 
(33) 
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To ensure that the role of the tax deductibility of interest payments is not over-
weighted, by ignoring the personal taxation and introducing an exogenous risk 
premium, we express the discount factor r as 
r = (1- c)(!- w)ro + wrE (34) 
where w, rD, rE, respectively, represent the ratio of equity in the composition of 
fmance, the cost of debt and the cost of equity. Also the present value of tax 
savings for depreciation deductions for a unit of investment can be rewritten in a 
separate form as f3 = ce, where (} represents the present value of depreciation 
deductions for a unit of investment. More formally, 8can be presented as 
(35) 
where C(x) denotes the depreciation deduction for an asset of age x, and n denotes 
the risk-free discount rate. In equation (35), it is implicitly assumed that there are 
no tax losses and there is a sufficiency of profits in the future against which to 
offset the tax depreciation amounts. 
As an exogenous tax policy, we assume that the government alters the corporate 
tax rate, changes depreciation rules for capital allowances and gives or cancels 
investment tax credits. For instance, as can be easily seen from equation (33), the 
effect of a corporate tax cut on Q comes from four different sources. The first one 
is a positive effect which increases the after-tax profits, but the other three sources 
have negative effects. Firstly, the cut of the corporate tax rate reduces the market 
value because of the reduction in the tax savings due to depreciation deductions of 
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new investments. It also causes a reduction in the market value via the increment 
in the cost of capital since the interest payments are tax deductible. The fmal 
negative effect comes from the replacement cost of capital, again because of the 
reduction in tax savings of depreciation deductions as can be seen from the 
denominator in equation (33). The adjustment cost function can simply be ignored 
by assuming that the investment-capital ratio equals the normal rate of investment 
at the steady state. Hence, denoting the constant expected future growth rate as g, 
the effect of a corporate tax rate cut of !le on Q can be written as 
(l-c+!lc)7r-(1-k-cB+!lcB)p 1 I (l-c)7r-(1-k-cB)p 1 I 
(1-c+!lc)(1-w)rD+ wrE- g !lQl!.c = _ __,_ _ ____:_::....___::_ __ ....:::..._ 
(l-k-cB+!lcB)p 1 K 
(1-c)(l-w)rv+wr£- g 
(l-k-cB)p 1 K 
(36) 
Doing the necessary adjustments, the overall impact of the effect of a corporate 
tax rate reduction on investment can be presented in a compact form as 
( (1-c+!lc) _ (1-c) ~ 
PI I!lc(1-w)rv+'(l-k-cB+!lcB) (r- g)- (I-k-cB) (r- g)) 
<D(r- g)(r- g)p1 K (37) 
where r = (1- c + !lc)(l- w)rD + wrE. The right-hand side of equation (37) 
reveals that the overall impact on investment of a reduction in the corporate tax 
rate depends on the magnitude of the change of the corporate tax rate, the level of 
the corporate tax rate, the composition of the cost of capital, depreciation rules, 
growth rate, investment tax credit, existing depreciation rules, cost of debt and 
equity, investment capital ratio, profit capital ratio, and the magnitude of the 
adjustment cost parameter which smoothes the response of the investment to this 
policy effect. 
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Unlike the corporate tax rate cut, the effect of increasing the present value of 
depreciation deductions and the effect of increasing the investment tax credit has 
two positive effects on Q, as can be seen from equation (33). The first effect 
comes from the reduction of the cost of new investment goods, which increases 
the market value. The second effect is the reduction in the replacement value of 
the capital. In a similar fashion, the effects of increasing the present value of 
depreciation deductions and giving investment tax credits on Q and on investment 
can respectively be written as 
and 
(1-c)7!-(1-k-cB-c6.B)p 1 I (l-c)7!-(1- k-cB)p 1 I 
(1-c)(l-w)ro+wrE- g 6.Q M = _..:..._____:_::_____:._ _ ______:::~ 
(1-k-cB-c6.B)p 1 K 
(1-c)(l-w)rD+wrE- g 
(1-k-cB)p1 K 
( I) 7!(1- c )c6.(} 
6. K 1!.8 = ~1K((1-c)(l-w)rv+wrE-g)(l-k-cB)(l-k-c{}-c6.B) 
(l-c)7!-(1-k-M-cB)p1 I (1-c)1!-(l-k-c(})p 1 I 
(1-c)(1-w)rv+wrE- g 6.Q = _____c:...__...:...:__:...__ _ ::....._ 
M (1-k-M-cB)p 1 K 
(1-c)(l-w)rD+wrE-g -
(l-k-cB)p 1 K 
( /) 7!(1-c)M /).KAL=-A-/ ----~~------
'-"' <1p K((l-c)(1-w)rv+wrE-g)(1-k-cB)(1-k-M-cB) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
which will be used for simulation purposes. Equations (39) and (41) reveal that 
the overall impacts of these policies on investment depend on the size of the 
policy changes, the average profitability of capital, the magnitude of the 
adjustment cost parameter, capital structure, cost of debt and equity, growth rate, 
level of existing corporate tax rate, depreciation rules and investment tax credit. 
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Section 2.6 Data and Econometric Issues 
To simulate the tax policy effects on investment via equations (37), (39) and (41), 
one must estimate the industry-wide adjustment cost parameters (<D) and growth 
rates (g) and determine the industry-wide present value of depreciation deductions 
for a unit of investment (B), the weights of debt (l-w) and equity (w) in the cost 
of fmance, cost of debt (m) and cost of equity (rE), investment-capital (IlK) and 
profit-capital (rc!lK) ratios, and the necessary tax parameters. Panel data were 
collected for the companies that are gathered under the "general industries" 
classification of Datastream for the period 1991-1995, which constitute the 
majority of the largest industrial companies traded in the stock markets. General 
industries include as sub-industrial sectors: house building and other construction; 
building materials and other merchants; chemicals; diversified industries; 
electronic and electrical equipment; engineering; engineering vehicle components; 
paper, printing and packagif!g; and textiles, cloth}ng and footwear. Althoug_h ~e 
companies are not numerous, they are sufficiently large to represent the aggregate 
levels of the necessary variables, with sales and market values ranging from 
hundreds of millions of pounds to billions of pounds. The number of the 
companies are 82, 38, 76 and 19, respectively, for the UK, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Datastream was also the basic data source for the other macro 
variables such as the stock market indices, interest rates and prices of investment 
goods. The corporate tax rules were obtained from the yearly corporate tax guides 
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of Price Waterhouse and Emst & Young. Below, the construction of the variables 
is described together with Datastream codes in brackets. 
To obtain the required adjustment cost parameters, one must estimate the 
investment equation given in (32) in section 2.4. For that purpose, investment-
capital and Q ratios were calculated for the firm-level panel data. 
Calculation of IlK Ratios 
Investment (p11) is the total new fixed assets [1024 for the UK and 435 for France, 
Germany and the Netherlands]. The replacement cost of capital figures (p1K) 
were not available. Thus, by assuming that the historic cost valuations [330 for the 
UK, France and the Netherlands, and 2005 for Germany] equals the replacement 
cost for the first year, they were calculated from the perpetual inventory formula 
as 
p 1 (t + 1)K(t + 1) = p 1 (t + 1)I(t + 1) + (p 1 (t + 1) 1 p 1 (t))(l- o)p1 (t)K(t) .(42) 
The price index (p1) is the implicit price detlator of fixed investment, respectively, 
[UKIPDMNIF], [FRIPDCFME], [BDIPDCAPE] and (NLIPDINV] for the UK, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. However, the economic depreciation rates 
( li) are not necessarily equal to the accounting depreciation rates. Thus, they were 
estimated for a unit of investment, without splitting the data for plant and 
machinery and buildings, to employ in equation ( 42) by solving the system 
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K(t +2) (1-5) 0 
K(t + 3) 
= 
(1- 5)2 (1-5) 
K(t+4) (1- 5)3 (1- 5)2 
K(t + 5) (1-5)4 (1- 5)3 
0 0 
0 0 
(1- 8) 0 
(1- 5)2 (1- 8) 
K(t + 1) 
l(t +2) 
l(t + 3) 
l(t +4) 
l(t + 2) 
l(t + 3) 
+ l(t+4) (43) 
l(t + 5) 
for five years for the firm-level data via Newton-Raphson algorithm through a 
non-linear iterative procedure. The results obtained as percentages with 
heteroscadasticity and first-order autocorrelation robust t-statistics for the four 
countries are 
Parameter UK 
4.67% 
(17.671) 
FR 
4.66% 
(15.470) 
Calculation of Q ratios 
BD 
5.98% 
(16.047) 
NL 
6.34% 
(20.613) 
To obtain the denominator of the Q ratios for each firm in each year, tax-
adjusted replacement value of capital (1-cB)/K figures are required. The 
replacement value figures were calculated as described above. To calculate (1 -cB) 
figures for each firm in each year, the present value of tax savings due to 
depreciation deductions (cB) are required. Furthermore, to calculate (cB) figures, 
the split of investment figures by asset type are required. However, these items 
were not available. Therefore, to obtain investment figures in plant and machinery 
(/!PM) and buildings (/!8L) separately, gross historic values of capital in plant and 
machinery [328], and gross historic values of capital in buildings [327] were 
differenced. However, for Germany, Datastream also did not have the split in 
gross fixed assets. For this purpose, the company reports were obtained for 32 
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companies from Germany by request, and the remainder was proxied by the 
average of this sample for each year. Hence, after assuming that the corporate tax 
rate (c) is equal to the statutory tax rate, and by dropping the time subscripts for 
the variables c, n, and d, the present value of tax savings for the reducing-balance 
method was calculated as 
"' j j-1 
c(}RB = ~)cdfl (1 + n)-l rr (1- d)]. (44) 
j=l i=l i=l 
Here, RB stands for the reducing-balance method, d denotes the accounting 
depreciation rate and n represents the discount factor employed, which is the long-
term government bond yield in each country. Datastream codes for the bond yields 
are [UKMGLTB], [FRNGLTB], [GRMGLTB] and [HOLGLTB], respectively, for 
0 
the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In equation (44), f1 (1- d) was 
i=l 
taken as unity. Similarly, the present value of tax saving for the straight-line 
method was calculated by employing 
(lid) j 
cBsL = ~)cdTJ(l+n)- 1 ] (45) 
j=l i=l 
where SL represents the straight-line method. Consequently, the present value of 
tax savings due to depreciation deductions in each year for each firm was 
calculated from 
(46) 
where, L denotes RB or SL, and 
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Here, 1,1/ represents the ratio of investment in plant and machinery to the total fixed 
investment for each firm in each year. In the UK, investments in commercial 
buildings receive no tax allowances, therefore they should be omitted. The term t; 
in equation ( 46) serves this purpose and denotes the ratio of investment in 
industrial buildings to investment in total buildings, which was assumed 0.65. 
This ratio was taken from Blundell et al. ( 1992). For other countries, this 
parameter was taken as one, because both commercial and industrial buildings 
attract similar tax treatments. 
As mentioned earlier, the market value of equity and debt reflects not only the 
value of fixed capital, but all assets. To consider this, total current assets [376], 
total intangibles [344], total investments including associates [356] and other 
assets [3 59] were also added to the denominator of the Q ratios. 
For the numerator of the Q ratios, in each year for each frrrn, the market value (V) 
is the market value of total equity at the end of the preceding accounting year 
[MV]. Total debt (D) was constructed by adding total current liabilities [389], 
total loan capital [321], minority interests [315], total long-term provisions 
excluding deferred tax [313 ], and total deferred tax [312]. The present value of 
writing down allowances on past investments that can be claimed at the present 
and future periods (G) also needed to be calculated separately for investment in 
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plant and machinery machinery (/lpu), and for investment in buildings (/IaL). By 
denoting the sample starting date ass and dropping the time subscripts fore, nand 
d for ease of exposition, the present value of tax savings on investment made 
before date t for the reducing-balance method for each firm in each year was 
calculated as 
G';a, 1 = cp; I';' (I+ n)-(1-J) d(1- d)(l-s-l) + cp;+i 1_;:1 (I+ n)-(1-s-l) d(1- d)(l-s-2) + ..... 
(47) 
where m represents the type of asset. The straight-line method was calculated in a 
similar fashion as 
Gm _ I fm(l )-{I-s) d I fm (1 )-{1-s-1) d I fm (1 )-1 d (48) SL,I -cp, s +n +cps+l s+i +n + ............. +cpl-1 1-1 +n · 
Hence, the present value of tax allowances on investment made before date t in 
each year for each firm was calculated as 
(49) 
where the commercial buildings were again excluded from the calculations for the 
UK companies. Table 2.2 gives summary statistics for the calculated IlK and Q 
ratios for the period 1991-1995 for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Calculation of Other Required V ariab1es 
The industry-wide weights of debt (1-w) in the cost of finance were constructed by 
averaging the gearing ratios [73 I] for the firm-level data from 1991 to 1996 for 
each country. They were found to be 27.88%, 40.48%, 27.3% and 33.55%, 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of IlK and Q Ratios 
UK.-82 Firms Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
IlK 0.1089 0.0873 0.0136 0.9429 
Q 1.3518 0.5306 0.3970 4.3678 
FR-38 Firms Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
IlK 0.1013 0.0471 0.0089 0.301 
Q 0.9398 0.2395 0.5534 2.4805 
BD-76 Firms Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
IlK 0.1016 0.0779 0.0000 0.9584 
Q 0.8316 0.3529 0.2995 2.6409 
NL-19 Firms Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
IlK 0.1211 0.0918 0.0160 0.5869 
Q 0.8463 0.2697 0.4245 1.9542 
respectively, for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. To obtain the 
industry-wide () figures, different tax codes of the countries described in table 2.1 
were used. However, the calculation of ()for a unit of investment again required 
the ratios for the split of investment by asset type, which were not available. Thus, 
using the panel data, the If/ figures as described in equation ( 46) were employed. 
By averaging the five years' firm-level data for the countries, the ratios of 
investment in plant and machinery to total investment were found as 70.7%, 
60.3%, 64.5% and 62.4%, respectively. Hence, the industry-wide () figures were 
calculated by using these ratios and the formulas presented in equations (44), (45) 
and ( 46). They were obtained as 61.5%, 70.4%, 68.1% and 62.4%, respectively. 
Cost of debt (rv) for each country was proxied by the monthly averages of the 
long-term government bond rates for the period 1991-1995. The results obtained 
were 8.02%, 7.11 %, 6.59% and 6.662%, respectively, for the UK, France, 
106 
Germany and the Netherlands. Because the stock market returns fluctuate 
excessively in many periods, a unique risk premium was constructed to calculate 
the cost of equity (rE) for each country. For that purpose, monthly total market 
returns were calculated for the four countries by using Datastream total market 
indices from 1991 to 1996. Then, taking the monthly government long-term bond 
rates as risk-free rates, monthly excess returns were calculated and averaged for 
the four countries to obtain a unique value. The unique risk premia of 4.23% was 
obtained and added to the cost of debt to calculate the cost of equity for each 
country. 
The necessary growth rates were estimated by using the pre-tax profits at the firm-
level data to proxy the necessary growth rates. For that purpose, for each country, 
the system 
7t(t + 1) 
7t(t + 2) 
7t(t + 3) 
7!(/ + 4) 
= 
7!(t)(1 +g) 
n(t)(1 + g) 2 
7!(/)(1 +g)] 
n(t)(1 + g)4 
(50) 
was solved through a non-linear iterative procedure for the period 1991-1995, 
where 1t and g represent the pre-tax profits [154] and the growth rate. Finally, the 
industry-wide investment-capital (IlK) and profit-capital (Tt!/K) ratios were 
obtained by the arithmetic averages of the ftrm-level panel data for each country. 
The obtained IlK ratios were 10.89%, 10.13%, 10.16% and 12.11%. Similarly, the 
obtained profit-capital ratios were 11.09%, 11.46%, 12.22% and 10.21%, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.3 Other Variables Required for Simulation(%) 
IlK 
m/K 
w 
rD 
rE 
(} 
g 
UK FR BD NL 
10.89 10.13 10.16 12.11 
11.09 11.46 12.22 I 0.21 
72.12 59.52 72.70 66.45 
8.02 7.11 6.59 6.62 
12.25 11.34 10.82 10.85 
61.5 70.4 68.1 62.4 
2.97 4.47 2.77 3.54 
(2.564) (3.147) (4.834) (3.994) 
I. The IlK, m/K and w figures were based on the arithmetic average of the entire 
sample for each country. The present value of depreciation deductions were 
calculated according to the depreciation rules described in table 2.1, and by using the 
necessary ratios for investment types given above. -
2. Cost of debt was proxied by the monthly average of the long-term government bond 
rates of the countries for the period 1991-1995. 
3. For the cost of equity, a unique risk premia of 4.23% was added to the cost of debt 
for all countries. 
4. The parentheses show the heteroscadasditicy and first-order autocorrelation robust 
t-statistics for the growth rates g, and they were estimated as described above. 
Table 2.3 presents the required variables other than the tax and adjustment cost 
parameters to simulate the tax policy effects. The next section presents the 
estimation results of the adjustment cost parameters for each country by using the 
calculated investment-capital and Q ratios for panel data. Below, the employed 
basic econometric methodology for data is described. 
Econometric estimation of panel data requires special treatment as it differs from 
time-series and cross-section regressions. For the purpose of estimation, a general 
linear single equation regression can be presented as 
(51) 
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where i=l,2, .... ,N and t=l,2, ... ,T. Here i denotes the cross-section dimension and t 
denotes the time-series dimension. X, y and u represent the K-regressors, the 
regressand and the disturbance tenn, respectively. The parameters (OJ,/3) can be 
estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) method. However, estimation by OLS 
simply ignores the unobservable individual specific effects. OLS can only be 
consistent and efficient if the individual effects are the same across units. For a 
proper treatment of individual effects, by ignoring time effects for simplicity, 
equation (51) can be rewritten as 
(52) 
where, rp represents unobservable individual specific effects and ~u denotes the 
remainder disturbance. One way to estimate equation (52) is by treating individual 
effects as fixed parameters. Equation (52) can be presented in the vector fonn as 
y = OJlNT + XfJ + Fq1J + ~ (53) 
where, y is NT" 1, X is NT" K and lNT is a vector of ones of dimension NT. F If is a 
matrix of individual dummies to estimate the individual effects. More fonnally 
F If = IN® tr, where IN is an identity matrix of dimension N, LT is a vector of ones of 
dimension T and the tenn ® denotes the Kronecker product. One can perfonn OLS 
on equation (53) to get estimates of (OJ, fJ, 17) which is known as the least square 
dummy variable (LSD V) estimation. However, because the F If matrix has a 
dimension of NT" N, estimation would require inversion of a large matrix. Instead 
one can transfonn equation (53) and then carry out the estimation. For the 
transfonnation, equation (53) can be pre-multiplied by matrix D which obtains the 
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deviations from individual means. Formally, D = llfl" - A and the matrix A averages 
the observation across time for each individual, which is A = IN ® Cr. Here 
Cr=Cr IT and Cr is a matrix of ones of dimension T. Both matrices A and Dare 
symmetric idempotent matrices. Hence, pre-multiplying equation (53) by matrix 
Dyields 
Dy=DXfJ+D~ (54) 
since DF, = Dwr = 0. Matrix D simply wipes out the individual effects 
while transforming the other variables, known as the Within Groups estimation. 
From here, after performing OLS, the resulting estimator would 
be Pwtthin = (X'DXf 1 X'Dy with variance var(Pwuhin) = aJ (X'DXf1• Simply, 
this transformation can be presented as 
(55) 
Despite its easy implementation, the Within Groups estimation method suffers from 
a large degrees of freedom loss, and because that it sweeps away the fixed effects, it 
cannot estimate any time-invariant variable effect. 
Alternatively, one can also treat the individual effects in equation (52) as random. 
By this way, the degrees of freedom loss can be recovered and constant term can be 
retained. In this case, 1]1 and ~~~ are distributed identically and independently with 
zero means and variances of a; and a:, respectively. From equation (53), the 
covariance matrix can be written as 
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n = F,.,E(7]7]')F~ + E(~~') (56) 
which reduces to 
(57) 
For the elements of the covariance matrix, for i=j, t=s, the covariance(uu, Ujs) would 
be (a; +a:), and for i=j, t#S, covariance(uit, Ujs) would be a;. As can be seen, 
the estimation is a generalised least square (GLS) estimation. However, it is difficult 
to invert the covariance matrix n with NT* NT dimension. As shown in Baltagi 
(1995), replacing Cr by TCT and I r by (Hr + Cr ), where Hr is (I r - Cr) by 
definition, and after adjusting, equation (57) can be rewritten as 
From the properties of matrix A and D, the general case 
gn =(Ta; +a:t A+(aJt D (59) 
can be derived. Equation (53) can be pre-multiplied by the term (a.;n-112 ). From 
equation (59), this term would be (D+ (a.; I (Ta; +aJ)112 )A), and then OLS can 
be performed on the resulting transformed regression to obtain the GLS estimate of 
the desired parameters. Hence, the transformed y and x can be presented as 
(60) 
and 
- r\-1/2 -Xu=a.;~~ Xu=Xu-({JXu (61) 
Ill 
where tp = 1- (a~ I (T a~ + aJ ) 112 ). To carry out the GLS estimation, one requires 
the estimates of the variance components. Balestra (1973) gives the best 
quadratic unbiased estimates as 
Although equation (62) gives the estimates of variance components to carry out the 
GLS estimates of the desired parameters, one cannot actually observe the true 
disturbances Wt. For that purpose, Wallace and Hussain ( 1969) suggest substituting 
the OLS residuals, whereas Amerniya (1971) shows that using the LSDV residuals 
would result in estimates of variance components that have the same asymptotic 
distribution as that in which the true disturbance is known. 
For the GLS estimation, an important assumption is that the explanatory variables 
Xu and the individual effects 7Ji are not correlated. If this occurs, then' the estimated 
parameters would be biased. In the Within Groups estimation, this problem 
disappears since this method wipes the individual effects. Hausrnan (1978) suggests 
comparing the GLS and Within Groups estimates of the parameters. Under the null 
hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ systematically. Thus, the Hausman 
specification test is based on the difference of the two estimates, and the test statistic 
can be given by 
s'[var(s)r 1s~ X~ (63) 
112 
~ ~ 
where s = PaLS - flwilhin . Here, s represents the estimated difference vector and 
var(s) denotes the estimated variance of the difference vector. The test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as xi under the Ho and K denotes the dimension of the 
slope vector {3. If the test statistic fails to reject the Ho hypothesis that the two 
estimates do not differ systematically, then the random effects are not significantly 
correlated with the explanatory variables for the GLS estimation. However, rejection 
of the Ho hypothesis would mean the GLS estimates are inconsistent. In this case, 
one can progress with an instrumental variable estimation. 
Section 2. 7 Estimation and Simulation Results 
For the estimation purpose, the investment equation in (32) can be presented as 
(64) 
As mentioned in the previous section, here, 1}i denotes the firm-specific effects and 
.;u denotes the remainder disturbance as an idiosyncratic shock to adjustment 
costs. Table 2.4 gives the results for OLS, Within Groups and GLS estimations. 
First of all, for all countries, the estimation results reveal that investment is 
significantly related to the Q ratio according to all three estimation methods. 
Looking at the OLS estimation of the constant parameters, which represents the 
normal rate of investment according to the theory, it is possible to say that they are 
all at reasonable levels for the manufacturing industries of the four countries. The 
estimated normal rates of investment are 8.10%, 10.63%, 11.43% and 14.12%, 
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Table 2.4 Estimation of (1/K)it =a.+ (1/<l>)(Qit-1) + Tli +~it 
a 
1 /<I> 
DW 
R2 
Hausman l(l) 
a 
1/<l> 
DW 
-2 R 
Hausman x.2(1) 
a 
1/<l> 
DW 
R2 
Hausman x.\1) 
a 
1/<l> 
DW 
R2 
Hausman x?(l) 
United Kingdom (82 Finns, 1991-1995) 
OLS Within Groups 
0.0810 
(0.003 1) 
0.0478 0.0377 
(0.0086) (0.0079) 
0.926 2.200 
0.1976 0.0950 
France (38 Firms, 1991-1995) 
OLS Within Groups 
0.1063 
(0.0038) 
0.0830 0.0611 
(0.0164) (0.0437) 
1.268 1.961 
0.1729 0.0466 
Germany (76 Firms, 1991-1995) 
OLS Within Groups 
0.1143 
(0.0062) 
0.0753 0.0708 
(0.0157) (0.0370) 
1.325 2.227 
0.1132 0.0291 
Netherlands (19 Firms, 1991-1995) 
OLS 
0.1412 
(0.0118) 
0.1309 
(0.0287) 
1.947 
0.1388 
Within Groups 
0.0778 
(0.0522) 
2.280 
0.0133 
1. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
GLS 
0.0829 
(0.0048) 
0.0420 
(0.0093) 
1.773 
0.1281 
(0.3793) 
GLS 
0.1059 
(0.0052) 
0.0761 
(0.0166) 
1.641 
0.1059 
(0.7107) 
GLS 
0.1141 
(0.0077) 
0.0745 
(0.0193) 
1.710 
0.0745 
(0.9077) 
GLS 
0.1405 
(0.0139) 
0.1258 
(0.0313) 
2.089 
0.0972 
(0.2505) 
2. Degrees of freedom correction is made for the Within Groups estimation. 
3. Parentheses show the significance levels for the Hausman Specification tests. 
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respectively, for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Although the 
estimated adjustment cost parameters imply slow adjustment and high adjustment 
costs, they are smaller and economically more meaningful compared to most of 
the previous studies. For a comparison, see Schaller (1990), for instance. This is 
most likely due to the fact that large companies were employed in the estimation 
process which might increase the efficiency. Also, the effect of using panel data 
instead of aggregate data should be considered. 
For all countries, the significance levels ofHausman test statistics fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the fum effects are not correlated with Qit, making GLS 
preferable over Within Groups estimation. The GLS estimates reveal that the 
adjustment cost parameters are 23.81, 13.14, 13.43 and 7.95 for the UK, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, respectively. As Bhargava et al. (1982) report, 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics are tighter for panel data than for time-series data. 
Although the estimation results reveal that serial correlation remains a problem 
for some countries according to some of the estimation techniques, for others it is 
not very disturbing. 
Using the tax parameters in table 2.1, the other variables in table 2.3 and the GLS 
estimates of the adjustment cost parameters from table 2.4, simulation results are 
presented in table 2.5 to approximate the three different tax policy effects on 
fixed investment for the four countries. To make a comparison, effects of a 10% 
reduction in corporate tax rates, a 10% increase in the present value of 
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depreciation deductions which will result from changing depreciation rules, and a 
5% increase in investment tax credits are simulated by using equations (37), (39) 
and (41) given in section 2.5. To measure the asymmetry between the countries as 
a result of the tax policy shocks, two measures of dispersion are calculated. They 
are the standard deviation and the mean absolute deviation. For that purpose, the 
same shocks are applied to calculate the average reaction by using the average tax 
rules described in table 2.1, the average variables given table 2.3 and the average 
GLS results of the estimated adjustment cost parameters in table 2.4. The standard 
N 
L(PSEij- AVERj)2 
deviation for policy effect j is calculated as SDVj = i N 
where N is the number of countries, PSE is the policy shock effect and AVER is 
the average. The mean absolute deviation for policy j is calculated as 
N 
'f.IPsEif- AVERjl 
MADj = ; N . The results in table 2.5 reveal that a permanent 
unanticipated 10% reduction of corporate tax rate causes a 5.38% increase in the 
investment-capital ratio between the two steady states for the Netherlands. 
Similarly, a permanent unanticipated 10% increase in the present value of 
depreciation deductions and a 5% increase of investment tax credit cause the 
largest effect of 6.68% increase in the investment-capital ratio in Germany and 
12.66% in France, respectively. Among all, the investment-capital ratio is the least 
\16 
Table 2.5 Tax Policy Effects (%) 
UK FR BD NL AVER. SDV MAD 
!le 1.12 3.38 4.47 5.38 6.74 3.502 3.135 
MJ 1.28 5.73 6.68 4.96 3.97 2.160 2.039 
M 3.27 12.66 9.42 11.78 8.67 3.718 3.331 
1. The values of the variables and the parameters employed for calculating the effects 
of policy shocks on the average given in column 5 are, (//K): 10.8225%, (mi K): 
11.245% , w: 67.6975%, rv: 7.085%, rli: 11.315%, g: 3.4375%, (1/ctJ): 0.0796, 
c(A VER.): 38.645%, O(A VER.): 65.6%, k(A VER.): 0.0%. 
2. The magnitudes ofthe shocks are, llc(UK): 3.3%, llc(FR):3.33%, llc(BD): 3.825%, 
llc(NL): 3.5%, llc(AVER.): 3.4895%, M(UK): 6.15%, M(FR): 7.04%, M(BD): 
6.81 %, llB(NL): 6.24%, llB(AVER.): 6.56%, and for all countries M: 5%. 
3. For the calculation of llc(BD): 3.825%, c(AVER): 38.645, and llc(AVER.): 
3.4895% , the effect of municipal tax which is deductible from corporate tax is 
considered for German companies. 
sensitive one to all policy effects in the United Kingdom. For instance, a 10% 
reduction in the corporate tax rate induces investment capital ratio to raise 1.12% 
in the long-run. 
Comparing the adjustment cost parameters and the differences in responses from 
table 2.4 and table 2.5 reveals that this result is due not only to the differences in 
the magnitudes of adjustment cost parameters, which is estimated as the smallest 
for the UK, but also to the differences in the magnitudes of other variables. 
Simulation results reveal that the Netherlands gives the largest response to a shock 
in corporate tax rate, whereas Germany and France are the most sensitive to 
changes in depreciation rules and investment tax credits, respectively. As can be 
seen from column 5, permanently reducing the average corporate tax rate from 
38.645% to 35.1555% causes a 6.74% increase in the average investment-capital 
ratio. Similarly, increasing the present value of depreciation deductions 10% and 
I I 7 
giving a 5% investment tax credit increases the average investment-capital ratio 
3.97% and 8.67%, respectively. 
Overall, the simulation results reveal that tax policies can be used to affect 
investment decisions. From the results in table 2.5, it can be inferred that fixed 
investment is more sensitive to investment tax credit relative to other policy 
effects because of its direct effects which should be considered by policy makers. 
On the other hand, there are substantial differences for tax policy effects on 
investment between the UK and France, Germany and the Netherlands as a group. 
There are also differences within this group in terms of different policy effects. 
The standard deviations and the mean absolute deviations calculated in columns 6 
and 7 reveal that the degree of asymmetry is the highest for investment tax credit 
shocks. This is followed by shocks in the corporate tax rate and depreciation rules. 
An important issue is how much of these asymmetries actually occur because of 
the differences in the treatment of investment by the tax systems of the countries. 
How much of these asymmetries can be eliminated by harmonising the tax 
systems? To answer these questions, another simulation study is conducted by 
again using the equations (37) (39) and (41), but this time the tax rules are 
harmonised to the average rates for the four countries under investigation. As 
given in the first note of table 2.5, the harmonised corporate tax rate, the present 
value of the depreciation deductions and the investment tax credit are, 
respectively, 38.645%, 65.6%, and 0.0%. To make comparisons between the 
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degree of the asymmetries, again the effects of a permanent 1 0% reduction in the 
corporate tax rate, a permanent 10% increase in the present value of depreciation 
deductions and giving a permanent 5% investment tax credit are simulated. The 
results are presented in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Tax Policy Effects: Tax Rules Harmonised (%) 
!le 
MJ 
Me 
UK 
2.37 
1.60 
3.49 
FR 
13.24 
5.74 
12.55 
BD 
5.42 
3.90 
8.53 
NL 
10.82 
5.69 
12.44 
AVER. 
6.74 
3.97 
8.67 
SDV 
4.465 
1.714 
3.747 
MAD 
4.069 
1.484 
3.244 
1. The values of the variables and the parameters employed for calculating the effects 
of policy shocks on the average given in column 5 are, (1/K): 10.8225%, (111/ K): 
11.245% , w: 67.6975%, ro: 7.085%, rE: 11.315%, g: 3.4375%, (1/<IJ): 0.0796, 
c(A VER.): 38.645%, B(AVER.): 65.6%, k(A VER.): 0.0%. 
2. The magnitudes of the shocks are the same for all countries. They are !le: 3.4895%, 
!lB: 6.56%, and M: 5%, respectively. 
The results in table 2.6 reveal that in the case of harmonised tax systems, the 
ranking of the responses to tax policy shocks also changes. In this case, France 
gives the highest response to all policy shocks, whereas the UK again gives the 
least response. Respectively, the Netherlands and Germany give the second and 
third highest responses to all of these permanent shocks. As can be seen from the 
standard and mean absolute deviations in columns 6 and 7 of table 2.6, 
harmonising the corporate tax rates actually increases the asymmetry in the 
responses to this shock to a higher level. Because the levels of investment tax 
credits were zero in the four countries, the degree of asymmetry stays at around 
the same level. Only in the case of depreciation rules does harmonising the tax 
rules reduce the asymmetry in the responses to this shock. The results found here 
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rule out the tax competition view for the domestic investment case. Expecting 
symmetric responses to tax policy shocks in the case of harmonised corporate tax 
rules will certainly be misleading. 
The simulations can be carried one step further by analysing the policy shock 
effects in the case of leaving the tax rules unchanged but harmonising the other 
variables to see their role in asymmetric behaviour. The values for the harmonised 
variables and parameters are the same as they were taken for the average case, 
except for the tax rules which are given in the first note of table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Tax Policy Effects: Other Variables Harmonised(%) 
UK 
6.16 
2.99 
8.08 
FR 
5.81 
3.73 
8.76 
BD 
9.09 
6.17 
9.76 
NL 
6.34 
3.27 
8.23 
AVER. 
6.74 
3.97 
8.67 
SDV 
1.315 
1.257 
0.657 
MAD 
1.069 
1.026 
0.551 
1. The values of the variables and the parameters employed for calculating the effects 
of policy shocks on the average given in column 5 are, (IlK): 10.8225%, (nl/ K): 
11.245% , w: 67.6975%, rv: 7.085%, rE: 11.315%, g: 3.4375%, (11<1>): 0.0796, 
c(A VER.): 38.645%, ~AVER.): 65.6%, k(A VER.): 0.0%. 
2. The magnitudes of the shocks are, 8c(UK): 3.3%, 8c(FR): 3.33 %, 8c(BD): 
3.825%, 8c(NL): 3.5%, 8c(AVER.): 3.4895%, MJ(UK): 6.15%, MJ(FR): 7.04%, 
88 (BD): 6.81 %, 88 (NL): 6.24%, 88 (AVER.): 6.56%, and for all countries M: 
5%. 
Actually, this final simulation decomposes the true effects of the differences in tax 
systems. Alternatively, it reveals the importance of the other variables rather than 
the tax rules for the asymmetric behaviour. As can be clearly seen from table 2.7, 
although the UK again gives the least and Germany gives the highest responses to 
all policy shocks, the differences between the countries are not too much in this 
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case. As expected, the standard deviations and mean absolute deviations reduce 
to very low levels compared to the two other cases. Especially in the case of the 
investment tax credit shocks, the measures of asymmetry reduce almost to 0.5%. 
This reveals the fact that to reduce the observed asymmetry, rather than 
convergence in the domestic tax rules, convergence in the fundamental variables 
such as expected profitability of capital, capital structure, cost of fmance and 
adjustment costs is more important. 
Section 2.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, a dynamic tax simulation analysis was conducted to understand the 
role of corporate tax policy changes on investment decisions. The analyses were 
oriented on four major European countries: the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands. First, we aimed to measure the dynamic effects of 
various corporate tax policy changes to see whether the effects are important, and 
which policy affects which country more. As a second aim, the policy effects were 
contrasted between the countries which has important implications for the tax 
harmonisation issue in the EU. To do so, starting from the neo-classical model 
augmented with the external adjustment costs of capital, a partial dynamic 
equilibrium model in capital and marginal q was derived. Simulations also 
required the adjustment cost parameters. To estimate these and to obtain some of 
the other industry-wide variables, panel data were collected for the period 1991-
1995. Although the companies were not numerous, they were sufficiently big to 
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proxy the general industries of the analysed countries. Econometric estimation of 
the investment equations revealed that high adjustment costs, low R-squares, and 
to some extent, serial correlation remained as empirical problems. Nevertheless, 
investment-capital ratios were found to be very significantly related to the 
observable Q ratios, which also capture the role of the expectations via the market 
values. In fact, this implies that managers significantly consider stock market 
behaviour and value maxirnisation when they are making fixed capital investment 
decisions. It also reveals, how importantly real and financial markets are 
integrated with each other. 
To measure the permanent policy shock effects quantitatively a simplified 
numerical procedure was followed. This approach enabled us to derive some 
easily interpretable analytical results, including the firm's fundamental variables, 
and to analyse the tax policy effects from the firm's point of view. Moreover, 
while making the inter-country comparisons, we could decompose the effects of 
shocks on investment into tax effects and other related variables which served for 
our second aim. The effects of three different permanent tax policy changes on 
investment were considered. To enable comparison, effects of a l 0% reduction in 
corporate tax rates, a 1 0% increase in the present value of depreciation deductions 
which will result from changing depreciation rules, and a 5% increase in 
investment tax credits were simulated. For the first issue, simulation results 
revealed that that tax policies can be used to affect investment decisions. It was 
found that fixed investment was more sensitive to investment tax credit changes 
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relative to other policy effects because of its direct effects. Moreover, substantial 
differences were observed for the tax policy effects on investment between the 
UK and France, Germany, and the Netherlands as a group, and also differences 
within this group in terms of different policy effects. The Netherlands gave the 
largest response to a shock in the corporate tax rate, whereas Germany and France 
were the most sensitive ones to changes in the depreciation rules and the 
investment tax credits, respectively. Among all, the investment-capital ratio was 
the least sensitive one to all policy shock effects in the United Kingdom. 
To see how much of these asymmetries can be eliminated by harmonising the tax 
rules, the same shocks were applied while the corporate tax rules were 
harmonised to the average values of the four countries. It was observed that the 
ranking of the responses to the tax policy shocks changed. In this case, France 
gave the highest response to all policy shocks whereas the UK again gave the least 
response. Respectively, the Netherlands and Germany gave the second and third 
highest responses to all of these permanent shocks. Harmonising the corporate tax 
rates actually increased the asymmetry in the responses to this shock to a higher 
level. Only in the case of depreciation rules, harmonising the tax rules reduced the 
asymmetry a limited amount in the responses to this shock. Within the context of 
the employed model, the obtained results rule out the tax competition view for the 
domestic investment case. As discussed in the introduction, in terms of the EU, 
harmonising corporate tax rules may mean the loss of a fiscal tool which could be 
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used for adjustments ~f; asymmetric sh,()cks, or for ·ll~tionali ,?emaiid management 
and .economic stabillsation,ofilie member economies. 
1124 
CHAPTER3 
TAXATION OF IRREVERSffiLE PROJECTS 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Section 3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a dynamic tax simulation study was conducted to observe 
the effect of changes in corporate tax rules on investment behaviour, and to 
investigate tax harmonisation issues in the EU. While studying the effects of a 
corporate tax system on investment, one approach commonly employed is to 
calculate the marginal effective tax rates. The marginal effective tax rate 
measures the difference between the pre-tax rate of return on investment and the 
post-tax rate of return on the capital used to fmance the project. This difference is 
known as the tax wedge and reveals the role of a tax system in the incentives or 
disincentives to invest given to fmns. Pioneered by King and Fullerton (1984), 
effective tax rates are commonly used for inter-country comparisons. In that study, 
they make comparisons between the effects of the tax systems of the UK, Sweden, 
West Germany and the US on incentives to invest. Recently, Chennells and 
Griffith (1997) analyse for ten countries how the corporate income taxes have 
affected the incentives for both domestic and international investment. 
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As discussed in chapter 2, taxation and its implications for investment decisions 
are also very important issues for the EU. Comparative studies often employ 
effective tax rates or implied cost of capital measures. For instance, to make 
comparisons between the member countries of the EU, Ruding (1992) uses the 
implied tax-adjusted cost of capital measures. Similarly, using effective tax rates, 
Devereux and Pearson (1995) analyse the impact on production efficiency of 
potential harmonisation of the taxation of income from capital in the EU. 
When using the effective tax rates, the studies cited above and many others 
assume a deterministic environment and also ignore the role of irreversibility risk 
for the investment decisions. Mint:Z ( 1996) stresses that taxes may interact with 
different kinds of risk such as income risk, irreversibility risk, capital risk, 
financial risk, inflation risk, and political risk. The effects of taxation in an 
uncertain world has a long tradition which goes back to Domar and Musgrave 
(1944) and Stiglitz (1969). Their analysis was put in a general equilibrium 
framework by Gordon (1985) indicating that by taxing a risky stream of income, 
the government will also absorb a fraction of the risk. Under loss offsetting, while 
the investors receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk, and these 
two effects largely offset each other. To understand this argument, assume an 
economy such that the return from a risk-free project is 4.5%. Assuming that the 
corporate tax rate is 35%, the after-tax return of this project would be 2.925%. 
Suppose that a risky project earns either 18% or -6% with equal chances. Thus, 
the standard deviation of this project would be 12%. 
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Hence, assuming the unit price ofrisk 0.125%, the pre-tax risk-adjusted return of 
the project would be 4.5%. Now suppose that the government fully refunds its 
share of losses, which is (0.35*6) = 2.1% in this case. The after-tax return and risk 
on this project would be, respectively, 3.9% and 7.8%. Thus, the after-tax risk-
adjusted return on the project would (3.9-0.125*7.8) be 2.925%. As can be seen, 
both the return and risk of the risky project reduces by 35%, and the after-tax risk-
adjusted return from the risky project is equal to the after-tax return from the risk-
free project. With full refundablility, the tax system treats both projects equally. 
However, in an influential paper, Bulow and Summers (1984) introduce capital 
risk, fluctuations in tangible asset prices, and argue that most of the risk borne by 
investors pertains to changes in relative asset prices rather than income risk, 
meaning that the government takes a much larger fraction of the return than it 
takes of the risk. They argue that, if economic depreciation is more costly than 
expected, the capital allowances will be less. Thus, the tax system can discourage 
risky investment. In another study, using the models developed in Pindyck (1988) 
and Bertola and Caballero (1994) for the incremental irreversible investment 
decisions under uncertainty, McKenzie (1994) shows that the tax distortion 
measures increase for various sectors in the Canadian economy. 
This chapter has two objectives. First, it will analyse how the tax distortions, 
measured by the effective marginal tax rates, will be affected for the risky 
investment by also considering the irreversibility of the investment decisions. The 
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analysis will be limited to the domestic effective marginal tax rate measure, and 
only income uncertainty will be taken into account. Second, using actual values, 
an application will again be carried out for the four major European countries, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands, to see how the observed 
tax distortions will be affected under the new measure. More importantly, the 
effects of harmonising the corporate tax rules and the asymmetries in the tax 
distortion measures will be investigated. 
Although employing an incremental investment decision approach as in 
McKenzie (1994) would give more valuable insights, this would also require 
actual parameter values for production and demand functions. To make the 
simulations feasible, the approach taken here is limited to a single project decision 
such as the one developed in McDonald and Siege! ( 1986). In the next section, a 
model which considers the effects of the income risk and the irreversibility of the 
undertaken project is developed. Section 3.3 presents the data and the simulation 
results, and the fmal section concludes. 
Section 3.2 The Model 
Consider a representative hypothetical investment project with a unit cost. The 
cost of the project net of the present value of any depreciation allowances can be 
written as 
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C= (1- eO) (l) 
where c is the corporate tax rate and (} is the present value of the depreciation 
allowances which depends on the tax rules. Assuming that the inflation rate, the 
tax rules and the economic depreciation rate are constant over time, under perfect 
certainty, the value of this project can be written as 
"' 
V= J [(1- c)Pexp- (ft+8(1 + 7l'))t]dt (2) 
0 
where P, 8 and 7l' represent the pre-tax nominal rate of return, the real economic 
depreciation rate and the inflation rate, respectively. The term P denotes the 
appropriate nominal discount factor, and it implicitly includes the effect of the 
source of finance. Assuming that a typical saver in the economy does not pay any 
personal or wealth tax, the after-tax real rate of return to the saver will simply be 
S I+ i =---1 
1 + 7l' 
(3) 
where i is the nominal interest rate prevailing in the economy. Therefore, 
considering the tax deductibility of the interest payments, the endoge~ous nominal 
discount factor without personal taxes can be written as 
p = (1- c)(l- w)i + wi (4) 
where the term w represents the weight of the equity capital in the source of 
finance. Under the assumption of no personal taxation, since the cost of the 
retained earnings and the new equity issues would be the same, they are simply 
gathered under the source of equity fmance. It is assumed that the decision maker 
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will be willing to maximise the net present discounted value of the project. By 
assuming that nominal profits grow with the inflation rate, the value maximisation 
condition can be stated as 
{ 
(1-cB) } 
W = max <1>- (1- c)(l + n/P + (1 + n)8 -n), 0 (5) 
where <1> represents the pre-tax real rate of return. The equilibrium condition can 
be rewritten as 
R=( ( ((1-c)(1-w)i+wi+(I+n)8-n)-8. (6) 
1- c) 1 + n) 
(I- eO) 
Here, R denotes the pre-tax real rate of return net of the real economic 
depreciation rate. Obviously, ifthe~e are no taxes, the equilibrium pre-tax real rate 
of return net of the real depreciation rate will be equal to the after-tax real rate of 
return stated in equation (3). In other words, the tax wedge will be zero. However, 
with corporate tax rules, since 0<0<1, the firm has to cover the relative tax 
disadvantage effect [(1-cB)/(1-c)] for the return to the saver and for the additional 
depreciation rate, except that it will benefit from the tax deductibility of the 
interest payments. Hence, the familiar form of the tax-inclusive domestic effective 
marginal tax rate under perfect certainty and reversibility assumptions can be 
expressed as 
(1- eO) 1 + i 
-----'-----'--((1- c)(I- w)i + wi + (1 + n)8 -1r)-8-- + 1 
(I- c)(1 + n) 1 + 1r (?) 
DEMTR = (1- eO) 
)( ((1- c)(l- w)i + wi + (1 + n)8 -n)- 8 (1- c 1 + 7r) 
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which summarises the impact of the corporate tax system on the hypothetical 
investment project in the economy. 
Now suppose that the pre-tax real rate of return (<I>) follows a stochastic process 
and that the investment decision is irreversible, which is a more realistic 
assumption for a real-world situation compared to the certainty and reversibility 
case. In this case, a rational decision maker should look ahead and compare the 
outcomes of investing immediately and waiting and investing at a future time. 
Since <I> evolves stochastically now, the equilibrium condition in equation (6), and 
the DEMTR in equation (7) will no longer hold. Thus, we need to fmd another 
critical value (<I>) at which it will be rational to invest when the pre-tax real rate 
of return is equal to, or greater than this critical value. 
Given the uncertainty about the state variable <I> and the option to wait for 
undertaking the project, the problem in hand can be viewed as an infinite horizon 
optimal stopping problem, which can be solved via dynamic programming. 
Assuming that <I> follows a geometric Brownian motion, the stochastic motion of 
<I> can be presented as 
de]) = a<l>dx (8) 
where o-is the variance parameter, and dx = e(dt/12 • Here, xis a Weiner process 
and e- N(O, 1). In order to make a comparison with the deterministic case, we 
keep assuming that the nominal profits grow with the inflation rate. Thus, the drift 
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rate of the process is assumed zero, which will also be considered later. 
Therefore, the maximisation problem in equation (5) can be rewritten as 
{ ( 
(1-cB) * ~ 1 l 
W*(<D,) =mlX <D,- (1-cX1+1!) (fJ +(1 +1!)0-1!)),'(1 +P*-t(1+1!)0-1!) E;[W(<DI+1]J(9) 
where E represents the expectation operator. The first term in the right-hand side 
of equation (9) is the stopping value, the value that the firm gets when it makes 
the investment immediately, just as in equation (5). The extra term represents the 
continuation value, the value of waiting and making the investment in the next 
period. The continuation value is based on the firm's current time expectations 
about the future, and it is discounted to the current time with the appropriate 
discount factor. 
Since there is uncertainty now, the saver should receive a premium for bearing the 
risk. Considering this, from the CAPM, the after-tax real rate ofreturn in equation 
(3) can be altered as 
(1- w)(1 + i) + w(1 + i + paA.(l + 1!)) S*= 1. 
1 + 1! 
(10) 
Here, p denotes the correlation of the pre-tax real rate of return of the hypothetical 
project and the pre-tax real rate of return of the market portfolio of projects in the 
economy, and A. is the exogenously given expected real market price of risk. From 
here, the endogenous nominal discount factor given in equation (4) can be altered 
to include the effect of uncertainty as 
P* =(I- c)(1- w)i + w(i + paA-(1 + 1!)). (11) 
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Looking at equations (IO) and (II), it can be inferred that although the 
government taxes the risk premium, it does not absorb the risk. Thus, the expected 
return to the saver does not change, and this can be taken as a no-refundability 
case for any losses that the ftrm incurs. 
From equation (9), the Bellman equation in the continuation region can be written 
for continuous time case as 
((1- c)(l- w)i + w(i + pcrA.(I + i'Z")) +(I+ 1£)8- i'Z")Wdt = E(dW). (I2) 
As can be seen from equation (9), we need to calculate E(dW). Using !to's 
Lemma, the total differentiation dW can be expressed as 
(13) 
and from here, 
(I4) 
Using the result in equation (I4), the Bellman equation in (12) can be rearranged 
as 
I d2W(<D) -~<D2 2 -((I-c)(l-w)i+w(i+ pcrA.(I +1£))+(1+1£)8 -i'Z")W = 0 .(15) 2 d<D 
As explained in Dixit (1993), the solution W(<D) should satisfy the three boundary 
conditions, 
W(O) = 0 (I6) 
• • (1-cO) 
W(<D) = <D- (I )( (/3 *+(I+ 1£)8- i'Z") 
- c I+ i'Z") (I7) 
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• 
dW(<l>) 
d<l> 
d(<i>- (1- cB) (fJ * +(1 + n-)J _ 1Z")) 
(1-c)(l+n-) _
1 __ __:______:_;______:_d_<l> ______ - 0 (18) 
Since when <l>=O, the value of the option to invest will also be worthless, and the 
first boundary condition reflects this fact. Equations (17) and (18) are, 
respectively, the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions. The value-
matching condition shows the value that the finn gets when it invests. The 
smooth-pasting condition implies that W(<l>) should be smooth and continuous at 
the optimal point. Otherwise, <l> would not be the optimal value. Normally, the 
Bellman equation appears in the form of a partial differential equation which 
usually makes analytical solution difficult, or sometimes impossible. However, 
due to the infinite horizon nature of the problem, the value function is 
independent of time, reducing the equation to a second-order differential equation. 
The differential equation in (15) has a solution as 
W(<l>) = g<D' (19) 
and inserting this function into equation ( l S) gives 
Dividing through g<D', equation (20) reduces to 
(21) 
and the two solutions to equation (21) can be written as 
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1 
-a2 + 2 -
(22) 
where r2 < 0, r1 > 1. The general solution given in equation (19) can be expressed 
as a linear combination of two independent solutions; however, the first boundary 
condition rules out the negative root. This reduces the solution to 
r 
W(<l>) = g1<1> I. (23) 
Inserting this solution into equations (17) and (18), two equations can be obtained 
• 
to solve the two unknowns, g1 and <1>, representing the constant and the critical 
value of the pre-tax real rate of return. The system of two equations will be 
• r • (1 (}) 1 -c gl <1> -<1>=- (,B*+(l+Jr)8-Jr) (1- c)(l + Jr) (24) 
(25) 
Hence, using equations (21), (22), (24) and (25), equation (6) can be altered as 
(1- c(}) 
R* ( (,8*+(1+Jr)8-Jr+F*)-8 (1-c) 1+Jr) (26) 
and fmally, the new condition for the domestic effective marginal tax rate in 
equation (7) can be rearranged as 
(1-c~ (1-w)(l+l)+ll(l+i+,ro1{1+n)) 
----'----'--(,8* -+(1 + 1f)§-n P') -8 +I (l-c)(l+n) 1+Jr ~ ~~~~--~--~-----------------------(1-c~ 
(1-c)(l+n} {,B*-t(1+1f)§-Jr+P')-8 
(27) 
where 
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The term F* denotes the irreversibility effect which derives an additional wedge 
between the pre-tax return and the post-tax return. As the variance parameter O" 
approaches zero, the new equilibrium value derived in equation (26) for the pre-
tax real rate of return net of real depreciation rate and the new domestic marginal 
effective tax rate in equation (27) approach the conditions derived in equations (6) 
and (7) under perfect certainty and reversibility. 
To see how uncertainty affects the domestic effective marginal tax rate 
considering irreversibility, we can take the partial derivative of DEMTR* with 
respect to the uncertainty parameter O". Doing the necessary calculations by 
assuming that all parameters are independent of each others gives 
where 
and 
wpA-(I + tr)2 8(1- c)c(1- ()) ( ) 
___:_____;_ _ __:____:_-----=---'----'-----'- z - 1 
8DEMTR* (l-ce) 2 
= (i(l- c(l- w)) + (1 + tr)(wpO"A + &(1- ())) + F * -tr) 2 (1- c()) 
(1- ce)(ic(I- w) + (O" + G)(i- tr) +M) 
2wpA-(1 + tr) 
Z=-----------~~--~----
8(1 + 1r )c(1- ()) 
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(28) 
and 
o-3 3o-2wpA.(l + tr) 
- + + o-(i(l- c{l- w)) + (1 + tr)8 -tr) 
G= 4 2 >0 
a 4 a 2(i(1- c(1- w)) + (1 + tr)(8 + wpo-A.) -tr) 
-+ 
16 2 
o-4 0'3 
o-2 16 + 4 wpA.(1 + tr) 
M=-+----;==:====::========'=========> 0. 
4 o-4 a 2 (i{l- c(1- w)) + (1 + tr)(8 + wpo-A.)- tr) 
16+ 2 
The denominator of equation (28) will be positive. Since 0<9<1 and other 
parameters are positive, the first term in the numerator of equation (28) will also 
be positive. Thus, the effect of uncertainty for irreversible investment on the 
domestic marginal effective tax rate will depend on whether Z is greater than, 
equal to, or smaller than one. To understand how the effect of uncertainty works 
on the domestic effective marginal tax rate, we can multiply (Z-1) with the term 
(
8(1 + tr)c(1- B)) . . . . 
m the numerator of equation (28), convertmg It to (1- cB) 
. (<a+ G)(i -tr) ) 8(1 + 1l')c(1- B) Z*=lc(1-w)+ +M - . 
2wpA.(1 + tr) (1- cB) (29) 
These three terms summarise the effect of the uncertainty parameter a on the 
DEMTR* which can be interpreted through equations (10), (11), (26) and (27). As 
the level of uncertainty increases, the required return to the saver (S*) also 
increases. This also increases the cost of equity in the nominal discount factor 
given in equation (11). However, the tax advantage of debt finance relatively 
reduces compared to the previous level of uncertainty, increasing the DEMTR* 
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due to the relatively higher level of the tax burden. The fust term ic(l-w) in 
equation (29) denotes this positive effect. The third term in equation (29) shows 
the only negative effect due to the relative reduction in the tax burden, occurring 
because of the depreciation rate that the firm has to cover. As can be seen from 
equation (27), the reason for this negative effect is the decrease in the relative 
importance of this tax burden due to the increase in the cost of equity finance. 
These two terms summarise the sign of the effect of a on the DEMTR * in the case 
of reversibility. Only if these two terms exactly offset each other, regardless of the 
level of uncertainty, the DEMTR given in equation (7) and DEMTR * in equation 
' (27) will be exactly the same under the reversibility assumption (F*=O). 
Finally, as the uncertainty increases, the irreversibility effect summarised by the 
term F* also increases. This happens because as a increases, the time value of 
waiting increases. In other words, the price of the real option that the fum kills 
when it undertakes the project will increase. The increase in this additional cost 
will not affect the after-tax real rate of return to the saver in equation (1 0), but will 
increase the pre-tax real rate of return in equation (26). Thus, the second term in 
equation (29) shows this fmal positive effect. If the two positive effects in 
equation (29) are larger than the negative effect, then Z will be greater than one, 
and this will make the uncertainty effect positive on DEMTR* in equation (28). 
Otherwise, the effect will be negative or zero. However, a negative or neutral 
effect requires excessive or impossible values for some of the param.eters, such as 
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very high depreciation rates or negative real interest rates. As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, for reasonable values the effect will be positive. 
In equation (8), in order to make a comparison with the deterministic case, the 
drift rate of the stochastic process followed by the pre-tax real rate of return was 
assumed zero. For a more realistic case, equation (8) can be altered as 
d<D = a<Pdt + o<J>dx (Sa) 
Here, a denotes the expected growth rate of the pre-tax real rate of return, a is 
the variance parameter, and dx is the increment of a Weiner process. Equations 
(26) and (27) can be altered to include the drift parameter a as 
(1- eB) 
R**= (ft*+(1+n-)8-Jr+F**)-8 (26a) (1- e)(l + n-) 
(l-et}) (I-~ +t)+l-1(1 +i + jril(1 +n)) 
-----'---------'-- (/3* -t{1 + n)b"-n-+ F* *) -8 + 1 
(l-e~+n) l+n-~··~--~~----~--~--------------------------
(l-et}) (/3*-t{l +n)b"-n-+ F**)-8 
(l-e~+n) 
where 
o-2 a 
F**=---+ 4 2 
(27a) 
To see how the expected growth rate a affects DEMTR**, we can take the partial 
derivative ofF** with respect to a. This will be 
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oa 2 
(~ _ a
4
2) 
r==============-1 
(
a_ a
2 )
2 
+ a
2 (,B*+{l+tr)b'-tr) 
2 4 2 
<0. (30) OF** 1 --=-
Equation (30) shows that as the drift term increases, the term F** decreases. This 
happens because as a increases, the value in waiting to undertake the project 
decreases. This implies that DEMI'R** < DEMI'R* if we replace the stochastic 
process followed by Cl> in equation (8) with the process described in equation (8a). 
Section 3.3 Data Description 
In this section, we present the data necessary to make the simulations. The 
analysis will be carried out for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. For 
the calculation of the weight of debt (1-w) and the weight (w) of equity in the cost 
of finance and for the nominal economic depreciation rate ( ~ 1+ n') ), the same set 
of panel data was employed for each country as in chapter 2. The necessary 
interest rates, prices, and stock market indices were also obtained from 
Datastream. The codes in brackets denote the associated Datastream codes. The 
corporate tax rules were obtained from the yearly corporate tax guides of Price 
Waterhouse and Emst & Young, and table 3.1 describes the corporate tax rules for 
the year 1995. 
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Table 3.1 Corporate Tax Rules(%) 
Corporate Tax Rates 
Plant & Machinery 
Industrial Buildings 
Commercial Buildings 
1. See the notes in table 2.1. 
UK 
33 
25(RB) 
4(SL) 
FR 
33.33 
20(SL) 
5(SL) 
4(SL) 
BD 
45 
30(RB) 
4(SL) 
4(SL) 
NL 
35 
12.5(SL) 
2.5(SL) 
2.5(SL) 
Industry-wide weight parameters (w) and the present value of depreciation 
deductions (B) were calculated as explained in section 2.6 The economic 
depreciation rates are not necessarily equal to the accounting depreciation rates, 
therefore they have to be estimated. The nominal depreciation rates were proxied 
by those previously estimated in section 2.6 The obtained results were 4.67%, 
4.66%, 5.98% and 6.34%, respectively, for the UK, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. 
For the inflation rates (n), the monthly averages of annualised inflation rates were 
used from the beginning of 1991 to the end of 1995 for each country, and they 
were calculated by using the monthly consumer price indices. Datastrearn codes 
for the price indices are [UKRP .... F], [FRCP .... F], [BDCP .... F], and 
[NLCP .... F], respectively, for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. The 
nominal interest rates (i) were the monthly averages of the annualised long-term 
government bond yields for 1991-1995 for each country. Datastrearn codes for the 
bond yields are [UKMGLTB], [FRNGLTB], [GRMGLTB], and [HOLGLTB], 
respectively. Table 3.2 describes the whole necessary data set for the simulation, 
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and the fmal column shows the average values of the four countries under 
investigation. 
Table 3.2 The Data Required for Simulation 
UK FR BD NL MEAN 
0.0802 0.0711 0.0659 0.0662 0.07085 
1l 0.0286 0.0203 0.0335 0.0258 0.02705 
w 0.7212 0.5952 0.7270 0.6645 0.67698 
c 0.3300 0.3333 0.5325 0.3500 0.38645 
(J 0.6150 0.7040 0.6810 0.6240 0.65600 
p 0.9292 0.9289 0.9774 0.9243 0.93995 
(]" 0.1428 0.2266 0.2119 0.2928 0.21850 
A. 0.1954 0.1750 0.1221 0.1744 0.16673 
a 0.0428 0.0795 0.0630 0.0765 0.06545 
8(1+ tr} 0.0467 0.0466 0.0598 0.0634 0.05413 
I. For the calculation of w, fJ, and (\ l +n") figures, see section 2.6. 
2. The corporate tax rate c in Germany includes the local tax rate. 
3. Mean represents the arithmetic average of the values for the four countries. 
To calculate the a, a, A. and p figures, Datastream general industry sector indices 
and the total stock market indices were used. Datastream codes for the general 
industry sector indices are [GENINUK], [GENINFR], [GENINBD], and 
[GENINNL], and the total stock market indices are [TOTMKUK], [TOTMKFR], 
[TOTMK.BD], and [TOTMKNL]. For the calculations, annual data were used by 
going back to the year 1982. The a and a figures were proxied by the means and 
standard deviations of the annual real returns on the general industry sector 
indices of the countries for the period 1982-1995. The real returns for the general 
industry sectors were calculated by adjusting the yearly nominal returns with the 
annualised inflation rates. The annualised inflation rates were calculated by using 
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the yearly conswner price indices for each country. The real expected market 
prices of risk (A.) were calculated by dividing the average excess annual real 
returns on the total market indices by the annual standard deviation of the real 
total market returns. The yearly average excess real total market returns were 
calculated by using the total market indices, the nominal long-term government 
bond yields as the nominal risk-free rates and the inflation rates. Finally, the 
correlation coefficients p are those between the yearly real general industry sector 
returns and the yearly real total market returns for the period 1982-1995. 
Section 3.4 Simulation Results 
In section 3.2, it was shown analytically that including income uncertainty and 
irreversibility risk into the traditional domestic effective marginal tax rate 
measures may have positive, neutral or negative additional effects for the tax 
distortions imposed by a corporate tax system upon investment decisions. In this 
section, the effect of this alteration will be measured and contrasted with the 
traditional deterministic case by using actual values for the UK, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands. Later, the effects of the new measure on the results of 
harmonising the corporate tax rules will be discussed, as they have important 
implications for the EU. 
Using the required values from table 3.2 and equations (3), (6), (7), (10), (26), 
(27), (26a) and (27a) derived in section 3.2, the simulation results are presented in 
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table 3.3, table 3.4 and table 3.5. To measure the asymmetry between the 
countries, two measures of dispersion were calculated: the standard deviation, and 
the mean absolute deviation. For that purpose, average measures were calculated 
by using the mean values from table 3.2. The standard deviation was calculated as 
N 
LO~- Mean) 2 
SDV= i 
N 
where N is the number of countries, and Y is the 
measure under consideration. The mean absolute deviation was calculated as 
N Ilr; -Mea~ 
MAD=_,,,__· ----
N 
Table 3.3 Simulation Results forS, S*, R, R* and R** (%) 
UK FR BD NL AVER. SDV MAD 
s 5.02 4.98 3.14 3.94 4.27 0.78 0.73 
S* 6.89 7.17 4.97 7.08 6.58 0.90 0.75 
R 5.98 5.31 5.11 5.08 5.28 0.37 0.28 
R* 12.71 15.43 15.57 20.41 15.83 2.78 2.09 
R** 10.63 11.51 11.79 15.79 12.27 1.99 1.60 
-------------
As can be seen from table 3.3, with the incorporation of uncertainty, the post-tax 
real rate of return (S) increases due to the risk premium required by the saver. 
Obviously, the net pre-tax real rate of return (R) also increases due to the effects 
of income uncertainty and irreversibility risk, which are associated with higher 
measures of asymmetry. Comparing the results of the changes in the after-tax real 
rate of return and the net pre-tax real rate of return reveals that it is the 
irreversibility effect which accounts, for the most part, for the increments in net 
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pre-tax real rate of returns. Both for the pre-tax real rate of return net of real 
depreciation rate and for the post-tax real rate of return, the highest differences 
occur in the case of the NL, whereas the lowest impacts are for the UK. 
Table 3.4 Domestic Effective Marginal Tax Rates(%) 
UK FR BD NL AVER. SDV MAD 
DEMTR 16.05 6.28 38.68 22.41 19.30 11.89 9.69 
DEMTR* 45.82 53.52 68.06 65.33 58.42 8.99 8.51 
DEMTR** 35.18 37.68 57.82 55.19 46.34 10.12 10.03 
Table 3.4 presents the domestic effective marginal tax rates for the deterministic 
and reversibility case and for the uncertainty and irreversibility case with and 
without the drift parameter a. The drift parameter a denotes the expected growth 
rate of the pre-tax real returns. Comparing the results of the first row with the 
second and third rows shows that there is a very large difference between the 
measures of tax distortions. Considering income uncertainty under irreversibility 
increases the effective tax rate measures to almost two-three times higher levels. 
The most dramatic increase happens for France, for which the DEMTR increases 
from 6.28% to 37.68% when the drift rate is considered, and to 53.52% when it is 
ignored. As discussed before, the results verify the argument about Z* from 
equation (29), indicating that the positive effects of income uncertainty under 
irreversibility are well above the negative effect on the domestic effective 
marginal tax rates. Additionally, the results show that DEMTR** measures are 
below the DEMTR * measures, confirming the exposition in equation (30) about 
the effect of the drift rate. Because the levels of the measures are closer than those 
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in the certainty and reversibility case, SDV and MAD are also lower for DEMTR* 
and DEMTR**. As explained in section 3.3, uncertainty measures were calculated 
by using stock market data. This was based on the assumption that fluctuations in 
firm values reflect changes in the profits. In reality, however, the volatility of the 
stock market data will be much higher than the volatility of income, implying that 
the results in table 3.4 and table 3.5 for the uncertainty and irreversibility case will 
be biased upward. Nevertheless, the results indicate that commonly applied 
classical effective tax rate measures, especially those which ignore the role of 
irreversibility risk, will underestimate the role of tax distortions on investment 
decisions. 
Important issues for the case of the European Union are: how much of the tax 
asyrnmetries actually occur because of the differences in the treatment of 
investment by the tax systems of the countries and to what extent can these 
asymmetries be eliminated by harmonising the tax systems? Moreover, what will 
. - -- - - - -- - -
be the effects of the commonly ignored irreversibility risk and income risk in 
reducing these asyrnmetries? To answer these questions, another simulation was 
conducted by again using equations (7), (27) and (27a), but this time the tax rules 
were harmonised to the average rates for the four countries under investigation. 
As given in the last column of table 3.2, the harmonised corporate tax rate and the 
present value of the depreciation deductions are, respectively, 38.645% and 
65.6%. To make comparisons between the degree of the asyrnmetries, the SDV 
and MAD measures were again used. 
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Table 3.5 Effect of Harmonising Tax Rules (%) 
UK FR BD NL AVER. SDV MAD 
DEMTR 17.29 12.97 26.23 22.97 19.30 5.14 4.74 
DEMTR* 46.74 56.27 63.58 65.65 58.42 7.41 6.55 
DEMTR** 36.24 41.45 51.60 55.57 46.34 7.73 7.37 
The results in table 3.5 reveal that in the case of harmonised tax systems, the 
asymmetry in the domestic effective marginal tax rates reduces for the three 
methods. The answers to the above questions can be best given by comparing the 
calculated standard and mean absolute deviations in columns 6 and 7 of table 3.4 
and table 3.5. As can be seen, for the certainty and reversibility case, harmonising 
the corporate tax rules reduces half of the observed asymmetry; however, almost 
half of the asymmetry still remains because of the differences in other values. 
More importantly, including uncertainty and irreversibility reduces the observed 
asymmetry for harmonising the tax rules far less than the certainty and 
reversibility case. For instance, the SDV of DEMI'R** reduces from HU2% to 
7.73%, and the SDV of DEMI'R* reduces from 8.99% to only 7.41 %. To a large 
extent, the results found here rule out the tax competition view for the domestic 
investment case. As found in chapter 2, expecting similar effective tax rate 
measures in the case of harmonised corporate tax rules will certainly be 
misleading, especially when the irreversibility risk and income risk are 
considered. This reveals the fact that, for the effects of taxation on investment 
decisions, it is not only the corporate tax rules that matter, but also their 
interactions with the relevant variables. Although convergence in interest rates 
and inflation rates would alleviate the observed asymmetry, convergence is also 
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required in the other structural variables like the expected growth rates and the 
uncertainties governing the profitability of capital, the financial capital structures 
and the economic depreciation rates. 
Section 3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Effective tax rates are commonly employed to reveal the role of a tax system in 
the incentives or disincentives to invest given to firms. However, for simplicity, 
many studies using these measures ignore the role of uncertainty and 
irreversibility risks. As an extension of the previous chapter, this chapter analysed 
the joint effects of income uncertainty and irreversibility of investment decisions 
on the domestic effective marginal tax rates. In the second section of the chapter, 
it was shown analytically that, although the joint effect might be neutral or might 
have negative effects on the measure of tax distortion, for reasonable values it 
would have positive effects. The third section presented evidence by using actual 
data for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands that the joint effect of 
uncertainty and irreversibility will increase the commonly used marginal effective 
tax rates measures to much higher levels. 
As a second objective, the effects of including uncertainty and irreversibility were 
analysed in the case of harmonisation of the corporate tax rules towards the 
average values by considering only the four countries under investigation. The 
results suggested that, when the joint risk was incorporated, the reduction in the 
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.. ' 
obsewed~asymrnetry. was far. less .. thil.fi ttie: reduction• iri. the. ru;yrometry' in1 the: ca_se 
of~ertain,o/ .<lildi reversibility, :similar tq,the 'fmdings. in chapter 2 for the dynarriic 
effects ;of tax policy ch!:Ulges; the results. found in this• ;chapter 1have important 
impllcations for the EU since it. contradiCts the tax rcompetition' .view for the 
domestic investment .case. 
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CHAPTER4 
INVESTMENT AND AGENCY/FINANCIAL DISTRESS COSTS 
OF DEBT: A EULER EQUATION APPROACH 
Section 4.1 Introduction 
Although the neo-classical and Q models of investment are theoretically 
appealing, empirically they have performed less successfully. Both approaches 
assume perfect capital markets and rely on the irrelevance result of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). In their path-breaking paper, Modigliani and Miller propose 
that capital structure decisions will be irrelevant to a firm's value. They argue that 
internal and external funds will be perfect substitutes and that financing and 
investment decisions will be independent. Also, Miller (1991) argues that 
increased leveraging by corporations does not imply increased risk for the whole 
economy, and that financial distress of highly leveraged firms does involve mainly 
private costs. 
On the other hand, for instance, informational problems as discussed in Akerlof 
(1970), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Myers and Majluf (1984), and/or incentive 
problems as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), rule out the 
irrelevance result of Modigliani and Miller. Although there is a growing empirical 
literature about the interactions of financing and investment decisions, most of 
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these studies concentrate on cash flow and liquidity effects such as in Fazzari et 
al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), Whited (1992), Calomiris and Hubbard (1993), 
Fazzari and Peterson (1993), Him.melberg and Peterson (1994), Bond and Meghir 
(1994), Hubbard et al. (1995), Chirinko and Schaller (1995) and Lamont (1997). 
Based on informational problems, cash flow and liquidity effects are well 
documented. On the other hand, as explained in section 1.5, the theoretical 
developments in the corporate finance side concentrate on incentive problems and 
possible relations between financial capital structure and real investment 
decisions. However, unlike the empirical evidence for the cash flow and liquidity 
variables, the empirical studies for the effects of incentive problems are not 
numerous, and they fmd controversial results. For instance, Cantor (1990), 
Galeotti et al. (1994), Cuthbertson and Gasparro (1995) and Lang et al. (1996) 
fmd support for incentive problems, whereas the results of Chirinko (1987), 
Oliner ·and Rudebusch (1992) and Kopcke and Howrey (1994) reveal opposite 
fmdings. 
The controversial empirical results about the effects of incentive problems on 
investment decisions imply that more empirical investigations into these effects 
are required. Therefore, this chapter aims to make a contribution to the empirical 
literature on this issue. For that purpose, based on the Euler equation approach, a 
model is developed to test the role of financing conditions on investment 
decisions. The model considers the possible effects of agency/financial distress 
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costs of debt by incorporating an external financing premiwn via the debt-capital 
ratio. As discussed in Schiantarelli (1996), unlike cash flow and liquidity effects, 
this explicit incorporation provides a sharper test of the hypothesised relationship. 
Fazzari and Peterson (1993) point out the neglected role of working capital as a 
source of finance. Firms might be smoothing agency/financial distress costs of 
debt in the short-run with their working capital policies. Thus, the model also 
considers possible beneficiary roles of working capital. Most of the studies that 
investigate fmancial factors' effect on investment decisions include large nwnbers 
of small firms in their samples. Unlike these, using firm-level panel data for the 
UK, Germany and France, in this study only large firms are investigated, and the 
fmdings make more sense for the overall economies. Moreover, the model is 
tested for firms with different levels ofindebtedness, since it is more-likely that·--·--
this relation will hold more significantly for highly leveraged firms. 
In the next section, the basic model is developed to investigate the potential links 
between investment and agency/fmancial distress costs of debt. The third section 
describes the econometric methodology. The fourth section presents the data and 
the estimation results of the model. In the fifth section, the results of the model 
are investigated further for firms with different levels of indebtedness, and 
concluding remarks are presented in the final section. 
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Section 4.2 The Model 
In the model, it is assumed that managers aim to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders. For simplicity, a tax-free world is presumed. The return to the 
shareholders of firm i at time t comprises dividends and capital appreciation net 
of new equity issues as 
E, (V; ,+1 -NE; 1+1)- Vu + E1Div; 1+1 Pu = ' ' ' 
Vu 
(1) 
Here, E, stands for the expectations at time t, and Pu denotes the equilibrium 
required return by the shareholders of the firm i at time t, which follows from the 
usual capital market arbitrage condition. The terms V, Div, and NE represent the 
market value of equity, dividends and new equity issues. Hence, by ruling out any 
bubbles and solving equation (1) forward, the firm's market value at time zero can 
be expressed as 
(2) 
where flu = (1 + Pu )-1 • 
The firm maximises its market value under two constraints. The first constraint is 
the motion of capital stock which can be given in the discrete time as 
(3) 
where K, I, and o represent the capital stock, the fixed investment and the 
economic depreciation rate, respectively. 
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In the model, for the sake of simplicity and also because of their negligible 
quantitative relevance, the frnn's policy about the net additions to equity capital is 
taken as exogenous. To make the debt policy endogenous, it will be assumed that 
the presence of debt may create agency/financial distress costs. Agency costs of 
debt may arise because of imperfections in the financial capital markets. For 
instance, if the lenders cannot perfectly observe the acts of managers or the quality 
of the projects that the firm is undertaking, they may charge additional agency 
costs as an insurance premium which may have negative effects on the managers' 
real investment decisions. Additionally, higher levels of debt may create financial 
distress costs and may also increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. Thus, the firm 
may not be able to borrow further to undertake profitable investment 
opportunities. However, the frnn may smooth the agency/fmancial distress costs 
of debt through its working capital, since the frnn may partially replicate the 
financing role of debt or alleviate the above mentioned- pressures by its working 
capital policy. For instance, working capital policies may include using cash and 
liquid assets, and altering debt and stock policies. Thus, it is postulated that the 
agency/fmancial distress cost function depends positively on debt and negatively 
on working capital. Further, the usual external adjustment costs of capital 
investment are also considered. 
The profits of the firm i at time t are defined as 
n(Kil ,Nil)= piiF(Kil ,Nil)- wiiNil (4) 
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where F(K;,.Nit) is the linearly homogenous production function, andp, wand N 
denote the price of the good sold, price of variable inputs, and the variable inputs 
employed in the production process. The second constraint is for the definition of 
the dividend as 
where A(L K) is the strictly convex external adjustment cost function, p the price 
of the investment good, r the nominal interest rate on debt, D the stock of debt, m 
the return on employed working capital, WC the working capital. The fmal term 
X(D, WC, K) represents the agency/fmancial distress costs as a function of debt, 
working capital and capital stock. 
Using the two constraints in equation (3) and equation (5) for the maximisation 
problem stated in equation (2), the optimality conditions for N, D, WC, I and K 
can be written as 
(6) 
1- X D (Dit' wcit' Kit)- E,/Jit (1 + ril) = 0 (7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Equation (6) denotes the usual marginal productivity condition for the variable 
input vector. Equation (7) states that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of 
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debt should be equal to the discounted cost of this debt phis the associated 
agency/financial distress costs. Also, equation (7) can be arranged as 
(?a) 
implying that the firm should conduct its debt policy so as to equate the marginal 
cost of debt and equity along the optimal path. Similarly, the optimality condition 
for WC in equation (8) states that the marginal cost of an additional unit of 
working capital should equate the discounted return on working capital plus the 
associated marginal smoothing benefits of this additional unit of working capital. 
Equation (9) denotes that the firm chooses its investment rate so as to equate the 
value of an additional unit of newly installed capital to its purchase price plus the 
marginal external adjustment cost. Solving the optimality condition forward for 
capital in equation (10) yields 
showing the equality between the present discounted value of the marginal 
revenue attributable to a unit of installed capital net of associated adjustment and 
agency/ financial distress costs, and the shadow price of capital. As usual, the 
discount factor also includes the economic depreciation rate 8, since capital 
depreciates at this rate. 
156 
To obtain a feasible investment equation, the shadow value of capital A. derived in 
equation (9) can be substituted into the optimality condition of capital stated in 
equation ( 1 0) as 
(11) 
By this way, the unobservable shadow value of capital is eliminated. Also, note 
that the linearly homogenous assumption about the adjustment cost function 
A(LK) is not necessary, since the market value approach is not adapted. The 
production function was presumed linearly homogenous. Using the Euler's 
theorem, it can be rewritten as 
(12) 
Using equation (12), the definition in equation (4) and the optimality condition for 
N in equation (6), the marginal productivity of capital can be transformed to an 
observable variable as 
tr(K.1 N. ) F (K. N. ) = r ' rl K rt> rl K · Pit it 
(13) 
Hence, using equation (13) and dividing through pft, equation (11) can be 
rewritten as 
(11a) 
157 
To make the model operational, the external adjustment cost fwiction can be 
presented as 
(14) 
where <1> and a denote the adjustment cost parameter and the normal rate of 
investment. In equation (14), as the investment-capital ratio exceeds the normal 
rate of investment, the firm incurs external adjustment costs as a fraction of the 
undertaken investment. From here, the marginal adjustment costs for investment 
and capital can be derived as 
(15) 
and 
(16) 
Finally, the agency/fmancial distress cost function is given as 
(17) 
where h1 and h2 are parameters to be estimated. The function is dependent 
positively on the debt-capital ratio, and negatively on the working capital-capital 
ratio. The debt-capital ratio is multiplied by the stock of debt and weighted with 
the parameter h1. This can be viewed as an additional cost on top of the interest 
paid for debt. The working capital-capital ratio is multiplied by the working 
capital and weighted with the parameter h2. Similarly, this can be viewed as an 
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additional return on top of the income obtained from working capital. Using 
equation (17), the necessary marginality condition for capital can be derived as 
(18) 
which shows that as the capital stock increases, the agency/fmancial distress costs 
of debt decreases, but also that the smoothing benefits of working capital 
diminishes. 
Using equations (15), (16) and (18) and rearranging equation (lla) gives an 
estimable investment equation via the Euler equation for capital 
I a P;,r+l h1 D;r ~ WCu ~ I J ( )2 ( )2 (Cl> 2) I it p{, Cl> p{,Kit Cl> p{,Kit + --- E f3. (1- -- +- -- -- -- (19) 
In the estimations, the discount factor flu is treated as a parameter and also the 
industry wide prices (p/) are employed. Hence, by assuming that the expectations 
are rational and allowing for a forecast error &u , equation (19) can be transformed 
to a stochastic Euler equation as 
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where &u - N(O,d"). In equation (19a), the first three variables (the profit-capital 
ratio, the expected investment-capital ratio and the expected price ratio) control 
the current investment ratio which is net of savings in the adjustment costs due to 
changes in the capital stock. Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the 
agency/financial distress cost function X(D1,WCu, K11 ) should not enter in the 
maximisation problem, hence the optirnality condition for capital and investment. 
Thus, in this case, the final two terms, especially the squared debt-capital ratio, 
should not matter. However, if the agency/financial distress costs- are binding, 
then the squared debt-capital ratio should be significant. Also, the squared 
working capital-capital ratio should be significant if the firms are using working 
capital policies to assist their investment decisions. 
Section 4.3 Econometric Issues 
For estimation purposes, by also considering the firm-speciflc effects, the 
investment equation in (19a) can be rewritten as 
v _ lTJ uJ ( fru ) uJ (p/+1 Jt.t+l) lTJ (p/+1) 
1 u-ro+rl 1 +r2 I +r3 I 
Pu K;, p, Kt,t+l Pt 
(20) 
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where . = (!JI_) - _!_ (!JI_) 2 Y;, K 2 K ' 
it it 
TJ; denotes the firm-specific effects and 
'I' 4 = !!J_ and 'I' 5 = - !!1._ . The coefficient 'I' o is the constant. 'I' 1 is the inverse of <I> <I> 
the adjustment cost parameter, and it should be positive. '¥2 denotes the discount 
factor including the economic depreciation rate, and it should be positive. '¥3 
represents the coefficient for the expected price ratio, and its sign depends on the 
magnitudes of <I> and a. '¥4 is the coefficient on the squared debt-capital ratio, and 
it is expected to have a positive sign if agency costs of debt are binding. '¥5 
represents the coefficient on the squared working capital-capital ratio, and it is 
expected to have a negative sign if working capital is employed as a source of 
finance. 
As can be seen from equation (20), there is an obvious simultaneity problem 
because of the one-period ahead values of the investment-capital ratio. The 
simultaneity can also occur because of the debt/capital and working capital-capital 
ratios. Since debt and working capital decisions are not necessarily exogenous, 
they may well depend on management's knowledge of investment opportunities. 
When the error terms and explanatory variables are correlated, estimated 
parameters will be biased. Thus, the estimation of equation (20) requires to 
employ some sort of instrumental variables which will be orthogonal to the error 
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terms. Observe from equation (20) that removing the means to eliminate the firm-
specific effects may violate the orthogonality conditions and thereby cause 
estimation bias. Therefore, instead of estimating the model in levels, the first-
difference of the model was employed as suggested by Anderson and Hisao 
(1982). This eliminates the firm-specific effects as 
(21) 
where !J. denotes the frrst-difference operator. For the estimation of equation (21), 
the generalised method of moments (GMM) technique outlined in Hansen (1982) 
was used. Hansen and Singleton (1982) describe how the GMM technique cari be-
used for estimating the parameters of dynamic objective functions of decision 
makers without solving for the stochastic equilibrium, with an application for an 
intertemporal asset pricing model. Arellano ( 1989) shows that the estimator that 
uses the levels instead of differences as instruments has much smaller variances. 
Following his suggestion, for the estimation of equation (21), time t-2 and t-3 
instruments in levels were employed, which will still be orthogonal to the 
moving-average error that is caused by the frrst-difference of the model. However, 
time t-2 values of the one-period ahead investment-capital ratio would be time t-1 
values, thus violating the orthogonality conditions. In addition, the difference 
between Yu and the investment-capital ratio is only the squared investment-capital 
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ratio, making them almost the same. Considering this, the employed instrument 
set S can be presented as 
( )
2 
1C fC. PI I D. 
S - V V 1,1-2 1,1-3 ~ Pt-3 1,1-2 
- ~ i,t-2' ~ i,t-3' I ' I ' I ' I ' 1 ' 
{ Pt,I-2KI,I-2 Pi,t-3Ki,l-3 Pl-3 Pt-4 Pt,t-2Ki,t-2 
(22) 
To estimate the necessary parameters, first a preliminary two-stage least square 
(2SLS) estimation was carried out to construct the required optimal weighting 
matrix. The first-step 2SLS estimation of the parameters can be written as 
l£l = (M'Z(Z'Z)-1 Z'M)-1 M'Z(Z'Z)-1 z·~y (23) 
where ~y is NT" 1 stacked vector of observations on ~Y11 , M is a NT*K matrix 
and each column of it represents the stacked observations on the right-hand side 
variables, and Z is aNT* J matrix and each column of it represents the stacked 
observations on the employed instruments. Here, NT, K, and J denote the total 
sample size, the number of the right-hand side variables, and the number of the 
instruments, respectively. The variance-covariance matrix of the estimated 
parameters will be 
var(~Jl) =a~. (M'Z(Z'Z)-1 Z'M)-1• (24) 
Then, usmg the estimated residuals of the first-step estimator, the optimal 
weighting matrix can be constructed as 
(25) 
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where Av is the NT*l vector of residuals from the first-step estimation. As a 
second-step, by using this optimal weighting matrix, the GMM estimation can be 
carried out as 
(23a) 
where 
(24a) 
The weighting matrix given above does not account for possible 
heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. For a more efficient estimation, the 
weighting matrix was altered by employing the method presented in Newey and 
West (1987) to obtain a heteroscedasticity and frrst-order autocorrelation 
consistent covariance matrix. The GMM estimation is based on the moment 
conditions between the instruments and the error terms. Thus, the minimum 
distance estimator will be 'i' that minimises 
Av'ZW;/ Z'Av . (26) 
As suggested by Hansen (1982), to test the orthogonality conditions between the 
error terms and the instruments, one can test whether the minimum distance 
criteria is significantly different than zero. The test statistic is given as 
A ,zw-lz'A d 2 
oV M oV ~ X(J-K) (27) 
where J denotes the number of instruments employed, and K represents the 
number of parameters in the model. Actually the test is an extension of an earlier 
test proposed by Sargan (195 8). The Ho hypothesis claims that the imposed 
moment conditions will be zero, and the alternative H 1 hypothesis says that it will 
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be significantly different from zero. If J ~ K, the model will be under-identified or 
exactly identified, and there will be nothing to test. Therefore, to be able to test 
the validity of the moment conditions, or in other terms, the validity of the 
employed instruments, one must over-identify the model by setting J> K. 
The resulting GMM estimator described above does not cover all the available 
moment conditions between the error terms and the instruments. For instance, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using additional available instruments. Baltagi 
(1995) chapter 8 covers a survey on this topic. However, although in a single 
linear static equation context, Bi0rn and Klette (1998) show that only a small 
fraction of the potential orthogonality conditions are essential, namely those based 
on one-period and two-period differences. 
Section 4.4 Data and Estimation Results 
The estimations were carried out for the UK, Germany and France. Panel data was 
collected from Datastream for the firms which are gathered under the general 
industries classification. As in chapter 2, these companies constitute many of the 
largest industrial companies in the UK, Germany and France. Most of the studies 
that investigate financial factors' effect on investment decisions include large 
numbers of small firms in their samples. Unlike these, in this study only large 
firms were investigated, and the fmdings make more sense in terms of the whole 
economy since these firms form a very large fraction of the total investment. 
165 
Table 4.1 gives information about the size of the companies employed by using 
the average values of the market value of equity from 1992 to 1996 in terms of 
each countries' currency. Figures ranging from hundred of millions to billion 
pounds, marks and francs show that the finns are notably large. 
Table 4.1 Size Information About the Firms 
' 000,000 
0-250 
250-500 
500-1000 
1000-2000 
2000 and Over 
'000,000 
0-250 
250-500 
500- 1000 
1000-2000 
2000 and Over 
'000,000 
0-250 
250-500 
500-1000 
1000-2000 
2000 and Over 
Mean 
172.35 
377.61 
714.64 
1,373.63 
3,897.70 
Mean 
245.01 
423.45 
714.02 
1,406.64 
10,231.63 
Mean 
780.87 
1,544.51 
13,945.65 
UK-76 Firms 
Median 
180.33 
370.87 
706.99 
1,324.23 
2,309.00 
German~-38 Firms 
Median 
245 .01 
473.04 
710.59 
1,413.20 
4,932.70 
France-26 Firms 
Median 
792.21 
1,634.40 
7,210.00 
Stdev. 
38.87 
84.90 
116.34 
297.89 
2,832.47 
Stdev. 
84.18 
137.41 
41.87 
10,385.23 
Stdev. 
148.97 
338.17 
15,285.35 
No. ofFirms 
20 
18 
15 
12 
11 
No. ofFirms 
1 
5 
9 
5 
18 
No. ofFirms 
4 
5 
17 
Because the model includes squared variables, to reduce the measurement errors 
the companies with very excessive values were excluded from the samples. For 
the UK panel data was collected for 76 companies for the period 1982-1996 for 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of the Model Variables 
United Kingdom Nobs. Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
.1Y;, 836 -0.0038 0.0684 -0.3363 0.3019 
~( .~r;,t p{,K J 836 -0.0010 0.0824 -0.8897 0.7890 
.1(p{+t Ii,t+t I p{ Kt,t+t) 836 -0.0055 0.0923 -0.5723 0.5051 
-1(p{+1 I p{) 836 -0.0039 0.0322 -0.0573 0.0564 
.1(Dit I p{,Kil )2 836 -0.0041 0.2941 -4.2337 4.5909 
.1(wc11 1 p{,K11 ) 2 836 -0.0727 1.0476 -7.6021 13.0540 
German~ Nobs. Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
.1Y;, 190 -0.0066 0.0266 -0.0863 0.0694 
~(tr11 1 p{,KJ 190 -0.0086 0.0406 -0.2371 0.1259 
-1(p{+Ji,t+t I p{ Ki,t+t) 190 -0.0114 0.0292 -0.1058 0.0813 
.1(p{+t I p{) 190 -0.0102 0.0068 -0.0174" -0.0002 
-1(D11 I p{,K11 ) 2 190 -0.0017 0.0382 -0.1618 0.2937 ° • 
.1(WC11 1 p{,K11 ) 2 190 -0.0632 0.2338 -1.2628 1.3433 
France Nobs. Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
.1Yil 130 -0.0070 0.0291 -0.0961 0.1051 
~(tr11 1 p1~KJ 130 -0.0074 0.0521 -0.1667 0.1798 
-1(p{+tf;,,+t I p{ K;,t+t) 130 -0.0078 0.0324 -0.1185 0.1008 
-1(p{+1 I p{) 130 -0.0064 0.0112 -0.0269 0.0039 
-1(D11 I p{,K11 ) 2 130 -0.0280 0.1091 -0.5587 0.4761 
.1(wcu 1 p{,K11 ) 2 130 -0.0891 0.3290 -1.6827 1.0969 
fifteen years. For Germany and France, the available number of companies that 
had the whole necessary data set dropped significantly over the period of 1982-
1996. Thus, the time dimension was constrained for the period 1988-1996 for nine 
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years. For Germany, data for 38 companies, and for France, data for 26 companies 
were obtained. First-differencing the data, and also using time t-2 and t-3 values in 
levels as instruments, gave a total sample size of 836 for the UK, 190 for 
Germany, and 130 for France. Table 4.2 gives the summary statistics for the 
model variables over the estimation period. 
The construction of the necessary variables and related Datastream codes are as 
follows. To calculate the replacement values of capital (p1K), the unobservable 
economic depreciation rates (0) were required. Thus, as in section 2.6, the 
equation of motion for the capital described in equation (3) was solved as a 
non-linear system by employing firm-level panel data. The system contains 14 
equations for the UK, and 8 equations for Germany and France. The obtained 
results were as 
Parameter UK 
0.0616 
(0.0017) 
Germany 
0.0833 
(0.0049) 
France 
0.0454 
(0.0054) 
where the standard errors of the estimated parameters are reported in parentheses. 
As in section 2.6, by using the estimated economic depreciation rates, the 
necessary replacement values for the capital figures were calculated from the 
perpetual inventory formula by employing the total new fixed asset figures [435 
for Germany and France, and 435 and 1024 for the UK], and the historical values 
of capital [330 for the UK and France, and 2005 for Germany]. The price 
index (p1) is the implicit price deflator of gross fixed capital formation, which is 
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Table 4.3 GMM Estimation of the Euler Equations: All Firms 
UNITED KINGDOM- (76 Firms, 11 Years2 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
'!'I 0.4847 0.2005 2.4177 0.0156 
'¥2 0.2858 0.2222 1.2860 0.1985 
'¥3 0.4018 0.2252 1.7839 0.0744 
'¥4 0.1045 0.0719 1.4544 0.1458 
't's -0.0262 0.0124 -2.1108 0.0348 
Test Result Significance 
Hansen x,2~62 9.5342 0.1457 
GERMANY- (38 Firms, 5Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
0.3308 0.2065 1.6012 0.1092 
0.6299 0.2923 2.1 551 0.0312 
0.5227 0.2615 2.0758 0.0379 
0.5395 0.2799 1.9269 0.0540 
-0.1667 0.0580 -2. 8737 0.0041 
Test Result Significance 
Hansen x,\62 4.8445 0.5639 
FRANCE- (26 Firms, 5Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
0.4441 0.1036 4.2854 0.0000 
0.4275 0.2879 1.4847 0.1376 
-0.1117 0.4697 -0.2379 0.8120 
0.1010 0.0349 2.8940 0.0038 
-0.0292 0.0257 -1.1360 0.2560 
Test Result Significance 
10.8027 0.0947 
[UKIPDMNIF] for the UK, [BDIPDCAPE] for Germany and [FRIPDCFME] for 
France. For the profit, debt and working capital figures, respectively, pre-tax 
profits [154], total debt [309+321], and total working capital [376) figures were 
employed. 
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To test whether the agency/financial distress costs of debt are important for 
investment decisions, the first-difference of the stochastic Euler equation for 
capital given in equation (21) was estimated using the GMM technique as 
described in the previous section. For possible time effects, the inclusion of time 
dummies were considered via the residual sum of squares criteria. The Euler 
equations were estimated both with and without time dummies. In all cases, the 
inclusion of time dummies increased the value of the residual sum of squares. 
Thus, the reported results do not include time dummies. As can be seen from table 
4.3, the results of the over-identifying restriction (Hansen) tests indicate that the 
instruments are orthogonal to the error terms for the three panels, validating the 
imposed moment conditions and the instruments employed in the estimations. 
Note that the Ho hypothesis claims that the error terms and the instruments are not 
correlated. Thus, the higher the p-value of the test, the less the probability of 
making a mistake in accepting the Ho hypothesis. The standard errors and the t-
tests in table 4.3 are robust to general heteroscedasticity and first-order 
autocorrelation, where the correction was made via the Newey-West procedure. 
The estimation results for \f' 1 parameters are very significant, and they all have 
positive signs as expected. They are, respectively, 0.48, 0.33 and 0.44 for the UK, 
Germany and France with t-statistics of 2.42, 1.60 and 4.29. These are the 
coefficients on the profit-capital ratios, and they are the inverse of the adjustment 
cost parameters <D. The results are at quite reasonable levels compared to the 
adjustment cost parameters estimated in section 2. 7. Obviously this result is due 
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to the elimination of the shadow value of capital, and employment of the Euler 
equation method for estimating the investment-capital ratios. The 't'2 parameters 
imply the inverse cost of capital values, and they all appear with positive signs as 
in equation (21 ). Although the estimated coefficients are unreasonably high, 
observe from equation (7a) that this is qualitatively consistent with the model 
assumptions, since the cost of debt also includes the associated agency/fmancial 
distress costs of debt as an additional premium. The signs of the price coefficients 
't'3 depend on the magnitudes of the adjustment cost parameters and the normal 
rate of investment parameters for each country. They appear significant with 
positive signs for the UK and Germany, and negative and insignificant for France. 
More importantly, observe from equation (17) that the agency/fmancial distress 
cost of debt was given as a function of debt, working capital, and capital. It was 
hypothesised that if the agency/financial distress costs of debt are important, then 
there should be a positive relation between the investment-capital ratio and the 
squared debt-capital ratio. On the other hand, it was also discussed that firms 
might smooth these pressures and costs via their working capital policy. In this 
case, it was hypothesised that there should be a negative relation between 
investment-capital and squared working capital-capital ratios. Estimation results 
reveal that the 't'4 coefficients are all positive. Although the corresponding 
/-ratio is only 1.45 for UK furns, it is significant at 6% level for German furns 
and I% level for French firms. Also, as expected according to the model 
171 
assumptions, the \f/5 coefficients appear with negative signs for the UK, Gennany 
and France with t-ratios of -2.11, -2.87 and -1.14, respectively. 
Obviously, the results indicate that the agency/financial distress costs are binding 
so that debt financing matters, playing a significant role in management's 
investment decisions. However, to some extent, firms have the ability to smooth 
these pressures and alleviate the costs by the way of their working capital policy. 
As proposed earlier, a possible explanation for this result is that when lenders 
cannot perfectly observe the acts of managers or the quality of the projects that the 
firm is undertaking, they may charge additional agency costs as an insurance 
premium. For instance, as in Smith and Warner (1979), to protect themselves, 
debt holders may demand covenants that restrict management behaviour in 
various ways. From the frrm's point of view, this would create an additional 
external fmancing premium in addition to the interest rate on debt, which may · -
have negative effects on the managers' real investment decisions. With higher 
levels of debt, it is likely that the value of tax savings due to additional 
borrowings may disappear because of the additional fmancial distress costs. 
Further, higher levels of debt may also increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and 
the firms may not be able borrow further. 
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Section 4.5 Splitting The Sample 
In section 4.2, it was argued that if there are imperfections in the credit markets, 
possible agency/financial distress costs of debt may affect the investment 
decisions in negative ways. Considering the possible smoothing effects of the 
working capital policies, evidence was given of the above-mentioned hypothesis 
for the firms Wlder study. However, it is likely that the firms with higher leverage 
ratios will face more significant costs and pressures of debt. In this section, to 
measure these possibilities, the model presented in equation (21) is tested for 
firms with different levels of indebtedness for the three coWltries. Thus, the three 
samples for the UK, Germany and France were split into two subsamples 
according to their book leverage ratios. 
Table 4.4 gives ·the summary statistics for ·the leverage ratios of the low-leverage· --- -
and high-leverage groups for the three countries. The sample split criterion is the 
arithmetic average of the mean and the median of each sample. The split criterion 
is 28.86% for the UK firms, 19.05% for the German firms and 42.46% for the 
French firms. The number of firms in the low-leverage group is 34 out of 76 
firms for the UK, 21 out of 38 firms for Germany, and 14 out of 26 firms for 
France. Among the three countries, the French firms under investigation appear 
with the highest average leverage ratio of 43.35%, whereas the German firms 
appear with the lowest average leverage ratio of 20.24%. 
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Table 4.4 Summary Statistics of Leverage Ratios 
UK-LEVERAGE (%), 1983-1996 
Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max. Number 
All Firms 28.2129 29.5136 9.1669 7.2621 53.9236 76 
Low-Leverage 20.1695 21.3054 5.6454 7.2621 28.5700 34 
High-Leverage 34.7243 33.4057 5.5664 29.0343 53 .9236 42 
GERMANY-LEVERAGE{%), 1989-1996 
Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max. Number 
All Firms 20.2431 17.8638 12.4678 2.4888 54.1363 38 
Low-Leverage 11.3909 11.6300 5.3453 2.4888 19.0263 21 
High-Leverage 31.1782 27.5325 9.6877 19.3650 54.1363 17 
FRANCE-LEVERAGE{%), 1989-1996 
Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max. Number 
All Firms 43.3457 41.5825 17.8422 15.5750 88.7388 26 
Low-Leverage 30.4703 31 .6969 8.4249 15.5750 41.6475 14 
High-Leverage 58.3669 59.3531 13.5088 42.8783 88.7388 12 
Using the subsamples described above, estimations were carried out first for the 
low-leverage group, and then for highly leveraged firms. Table 4.5 gives the 
GMM estimation results for the low-leverage groups for the three countries. The 
results are robust to general heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. The 
over-identifying restriction tests indicate that the employed instruments are valid 
for the three countries. The estimated '¥1, '¥2 and '¥3 parameters all appear with 
the expected positive signs. However, some of the parameters are not very 
significant, especially the '¥1 parameter for Germany. Interestingly, the '¥4 
parameters appear to be insignificant for all countries. It comes with a positive 
sign, but it has a !-ratio of 1.33 for the UK. Although it is positive for 
France, it comes with a very insignificant !-ratio. For German firms, it comes with 
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Table 4.5 GMM Estimation of the Euler Equations: Low-Leverage Group 
'PI 
'P2 
'P3 
'P4 
'Ps 
Hansen x.\6~ 
'PI 
'P2 
'P3 
'P4 
'Ps 
Hansen x.\6~ 
UNITED KINGDOM- (34 Firms, 11 Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T -Stat 
0.5978 0.2648 2.2573 
0.3055 0.2611 1.1702 
0.5415 0.3720 1.4555 
0.1977 0.1492 1.3250 
-0.0418 0.0232 -1.8068 
Significance 
0.0240 
0.2419 
0.1455 
0.1852 
0.0708 
Test Result Significance Level 
8.3220 0.2155 
GERMANY- (21 Firms, 5Years~ 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
0.1 311 0.1671 0.7845 0.4327 
0.3771 0.3076 1.226 1 0.2202 
0.6180 0.3093 1.9979 0.0572 
-0.3866 0.6445 -0.5999 0.5486 
-0.0421 0.0375 -1. 1247 0.2607 
Test Result Significance Level 
9.0255 0.1722 
FRANCE - (14 Firms, 5Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
0.3758 0.2298 1.6355 0.1020 
0.4763 0.3088 1.5423 0.1230 
0.6483 0.5576 1.1626 0.2450 
0.0121 0.0890 0.1361 0.8917 
-0.0455 0.0291 -1.5664 0.1173 
Test Result Significance Level 
5.7188 0.4554 
a negative and very insignificant sign. On the other hand, the "Ps parameters 
appear with the expected negative signs for the three countries. The t-ratios for 
these parameters are -1.81 for UK. firms, -1.12 for German fums and -1.57 for 
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Table 4.6 GMM Estimation of the Euler Equations: High-Leverage Group 
Hansenx\6) 
Hansen x\6) 
UNITED KINGDOM- (42 Firms, 11 Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
0.5860 0.2532 2.3301 0.0198 
0.0301 0.0310 0.0970 0.9227 
0.2607 0.2598 1.0033 0.3 157 
0.0633 0.0338 1.8724 0.0611 
-0.0192 0.0086 -2.2308 0.0198 
Test Result Significance Level 
6.5594 
GERMANY- (17 Firms, 5Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat 
0.2920 0.1528 1.9107 
0.2615 0.2023 1.2926 
0.3134 
0.3080 
-0.0583 
0.3974 
0.1558 
0.0322 
0.7887 
1.9765 
-1.8132 
0.3635 
Significance 
0.0560 
0.1962 
0.4303 
0.0481 
0.0698 
Test Result Significance Level 
10.8577 0.0929 
FRANCE- (12 Firms, 5Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
0.2365 0.0778 3.0393 0.0024 
0.1902 0.2104 0.9039 0.3660 
-0.3448 0.4963 -0.6948 0.4872 
0.0626 0.0273 2.2946 0.0218 
0.0109 0.0157 0.6955 0.4868 
Test Result Significance Level 
7.7999 0.2531 
French firms. Not surprisingly, the results suggest that the low-leverage groups do 
not face significant agency/financial distress costs of debt. In other words, the 
hypothesised costs and pressures do not bind the investment decisions of these 
firms, and debt policy does not matter for their investment decisions. In addition, 
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the results reveal that, although not significantly, these firms use their working 
capital policies to assist their investment activities. 
Table 4.6 presents the results for the high-leverage groups. The over-identifying 
restriction tests verify the imposed moment conditions and the employed 
instruments. The '¥1 parameters on the profit-capital ratios all appear with positive 
significant signs. The '¥2 and '¥3 coefficients appear to be very insignificant. 
Moreover, the '¥2 coefficients come with very small values, implying unjustifiable 
cost of capital measures. However, as mentioned earlier, this observation 1s 
qualitatively inline with the agency/financial distress costs of debt argument. 
As expected, the 'I' 4 parameters all appear with positive and significant signs. The 
related !-ratios are 1.87 for the UK, 1.98 for Germany and 2.29 for France, 
implying significant agency/financial distress costs of debt. Although the 'I' 5 
parameter appears with an opposite and very insignificant !-ratio for French firms, 
the results suggest that UK and German firms significantly use their working 
capital policies to smooth these costs and pressures. Overall, the fmdings show 
that the agency/fmancial distress costs of debt matter for the high-leverage groups, 
implying important interactions between fmancing and investment decisions. 
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Section 4.6 Concluding Remarks 
Both the Q theory and neo-classical theory of investment draw on the proposition 
of Modigliani and Miller, asswning perfectly operating fmancial markets and 
exogenous fmancing decisions. However, information and incentive problems 
may create frictions in financial capital markets and undermine the MM theory's 
applicability which assumes perfect capital markets. The imperfect substitution 
between internally generated and externally raised funds due to imperfect 
information and incentive problems can create an external fmancing premium. 
Moreover, some firms might be under financial distress, or even credit rationed. 
Thus, unlike Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance result, financing conditions may 
have important implications on investment decisions. 
Studies testing the possible relations between investment and financing decisions 
mostly documented cash flow and liquidity effects. However, existing empirical 
studies about the effects of incentive problems on investment decisions reveal a 
controversy while at the same time showing that empirical investigations into 
these effects are important. Thus, in this chapter, using the Euler equation 
approach and based on the agency/fmancial distress costs of debt, an investment 
equation was derived to test the role of debt fmancing conditions on investment 
decisions. In the model, we also considered the possible beneficiary role of 
working capital on the asset side of the balance sheet to smooth these costs. 
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Using panel data, the analyses were carried out for the UK, Germany and France. 
In the model, it was hypothesised that if the agency/fmancial distress·costs of debt 
were binding, then the squared debt-capital ratio in the investment equation 
should appear with a significant positive coefficient. Similarly, if the firms were 
using their working capital policy to smooth these costs, the squared working 
capital-capital ratio should have a significant negative coefficient. The estimation 
results revealed that the perfect financial capital markets hypothe.ses were not 
. 
acceptable. According to the developed model, the agency/fmancial distress costs 
of debt were important so that debt financing had a significant role in 
management's investment decisions. However, to some extent, firms had the 
ability to smooth these costs and alleviate pressures through their working capital 
policy on the asset side of their balance sheets. 
It was argued that, more likely, the firms with higher leverage ratios would face 
more significant costs and pressures of debt. To measure these possibilities, the 
model was tested for firms with different levels of indebtedness for the three 
countries. Thus, the samples were split into two subsamples according to their 
book leverage ratios. Not surprisingly, the results revealed that the 
agency/financial distress costs of debt did matter for the high-leverage groups, 
whereas it was not significant for the low-leverage groups. 
Overall, the results show that imperfections in the markets exist, financing and 
investment decisions interact, and the financing conditions have important 
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implications for investment decisions. Naturally, these effects are in different 
magnitudes and combinations in different countries. However, it is for the hlgh-
leverage group of all three countries that these hypothesised costs and pressures of 
debt matter. The agency costs of debt might occur when lenders cannot perfectly 
observe the acts of managers or the quality of the projects that the ftrm is 
undertaking. They may charge additional agency costs as an insurance premium to 
protect themselves and/or restrict management behaviour in various ways. Higher 
levels of debt may create additional fmancial distress costs, increase the likelihood 
of bankruptcy, and restrict the ftnns to borrow further. Moreover, as discussed in 
Myers ( 1977), in the case of a hlghly leveraged ftrrn, since most of the return from 
a positive net present value project will be distributed to debt holders, the managers 
may not be willing to exploit all the available growth opportunities if they are acting 
in the shareholders' interests. 
The fmdings of this study imply important effects for the three economies, since it 
was conducted by using only large industrial ftnns which constitute a very large 
fraction of the total investment in the UK, German and French economies. Thus, 
contrary to Miller's argument, leverage increases by corporations may increase the 
economy-wide costs, risk and financial distress. 
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CHAPTERS 
CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, THE Q RATIO AND 
INVESTMENT: THE UK CASE 
Section 5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, based on the stochastic Euler equation for capital, an 
investment equation was derived to test the possible relationships between 
investment decisions and balance sheet variables. In this approach the 
unobservable shadow value of capital was eliminated via substitution. In this 
chapter, an alternative model will be derived in which the unobservable shadow 
value of capital will be converted to an observable one, again by considering the 
possible agency/financial distress costs of debt. The possible smoothing benefits 
of the working capital will also be taken into account. An application will be 
carried out for UK firms to test this alternative representation. 
The approach is an extended version of the standard Q model of investment which 
considers the possible imperfections in the capital markets and the interactions 
between financing and investment decisions. The next section presents the model 
developed in a continuous time framework and a tax-free world. It starts from the 
usual value maxirnisation objective. In this structural model, investment becomes 
a function of marginal q. Section 5.3 converts the unobservable marginal q to an 
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observable one under the model assumptions. Section 5.4 presents the data and 
the estimation results. The final section concludes. 
Section 5.2 The Model 
In the model, for simplicity, we assume a tax-free world. As in chapter 4, the net 
equity issue policy is taken as exogenous. By ruling out any bubbles, the usual 
continuous time value maximisation objective can be presented as 
"" 
V(O) = max fe-p1 [Div(O)- NE(O)]dt (1) 
0 
where the terms p, NE and Div denote the required nominal rate of return, the new 
equity issue and the dividend, respectively. For ease of exposition, both the firm 
and the time notations will be suppressed. Four constraints are introduced into the 
maxirnisation problem. The first one is the motion of capital stock 
dK 
-=I-oK 
dt 
(2) 
where K, I and o represent the capital stock, the investment and the depreciation 
rate. The second and the third constraints are the motion of debt and working 
capital as 
182 
dD 
-=B 
dt 
dWC 
--=L 
dt 
(3) 
(4) 
where D and B denote the stock of debt and net borrowing, and WC and L denote 
the working capital and the net change in the working capital. It is assumed that 
the agency/financial distress costs of debt depend on the level of the stock of debt 
and on net borrowing. Additionally, the possible smoothing role of working 
capital is considered. It is assumed that this smoothing function depends on the 
net change in working capital and on the level of working capital stock. Also, the 
usual external adjustment costs of investment are considered. Hence, the final 
constraint is for the definition of dividend which includes the adjustment costs of 
capital, the possible agency/financial distress costs of debt, and the smoothing 
benefits of the working capital as 
Div=fpF(K,N)-wN-/(I+A(I,K))+NE-r(D+X(B,D))+B+l1(WC+S(L,WC))-L](5) 
where F(K,N) is the production function, A(I,K) the strictly convex external 
adjustment cost function, X(B,D) the agency/fmancial distress cost function, 
S(L, WC) the smoothing benefit function, p the price of output, N the variable input 
vector, w the nominal price vector of the variable input vector, / the price of 
investment good, r the nominal interest rate on debt, m the nominal rate of return 
on working capital. 
The functional relationships F(K,N), A(I,K), X(B,D) and S(L, WC) are all assumed 
to be linearly homogenous in their arguments. Further, it is postulated that the 
agency/financial distress costs of debt are positively dependent on net borrowing 
and stock of debt, and priced in terms of the nominal interest rate on debt. 
Similarly the smoothing benefits are positively dependent on net change in 
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working capital and stock of working capital and priced in terms of the nominal 
rate of return on working capital. By ignoring the linear term, the quadratic 
external adjustment cost function is introduced as 
1 (I )2 A (I, K) = <l> K- a K (6) 
where, <l> is the adjustment cost parameter and a is the normal rate of investment. 
Using the four constraints, the maximisation problem in equation (1) can be 
rewritten as 
00 
V= max fe-pt [pF(K,N)- wN- p 1 (I+ A(I,K)) + B- r(D + X(B, D))- L 
0 
+ n(WC+S(L,WC)) +A(/ -liK -dK/dt)+ f(B- dD/dt)+ H(L- dWC/dt)]dt(7) 
where the symbols A, r and H represent the related Lagrange multipliers. 
Respectively, the flrst-order conditions for N, K, I, D, B, WC and L will be 
OF(K,N) 
p =w 8N 
(8) 
dA < "'), OF(K,N) 1 oA(l,K) 
-=p+u/lo-p +p dt ilK ilK (9) 
00 
A = I e -(p+b")s [p OF( K' N)/ oK - pI oA( I, K)/ ilK]ds (9a) 
1 1 oA(I,K) A=p +p iJI (10) 
dr dr(B,D) 
- = pr + r + r _ _:___.:.____:_ 
dt 8D 
(11) 
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<X> 
- r = Je-ps[r + r t:K(B,D)jb'D]dS' 
-r = 1- r t:K(B,D) 
8B 
dH =pH_ m- m iS(L,WC) 
dt owe 
<X> 
H = Je-ps[m + miS(L,WC)jbWC]dS' 
H = 1- m iS(L,WC) 
8L 
(lla) 
(12) 
(13) 
{13a) 
(14) 
Equation (8) denotes the usual marginal productivity condition for the variable 
input vector. Solving the optimality condition for capital in equation (9) yields 
equation (9a), showing the equality between the present discounted value of the 
marginal revenue attributable to a unit of installed capital and the shadow price of 
capital. The optimality condition for I in equation ( 1 0) states that the firm chooses 
the rate of investment so as to equate the value of an additional unit of newly 
installed capital to its purchase price plus the marginal adjustment cost. 
Equation (11) is the shadow value of debt, and solving this equation gives 
equation (11a). Equation (11a) states that the marginal cost of additional debt is 
the present value of the nominal interest rate on debt plus the associated marginal 
agency/financial distress costs. Since debt is a liability, the shadow value comes 
with a negative sign. Equation (12) shows that the marginal benefit of this 
additional debt equals the receipts minus the associated agency/financial distress 
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costs. At the steady state, by using the condition derived in equation (12), 
equation (11) also implies that the furn should conduct the debt policy so as to 
equate the marginal cost of debt and equity along the optimal path. Solving the 
optimality condition for working capital gives equation (13a), indicating that the 
marginal benefit of additional working capital is the present value of the nominal 
rate ofreturn on working capital plus the associated marginal smoothing benefits. 
Finally, equation (14) states that the marginal cost of this additional working 
capital will be the unit of spending net of the associated smoothing benefits. 
Next, using equation (6) and manipulating equation (1 0) yields an investment 
equation as 
_!_=a+_!__(~ -1). 
K <I> PI 
(15) 
Since/ and A. are, respectively, the unit purchase price and the shadow value of 
capital, the term (A. I p 1 ) can be defined as Tobin's marginal q. As usual, 
equation (15) implies that if marginal q is greater than one, then the marginal 
value of the project exceeds its replacement cost and the furn should undertake 
the project, or vice versa. However, in practice it is not possible to observe the 
marginal q, and for the purpose of estimation it should be converted to an 
observable variable. 
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Section 5.3 The Observable Q 
In this section we derive an empirically feasible expression for the unobservable 
marginal q ratio under the imperfect financial capital markets considering the 
asswnptions of the model. 
Proposition: For the model which is described above, an observable relation such 
as 
A.(O) V(O) + D(O)- WC(O)- (1 + f(O))D(O) + (1- H(O))WC(O) 
p 1 (0) = p 1 (O)K(O) (16) 
holds along the optimal path, if and only if the functions F(K,N), A(LK), X(B,D) 
and S(L, WC) are linearly homogeneous in their argwnents. 
Proof: Using the linearly homogeneous asswnption for F(K,N), A(LK), X(B,D) 
and S(L, WC), from the Euler's theorem 
F(K N) = IJF(K,N) K + iJF(K,N) N 
' iJK iJN 
(17) 
A( I K) = iJA(I, K) I+ iJA(I, K) K 
' IJI ilK (18) 
X(B D)= OX(B,D) B+ OX(B,D) D 
, 8B iJD (19) 
S(L WC)= iE(L, WC) L + iE(L, WC) WC. 
' OL owe (20) 
Using the conditions derived in equations (8) and (17), the marginal productivity 
condition of capital will be 
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OF(K,N) _pF(K,N)-wN 
IJK - pK (21) 
Consider the term [A.K + (1 + r)D- (1- H)WC]e-pt. The time derivative of this 
term can be written as 
d[AK +(1 + r)D- (1- H)WC]e-pt = [(dA.fdt)K + A.(dK/dt)- pAK + (dr/dt)D 
dt 
+ r(dD/dt)- p[D + (dDjdt)- pD + (dH/dt)WC + H(dWC/dt)- pHWC. 
- (dWC/dt) + pWC]e-pt. (22) 
Using equations (2), (3), (4), (9), (11) and (13), the equality in equation (22) can 
be rewritten as 
d[AK +(l+f)D-(1-H)WC]e-.a =[((p+O)A.- piF(K,N)/iK + p 1 oA(I,K)/iK)K 
+A.(!- t5K)- pA.K + (pf + r + r oX(B, D)joD)D + r B- pf D + B- pD 
(pH- m- miS(L, WC)/ OWC)WC + HL- pHWC- L + pWC]e -pt dt. (23) 
Adjusting equation (23) yields 
d[AK + (1 + r)D- (1- H)WC]e-pl = [-p(8F(K,N)/8K)K + p 1 (oA(I, K)/IJK)K 
+ AJ + rD + r(IJX(B,D)/t3D)D + fB+ B- pD- mWC- m(iS(L,WC)/OWC)WC 
+ HL- L + pWC]e-pt dt. (24) 
Then, using equations (10), (12), (14) and (21), and adjusting equation (24) gives 
d[AK + (1 + r)D- (1- H)WC]e-pt = [-pF(K, N) + wN + p 1 (oA(I,K)/IJK)K 
+ p 1 I+ p 1 (oA(I,K)/ol)I + rD + r(IJX(B,D)/oD)D- B + r(IJX(B,D)/oB)B 
+B-pD-mWC-rr(iS(L,WC)/CWC)WC+L-rr(iS(L,WC)ja.)L-L+pWC]e-.adt.(25) 
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Multiplying equation (25) by minus one, integrating from zero to infinity, and 
using equations (18), (19) and (20) yields 
"' 
[A(O)K(0)+(1+r(O))D(0)-(1-H(O))WC(O)]= JpF(K,N)-wN- p 1 (I -J-A(/,K))+B 
0 
"' "' . 
-r(D+X(B,D))+n(WC+S(L,WC))-LY11dt+ Je-11 [pD-B]dt- Je-11 [pWC-L]dt.(26) 
0 0 
In deriving equation (26), note that we make use of 
lim[A.K]e -pt = lim[(l + r)D]e -pi = lirn[(1- H)WC]e -pi = 0. (26a) 
/~CO /~«J /--tct:J 
At time zero, (dD/dt) = B = (dWC/dt) = L = 0, and the last two terms in 
equation (26) imply the stock of debt and working capital in the beginning of the 
period as 
"' 
D(O)= Je-ptfpD-B]dt (27) 
0 
and 
"' 
WC(O)= Je-plfpWC-L]dt. (28) 
0 
Observe the similarity between the first integral in equation (26) and the 
right-hand side of equation (7). Using equations (7), (27) and (28), the equality in 
equation (26) can be rewritten as 
[.t(O)K(O) + (1 + r(O))D(O)- (1- H(O))WC(O)] = V(O) + D(O)- WC(O) .(29) 
Finally, adjusting equation (29) and dividing through i gives equation (16), 
which completes the proof. 
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Section 5.4 Data and Estimation Results 
Inserting equation (16) into equation (15) and partitioning gives an observable 
investment equation as 
_!_=a+ _!_(V+ D- WC _ (1 + r)D + (1- H)WC _ 1). K <1> pI K pI K pI K (30) 
The first ratio on the right-hand side of equation (30) can be interpreted as the 
average Q ratio since it denotes the ratio of market value of equity and debt to the 
replacement value of capital. Note that the market value of liabilities not only 
includes the fixed capital, but also the working capital and intangible assets. The 
subtraction of the term WC in the numerator verifies this fact. Because the 
intangible assets were not explicitly included in the model, they do not exist here, 
but they will be considered in the estimation process. 
Obviously, the second term DI/K on the right-hand side of equation (30) denotes 
the effect of financing activities on investment decisions. Observe from equation 
(12) that if agency/financial distress costs do not exist, then r = -1, and the debt-
capital ratio disappears. However, if these costs are binding, since X 8 (B, D) is 
assumed positive, then it is expected that the debt-capital ratio negatively affects 
the investment decisions. This can be seen from equations (12) and (30). The third 
term WC!/ K on the right-hand side of equation (30) denotes the effect of working 
capital policy on investment decisions. Again, observe from equation (14) that if 
the postulated smoothing benefits do not exist, then H = 1, and the working 
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capital-capital ratio disappears. However, if these benefits are important, since 
S L (L, WC) is asswned positive, then the working capital-capital ratio should enter 
the investment equation positively. This is evident from equations (14) and (30). 
For the econometric estimation, equation (30) can be rewritten as 
( i.) = 'Po + 'P, (Q;, -1) + 'P2 (+) + 'P3( ~c) + 77; + v, (31) 
K u P K it P K it 
where 'P0 =a, 'P1 = 1 I <1>, '¥2 = -(1 +f) I <1> and '¥3 = (1- H) I <1>. The term 77; 
represents the usual firm-specific effects. Also, note that the Lagrange multipliers 
r and H could be further extended by defining the functions X(B,D) and S(L, WC) 
explicitly; but for simplicity, they were left to be estimated as parameters in 
equation (31). Since the financing decisions are not necessarily exogenous and 
may well depend on the management's knowledge of investment opportunities, 
debt-capital ratios might be correlated with the disturbance terms. This can cause 
biases in the estimated coefficients. This may also happen because of the 
simultaneity between investment-capital and working-capitaVcapital ratios, and 
investment-capital and Q ratios. Thus, a consistent estimation requires the use of 
instrwnental variables. For that purpose, equation (31) was first-differenced to 
eliminate the firm-specific effects 77;. Then, the GMM estimations were carried 
out and the optimal weighting matrix was constructed via the Newey-West 
procedure as in section 4.3. Time dummies were considered for the possible time 
effects, however, the residual swn of squares criteria rejected their inclusion. Also 
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twice-lagged instruments in levels were employed which would be orthogonal to 
the error terms. 
The model was tested for the UK firms employed in the previous chapter. The 
necessary variables were constructed as follows. The replacement cost of capital 
was calculated as described in section 4.4. To calculate the numerator .of the Q 
ratios, market value of equity [MV], total loan capital [321], total current 
liabilities [389], minority interests [315] and total long-term provisions excluding 
deferred tax [313] were added, and total current assets [376], total investments 
including associates [356] and total intangibles [344] were subtracted. For the 
numerator of the debt-capital ratios, total debt [1301] figures were employed, 
comprising total loan capital [321] and borrowings repayable in less than a year 
[309]. For the numerator of the working capital-capital ratios, total current assets 
[376] were employed, comprising total stock and work-in-process [364], total 
debtors and equivalents [370], and total cash and equivalents [374]. 
The instrument set includes twice-lagged values of the investment-capital ratios, 
Q ratios, debt-capital ratios and working capital-capital ratios. To over-identify 
the model, a constant and twice-lagged values of the squared investment-capital 
ratios, total sales [ 1 04]-capital ratios, depreciation [ 136]-capital ratios, total 
interest charges [153]-capital ratios, pre-tax profit [ 154]-capital ratios, adjusted 
total tax charges [ 172]-capital ratios and minority interests [315]-capital ratios 
were employed as additional instruments. All capital figures in the denominators 
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were the replacement cost of capital values used to normalise the extra 
instruments. Observe that the model will be over-identified with nine degrees of 
freedom, since the difference between the employed instruments and the estimated 
coefficients is nine. 
Table 5.1 GMM Estimation of ~(I/K)it = 'I' t ~(Qi,-1) + 'I'2~(D/p1K)it + 
Hansen x.\9) 
Hansen x.\9) 
FULL-SAMPLE PANEL, (7 6 Firms, 11 Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T -Stat 
0.0499 0.0157 3.1858 
-0.3202 0.1677 -1.9089 
0.1190 0.0814 1.4611 
Significance 
0.0014 
0.0563 
0.1440 
Test Result Significance 
12.3160 0.1961 
LOW-LEVERAGE PANEL, (34 Firms, 11 Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T -Stat 
0.0342 0.0170 2.0134 
-0.0719 0.1256 -0.5725 
0.0766 0.1192 0.6430 
Significance 
0.0441 
0.5670 
0.5202 
Test Result Significance 
15.0782 0.0888 
HIGH-LEVERAGE PANEL, (42 Firms, 11 Years) 
Coefficient Std. Error T -Stat 
0.0538 0.0221 2.4348 
-0.4020 0.2268 -1.7724 
0.1426 0.0842 1.6935 
Significance 
0.0149 
0.0763 
0.0904 
Test Result Significance 
9.5388 0.3891 
Estimation results are given in table 5.1. The model was tested for all firms, and 
then the estimations ~ere carried out separately for the low-leverage and high-
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leverage groups. The two subsamples are as described in table 4.6. The results in 
table 5.1 indicate that for the full-sample panel, the moment conditions and the 
employed instruments are valid. The Q ratio appears to be quite significant, but 
the implied adjustment costs are unreasonably high, as found in section 2.7. Both 
the \f2 and \f3 parameters come with the expected signs. Although the debt-capital 
ratio is significant at 6% level, the working capital-capital ratio appears with t-
ratio of I.46, which is only significant at 15% level. Nevertheless, the overall 
results for the full-sample supports the model and the hypothesised 
agency/financial distress costs of debt, casting doubt for the independent financing 
and investment decisions argument. As can be seen, a I% increase in the debt-
capital ratio causes a 0.32% decrease in the investment-capital ratio. However, the 
results imply that this negative effect is alleviated around 0.12% by the 
interactions between investment and working capital policies. 
Contrary to the results found for the full-sample, the results for the low-leverage 
panel supports neither the agency/financial distress costs of debt nor the 
smoothing benefits of working capital policies argument, as evident from the 
significance levels of the \f2 and '1'3 parameters. Although these parameters 
appear with the expected signs, the t-ratios are only -0.5725 and 0.643, 
respectively. For the high-leverage panel, the Q ratio again appears to be quite 
significant for investment decisions. Both the '1'2 and '1'3 parameters come with 
the expected signs. Unlike the results for the low-leverage group, they are both 
significant at I 0% level, implying significant agency/financial distress costs of 
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debt and smoothing benefits of working capital. For this group, a 1% increase in 
the debt-capital ratio causes a 0.40% decrease in the investment-capital ratio, and 
a 1% increase in the working capital-capital ratio implies a 0.14% increase in the 
investment-capital ratio. The overall results suggest that the agency/fmancial 
distress costs of debt does matter for the investment decisions of the highly 
leveraged firms, implying significant interactions between debt financing and 
capital investment decisions. Also the results reveal that the highly leveraged 
group use their working capital policies significantly to support their investment 
decisions. 
Section 5.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, considering the possible agency/fmancial distress costs of debt and 
the smoothing benefits of working capital, an investment equation was derived as 
a function of the observable Q ratio. In the model, the Q ratio was used to control 
the investment opportunity, the debt-capital ratio for the possible interactions 
between financing and investment decisions and the working capital-capital ratio 
as a measure of the working capital policy to assist the investment decisions. If the 
agency cost function is insignificant, the model satisfies the standard Q model of 
investment which draws on the MM proposition. It was hypothesised that if the 
agency/financial distress costs are binding, then the debt-capital ratio should have 
a significant negative coefficient. The model was tested using UK panel data for 
76 large industrial firms over 11 years for two groups of firms with different 
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,, 
1lhvels ,of'mdebtedhess. the flrtdin~s reveruedi ;that .agency/financial' distress: costs 
of debt •matters for .the higilly leveraged :group;. hence; affect their ·investment 
cl(:cjsions negatively. However, the results also. show that ~the fiiills: use ilieif 
working capital ,policy to: :smooth' these costs and pressiires to :some r::xtent, A!> 
mentioned' :in the ,preVious chapter, the flnding.s of this study imply important 
.effects for the whole ec()Q()rny, since .it was 'COnducted by :using only 1large 
·i.ndustiial. fuii'Is, ~~ollstjtuting an important fraction ·oftotal investrnentin' the :NK 
:economy. 
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CHAPTER6 
PRODUCT SPECIALISATION AND THE ROBUSTNESS 
OF THE INVESTMENT-UNCERTAINTY 
RELATIONSHIP: AUK PANEL STUDY 
Section 6.1 Introduction 
Apart from the negative relation between investment and uncertainty due the 
covariance effect of CAPM, economic theory has two opposing views about the 
variance effect at firm-level analysis. Assuming perfect competition and constant 
returns-to-scale technology, Hartman (1972) and A bel ( 1983) show that current 
investment does not decrease with increased uncertainty. In these models,_ the ____ _ 
positive relation between investment and uncertainty depends entirely on the 
convex relation between the expected value of the marginal revenue product of 
capital and the price of output and/or input costs. As in Hartman (1972), a 
Jensen's inequality argument explains the positive relationship, since an increase 
in the variances of the output price and/or input costs will increase the marginal 
profitability of capital due to convexity, hence the current investment level. 
On the other hand, the opposing view considers the irreversibility of investment 
decisions under uncertainty and assumes some degree of imperfect competition 
and/or decreasing returns-to-scale technology. Irreversibility usually arises if the 
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capital employed by a firm is industry- and/or firm-specific, making the return to 
investment asymmetric. Investment expenditure involves exercising an option 
which represents resources that can be productively invested at any time in the 
future. This lost option becomes an additional cost of the new investment, and 
uncertainty affects investment decisions through the options held by the firm. An 
increase in uncertainty makes better and worse news more likely, but it is optimal to 
increase the protection by investing less due to the irreversibility effect. 
As Caballero (1991) shows, the results of Abel and Hartman continue to hold even 
in the case of irreversibility. Despite the ineffectiveness of the asymmetric 
adjustment costs for the results of Abel and Hartman, the assumptions of imperfect 
competition and decreasing returns-to-scale technology tend to change the sigri- of 
the investment-uncertainty relationship towards negativity. Thus, the product market 
structure and/or the production technology play the central role in the fmdings of 
these two opposing theoretical views. 
A small number of studies examined the sign of the investment-uncertainty 
relationship at firm level and found mostly negative effects. For instance, using 
firm-level US data, Brainard et al. (1980) investigate the relation between 
investment and CAPM-based uncertainty. They report both positive and negative 
effects, only some of which are significant In a more recent study, using US large-
company panel data, Driver et al. (1996) report that increased demand uncertainty 
may reduce the incentive to invest. Moreover, this negative relationship appears to 
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be more significant in highly integrated plants where firms have better protection 
from competition. In a more comprehensive study, Leahy and "Ybited (1996) 
examine both the covariance and variance effects using Q models of investment for 
US firm-level panel data. Although they report negative effects of uncertainty, they 
fmd no evidence for the covariance effect or for the positive effect due to convexity. 
Empirical studies are considerably behind the theoretical developments in the field 
of the investment-uncertainty relation. Most of the studies are at aggregate-level, 
and more firm-level studies are required. Another important issue in studying this 
relationship is the particular consideration of the market structure and/or the 
technology. Using UK panel data for 66 large industrial firms, this chapter examines 
the sign and significance of the investment-uncertainty relationship. Unlike previous 
empirical studies, particular emphasis is given to product specialisation criteria to 
consider the assumptions of the two opposing theoretical views. Moreover, to test 
the robustness of the observed relationship, two different models and two different 
measures of uncertainty are employed. The next section presents the relevant 
empirical issues and the employed investment models. The third section describes 
the data and gives the summary statistics. The fourth section presents the 
econometric evidence, and the fmal section concludes. 
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Section 6.2 The Empirical Issues 
To test the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship, two issues should be 
considered. The first one is the difficulty of constructing and estimating a 
structural model, since the resulting inferences will be sensitive to the 
assumptions used to derive the model. Thus, one-period ahead uncertainty 
forecasts will be incorporated into the investment equations in an ad hoc way in 
which any long-run, and any form of non-linear relations between investment 
decisions and expected uncertainty will be ignored. However, to consider the two 
opposing theoretical works, the sample will be split according to the product 
structure criteria embedded in the assumptions of the model. 
For the purposes of estimation, two different models will used. The fust one 
incorporates the expected uncertainty measures into the static Q model in a Linear 
fashion as 
(I) 
In this reduced-form model, the variables J, K, Q and d represent investment, 
capital stock, average Q ratio and uncertainty, and the terms E, 77 and t; denote the 
expectations operator, the firm-specific effects and the remaining stochastic 
disturbance term. Since we are not analysing the long-run adjustments of 
investment to uncertainty shocks, one-period ahead forecasts of the uncertainty 
measures will be employed. 
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To observe the robustness of the results obtained from equation (1), another ad 
hoc linear dynamic investment equation will be employed as 
where the variables SG and CF denote the sales growth and the cash flow. In this 
model, the sales growth and the lagged investment-capital ratio control the 
investment opportunities and the lagged form of adjustment, and the cash flow-
capital ratio controls the effect of the availability of funds to finance the 
investments. 
The two theoretical works about the investment-uncertainty relationship predict 
opposite signs. The irreversibility argument predicts negative effect of uncertainty 
on investment decisions, and requires some degree of imperfect competition. On 
the other hand, assuming perfect competition, Abel and Hartman predict positive 
effect of uncertainty. To consider this difference in the assumptions of the two 
opposing views, in estimating the investment equations given in equations (1) and 
(2), the sample will be split according to the product specialisation criteria. For 
the sample split criteria, sales figures will be used to obtain the average critical 
ratio (CR). Firms produce and sell different kinds of products; some are 
specialised and some are more diversified in their products. If a firm's sales 
figures are concentrated in one product market, the irreversibility effect should be 
stronger for this firm. Moreover, if a firm is heavily specialised in one product, it 
might be expected to have more market power when compared to a less 
specialised firm, resulting in a higher degree of imperfect competition. On the 
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contrary, if a firm is less specialised in its products, it is likely to be more 
competitive and also less vulnerable to the irreversibility effect when compared to 
a heavily specialised firm. Thus, it will be classified in the positive effect group. 
While investigating the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship, the second 
problem would be to identify and measure the uncertainty because many variables 
affecting investment decisions will be a part of the relationship. For instance, 
uncertainty can be in the form technological uncertainty, output price uncertainty, 
wage uncertainty, demand uncertainty such as changes in consumer tastes, and/or 
in other forms. Moreover, uncertainty concerns possible outcomes of events but 
not actual outcomes. Thus, we cari only obtain proxy measures of the expected 
uncertainty. Given the identification problem of the source of uncertainty, the 
movements in the share prices will be employed to obtain the measures of 
uncertainty for each firm. Although various forms of bubbles and noise traders 
would be incorporated into our proxy measure, this general. measure can capture 
different forms of uncertainty relevant to a firm's investment decision, since it 
would reflect the market's expectations covering all aspects. 
For the empirical implementation, two different uncertainty measures will be 
constructed. The first one is the CAPM-based risk measure. For each fmn, based 
on conditional CAPM, ex-ante abnormal share return volatility will be calculated 
as a proxy for expected uncertainty. For the purposes of estimation, the 
conditional CAPM can be presented as 
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(3) 
where R, RM, RF, n, a, p and /J represent the share return, the stock market 
return, the risk-free rate, the conditioning information available to the investors 
before time t, the constant, the ftrm' s beta and the idiosyncratic shock. The 
information set may include various variables such as long-term interest rates, 
term structure of interest rates, dividend yield, etc. However, a certain chosen set 
of information variables may not be a good proxy for some of the ftrms. For that 
purpose we will employ the lagged values of the excess market return in the 
information set. In the estimation process, monthly returns will be used, and the 
information set will be extended up to time t-6 values of the excess market return 
to include most of the relevant information. The conditional CAPM can be 
presented as 
6 
E[Rii-RF,]=a+ L<l>m(RM-RF),_m +!Jit (4) 
- m~l 
where <!> represents the set of parameters on the information variables. For each 
firm, based on the recursively estimated a and the set of<!> parameters, out-of-
sample forecasts will be carried out to obtain the ex-ante volatility measures. 
Hence, for each firm, the proxy measure of expected uncertainty can be presented 
as 
6 
Eil [a1~,t+i] = [(Ri,t+i - RF,+I)- (a;, + L <1> il,m(RM- RF)t+i-m )]2 · (5) 
=I 
The investment models presented in equations (I) and (2) will be estimated on a 
yearly frequency basis. Although employing the 12-month moving-average of the 
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forecast squared errors may help to capture the overlapping effects from one 
period to another, this will also smooth the effects of the forecasts of expected 
uncertainty on investment decisions. Considering this, for each fmn in each year 
one-period ahead uncertainty forecasts will be constructed by the arithmetic 
average of the 12-month uncertainty forecasts. 
However, note that the CAPM-based uncertainty measures will reflect mostly the 
fmn-specific uncertainty effects. Since the irreversibility argument considers 
primarily the firm-specific shocks, employing these measures may bias the 
estimation results of the investment-uncertainty relation towards negativity. 
Considering this possibility, and also to test the robustness of the estimations, 
another proxy measure will be constructed for the expected uncertainty. The 
second uncertainty will be based only on the ex-ante volatility measures of the 
share returns. By this way, not only the firm-specific uncertainty effects, but also 
the economy-wide shocks can be taken into account. For the second uncertainty 
measure, for each firm an AR(6) (autoregressive) process will be employed. This 
can be presented as 
6 
E[ Ru] = a+ L <I> m R/,1-m + J.lit. (6) 
m= I 
Again, by using equation (6), recursive estimations will be carried out for each 
firm. After obtaining the monthly recursive out-of-sample forecasts of the share 
returns, the second uncertainty measure will be calculated as 
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6 
E;,[cr}l,t+d=[R;,t+l -ail- .L:CI>;,,mRi,t+l-m)l2 • 
m= I 
Section 6.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
(7) 
This section describes the construction of the data and presents the related 
summary statistics. The study covers the UK consisting of 66 industrial firms for 
the period 1982-1996. The construction of the critical ratio (CR) to split the 
sample, the construction of the two measures of uncertainty forecasts and the 
other variables employed in the estimation of the investment equations are 
explained. The necessary variables were obtained from Datastream, and the 
associated Datastream codes are given in brackets .. 
Datastream gives the distribution of sales figures [190F] in percentages according 
to the three-digit standard industry classification codes. For each firm in each 
year, the highest percentage sales figures were taken for the period 1987-1996. 
Then, for each firm, the arithmetic averages of these highest figures were 
calculated over the ten-year period. Using this average figure for each firm, the 
arithmetic average and the median of 66 firms were calculated. They are given in 
table 6.1. Hence, the CR to split the sample was constructed as the arithmetic 
average of the mean and the median of the whole sample. This was found to be 
61.38%. 
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Table 6.1 Sales Specialisation Figures (%) 
Highest Sales ( 1987 -1996) 
Mean 
Median 
Stdev. 
Min. 
Max. 
No. ofFirms 
All Firms 
62.259 
60.5 
19.306 
28.333 
100 
66 
Firms<CR 
47.695 
51 
9.333 
28.333 
6l.l11 
35 
Firms>CR 
78.703 
75.556 
13.491 
63.111 
100 
31 
The number of firms belonging the subsample with sales specialisation figures 
lower than the CR is 35. As discussed in the previous section, these firms are 
assumed more competitive when compared to the firms in the other subsample. 
Thus, the positive effect of the expected uncertainty should be more significant for 
this subgroup. Conversely, for the firms with sales specialisation figures above 
the CR, the irreversibility effect of uncertainty should be significant. Thus, it is 
more likely that the expected uncertainty will have a negative effect for this 
subgroup. To observe this, estimations will be carried out separately for the two 
different subsarnples. 
To construct the proxy measures for the two uncertainty effects, the monthly share 
prices [P], and the monthly dividend yields [DY] were obtained from 1 January 
1976 to 1 January 1998. For the dividend yields, Datastream gives the annualised 
figures in percentages. Thus, for each firm in each month, the share returns were 
calculated as 
P;, + (P;r "'DY;,) 11200- P; ,_1 R;r = , 
P;,r-t 
(8) 
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where P denotes the capitalisation issue-adjusted share prices. The stock market 
return was calculated by using the monthly stock market index [TOTMKUK], and 
for the risk-free rate, monthly yield on 1-month Treasury Bills [LDNTB1M] were 
employed. For each firm, starting from the period 1 January 1976-1 January 1982, 
equations (4) and (6) were estimated recursively. Then, forward forecasts were 
obtained by equations (5) and (7) to construct the ex-ante volatility measures. The 
procedure was applied up to 1 January 1998. 
Table 6.2 Summary Statistics of the Uncertainty Measures 
al2 ( 1982-1997) All Firms Firms<CR Firms>CR 
Mean 0.0087 0.0091 0 .. 0083 
Stdev. 0.0147 0.0185 0.0087 
Min. 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 
Max. 0.4027 0.4027 0.0970 
ai (1982-1997) All Firms Firms<CR Firms>CR 
Mean 0.0096 0.0103 0.0089 
Stdev. 0.0228 0.0298 0.0102 
Min. 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 
Max. 0.5796 0.5796 0.1107 
Table 6.2 gives the summary statistics for the one-year ahead uncertainty forecasts 
in monthly frequencies. The results are reported for the two measures and also for 
the two subgroups for the period 1982-1997. For the whole sample, the mean of 
the CAPM-based risk measure is 0.87 % and the mean of the return-based risk 
measure is 0.96 %. Both measures are slightly higher for the group of firms below 
the CR. 
207 
The investment-capital and Q ratios were calculated as in section 5.4. For some of 
the firms, the adjusted profit measures were missing. Thus, depreciation of fixed 
assets [136] was added to profits [154] as a proxy for the cash flow figures . For 
the denominator of the cash flow-capital ratios, previously constructed 
replacement value of capital figures were employed. Finally, sales [104] figures 
were used for the sales growth. Table 6.3 gives the summary statistics of these 
four variables for the whole sample and for the two subgroups. For the whole 
sample, the IlK ratio appears with a mean of 12.8%, the Q ratio 
Table 6.3 Summary Statistics of the Model Variables 
IlK (1982-1996) All Firms Finns<CR Firms>CR 
Mean 0.1280 0.1177 0.1396 
Stdev. 0.0986 0.0913 0.1052 
Min. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0088 
Max. 0.901 1 0.9011 0.8724 
Q-1 (1983-1 996) All Firms Finns<CR Firms>CR 
Mean 0.4082 0.2589 0.5767 
Stdev. 1.1748 0.9922 1.3329 
Min. -1.3924 -1.3924 -1.2585 
Max. 9.7242 8.9749 9.7242 
CFIK (1982- 1996) All Firms Firms<CR Firms>CR 
Mean 0.2372 0.2178 0.2592 
Stdev. 0.1460 0.1378 0.1520 
Min. -0.2684 -0.2684 -0.0965 
Max. 1.4857 1.4857 0.9927 
SG (1983-1996) All Firms Firms<CR Firms>CR 
Mean 0.1512 0.1336 0.1712 
Stdev. 0.4930 0.5988 0.3354 
Min. -0.3544 -0.3 192 -0.3544 
Max. 10.761 10.761 4.234 
with 1.4082, the CFIK ratio with 23.72% and the sales growth with 15%. The 
mean of the IlK ratio for the group of firms> CR is 13.96% and it is higher than 
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the other subgroup. Consistent with that observation, the mean of the Q ratio and 
the sales growth are also higher for the group of firms above the CR. 
Section 6.4 Estimation Results 
For the estimation of models, first-difference of equations (1) and (2) were taken 
to eliminate the unobservable fixed effects. The new equations can be presented 
as 
(9) 
To consider any possible simultaneity effects, the GMM estimation technique 
was employed as in section 4.3. To obtain heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent optimal weighting matrix, the procedure of Newey and West (1987) 
was applied. The models were over-identified, and the Hansen tests were carried 
our for the imposed moment conditions. Also, time t-2 and t-3 level instruments 
were employed which would be orthogonal to the moving-average error caused by 
the first-difference of the data. 
Equation (9) was estimated for the whole sample and for the two subsamples by 
employing the two uncertainty measures. The employed instrument set includes a 
constant, time t-2 and t-3 values of the investment-capital ratios, the Q ratios, the 
uncertainty measures, and the squares of these three variables. With 13 
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instruments, the first model is over-identified with 11 degrees of freedom. All 
estimations were carried out with and without time dummies. For the inclusion of 
the time dummies, the unrestricted residual sum of squares and the restricted 
residual sum of squares were compared. The estimation results are given in table 
6.4 together with the t-ratios in parentheses. The results of the Hansen tests verify 
the validity of the employed instruments and moment conditions for all 
estimations. In all cases the inclusion of the time dummies reduces the residual 
sum of squares, thus the reported results include the time dummies. The first two 
columns of table 6.4 give the results for the whole sample. Estimation results 
reveal that the Q ratio is very significant. The uncertainty measures come with 
positive signs, however, neither the CAPM-based risk measure nor the return-
based risk measure is significant. 
Table 6.4 GMM Estimation of il(I/K)u = \}'Iil(Qirl) + \}'2L1Eit(cr\ t+I ] + L1Sit 
All Firms Finns < CR Firms > CR 
t.(Q;, -1) 0.0667 0.0566 0.0589 0.0390 0.0710 0.0831 
(5.416) (8.705) (4.605) (3.496) (2.865) (3.224) 
AE;, [CTI~,t+l] 0.0996 0.4039 -0.3497 
(0.730) (2.832) (-2.207) 
AE, [CTii,t+l] 0.111 8 0.4294 -0.2538 
(0.686) (2.620) (-1.323) 
Hansen x2( ll) 0.7003 0.5473 0.9231 0.6863 0.7565 0.7161 
URRSS 5.8980 5.7238 2.3147 2. 1564 3.2664 3.3600 
RRSS 7.5883 9.2953 4.5452 4.2674 3.5005 3.4261 
I. The !-ratios are given in parentheses which are corrected fo r heteroscedasticity 
and first-order autocorrelation. 
2. Significance levels of the results of the Hansen tests are given. 
3. URRSS denotes the unrestricted residual sum of squares for the estimations 
with the time dummies, and RRSS denotes the residual sum of squares for the 
estimations without the time dummies. 
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The firms<CR are less vulnerable to irreversibility effects and they .are likely to 
be more competitive when compared to the other subgroup. Consistent with this 
argument, when the sample is split according to the CR of the sales specialisation 
figures, estimation results reveal that the one-period ahead uncertainty forecasts 
affect investment decisions in a positive and significant way for the fmns<CR. 
This result holds regardless of the type of uncertainty measure employed. The 
return-based uncertainty measure comes with a slightly higher coefficient for this 
group, and the Q ratios have significant positive coefficients. 
The second subgroup consists of firms which are more specialised in their 
products when compared to the fmns<CR. Thus, this group may have more power 
in their product market, increasing the degree of the imperfect competition. Also, 
their exposure to irreversibility effects should be more. The estimation results for 
this subgroup indicate that the Q ratios have significant positive coefficients. As 
expected, the results for the firms>CR indicate that the CAPM-based risk measure 
appears with a negative and significant coefficient. Although the return-based 
risk measure appears with a negative sign, it is not as significant as the CAPM-
based risk measure for this subgroup. However, these results are consistent with 
the argument that the CAPM-based risk measure is more likely to capture the 
irreversibility effect, since it is a measure of non-systematic risk. 
In equation (9), while using the average Q ratio to control investment decision, 
perfect competition was assumed implicitly since the equality of marginal q and 
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average Q requires this. As discussed in section 1.3, the assumption of imperfect 
competition requires the inclusion of sales figures in the average Q ratio, and it 
should appear with a negative sign. For that purpose, the estimations were carried 
out by including the sales-capital ratios. The findings in table 6.4 were 
qualitatively robust to the inclusion of sales-capital ratios. Although insignificant, 
this ratio appeared with a positive sign for the firms<CR and with a negative sign 
for the firms>CR. 
The results obtained imply the importance of considering the fmns' heterogeneity 
and the differences in the assumptions of the two theoretical views while studying 
the investment-uncertainty relationship. As a second step, to test the robustness of 
the results obtained from equation {9), the investment model given in equation 
(10) was estimated. For this dynamic model, the instrument set employed includes 
a constant, time t-3 and t-4 values of the investment-capital and the cash flow-
capital ratios, time t-2 and t-3 values of the sales growth, uncertainty measures, 
and the squared versions of all variables. 
With 13 degrees of freedom, the results of the Hansen tests validate the instrument 
set employed and imposed moment conditions. The unrestricted residual sum of 
squares figures are smaller than the restricted residual sum of squares figures for 
all estimations. Therefore, the estimations include time dummies. For the whole 
sample, the lagged investment-capital appears with a negative and insignificant 
coefficient. Both the cash flow-capital ratio and the sales growth have 
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significant positive coefficients. Although negative, both measures of uncertainty 
appear with very insignificant t-ratios. 
qJJfl(CFIK)i, t-t + qJ4flEit(a\ t+d + flsu 
All Firms Firms< CR Firms> CR 
11(1 I K) ;,H -0.0405 0.0025 0.2698 0.2108 -0.4381 -0.3999 
(-0.512) (0.028) (2.672) (2.004) (-4.682) (-3.316) 
MG;I 0.0563 0.0768 0.0677 0.0786 0.0858 0.0938 
(3 .043) (6.444) (10.859) (9.048) (3 .1 01) (3.398) 
fl(CF I K);,l-1 0.3353 0.3447 0.3794 0.3143 0.7731 0.7432 
(6.374) (6.065) (5.068) (4.652) (4.078) (4.168) 
M,/ [crl~,t+l] -0.0787 0.0808 -0.3260 
(-0.624) (0.645) (-2.502) 
Mu [crJi,r+l] -0.0250 0.2199 -0.3009 
(-0.171) (1.913) (-1.928) 
Hansen x_2(13) 0.4382 0.3598 0.8138 0.8522 0.4476 0.533 1 
URRSS 4.1698 4.3256 1.6121 1.5905 2.6690 2.5838 
RRSS 5.0562 4.8390 1.7801 1.5965 2.8404 2.6615 
l. See the notes in table 6.4. 
The results for the group of fmns<CR show that the lagged investment-capital 
ratio, the cash flow-capital ratio and the sales growth have significant 
coefficients. Although positive, the CAPM-based risk measure comes with an 
insignificant !-ratio of 0.645. On the other hand, the return-based uncertainty 
measure appears with a significant positive coefficient. As found in table 6.4, one-
period ahead expected uncertainty seems to affect investment decisions in a 
positive way for this subgroup. Finally, all variables have significant coefficients 
for the group of firms>CR. As found before, both of the uncertainty variables 
appear with negative coefficients. Moreover, the CAPM-based risk measure again 
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has a more significant and slightly higher coefficient than the return-based risk 
measure for this subgroup. 
Section 6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we examined the sign of the short-run investment-uncertainty 
relationship for 66 large UK industrial companies. Theoretical work suggest that 
the sign of investment-uncertainty depends on the degree of competition faced by 
a firm and/or the assumption about the technology that the firm adapts. 
Considering this, the sample was split according to the product specialisation 
criteria. Although not a sufficient condition, one may expect that the firms which 
are highly specialised in their products will face less competition and may have 
.. 
more market power when compared to the firms which have diversified products. 
More importantly, the higher the degree of product specialisation, the more likely 
that a firm will suffer from irreversibility problems. Given the difficulty of 
obtaining an estimable structural model, the uncertainty effect was incorporated 
into the investment equations in ad hoc way. However, to test the robustness of 
the obtained results, two different models and two different measures of 
uncertainty were employed. The fust uncertainty measure was based on 
conditional CAPM, and the second one was based directly on the conditional 
stock returns. 
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When the investment models were estimated for the whole sample, regardless of 
the uncertainty measures, the investment-uncertainty relationship appeared with 
both positive and negative insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, when the 
sample was split according to the product specialisation criteria, consistent with 
the theoretical argument, the sign of the investment-uncertainty relation was 
negative for the group of firms which are highly specialised in their products. 
Regardless of the different investment models employed, the negative sign 
consistently appeared for this subgroup. The negative effect of uncertainty seemed 
to be more significant in the case of the CAPM-based risk measure. However, this 
is consistent with the argument that the CAPM-based risk measure considers 
idiosyncratic uncertainty which can bias the results towards the irreversibility 
argument. Consistent with the convexity argument, the results generally appeared 
with positive significant coefficients for the firms<CR, which were considered to 
face more competition and less vulnerable to irreversibility effect. For this 
subgroup, the results are robust under different model specifications, and the 
positive effect of uncertainty is more significant in the case of the return-based 
risk measure. 
Since both positive and negative effects appear significantly for different 
subgroups, the findings of this study are not consistent with the findings of the 
previous empirical studies. However, it is difficult to reach a conclusion about the 
short-run effect of the expected uncertainty at the aggregate-level. Even if there 
might be bias in the results due to the ad hoc nature of the models employed, 
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•consistent with both of the !theoretical viewsi disintegrating: the fums a:c:c:ording :to 
'-
·the :product· market aSsumption resulted in i~trong figtiteS .abo\}t the ~ign of t!Ie 
ilivestmenHmcel"taihty ~relationshjp. 'fhis: important -result should be:considered -in 
funrre'researC:lL Another :important result is that the uncertainty measure employed 
•can: llffect:tlie findings of a,•study:. Thus,, it ·is !useful. to :employ different measures 
:ofuncertainty: 
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CHAPTER7 
A VARANALYSIS OF AGGREGATE 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE UK 
Section 7.1 Introduction 
In the literature, most of the aggregate-level studies examining the investment-
uncertainty relationship report negative effects. For instance, using aggregate data 
for 20 US manufacturing industries, Caballero and Pindyck (1992) find a negative 
effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment decisions. Pindyck and Solimano 
(1993) employ a similar version of the model developed in CaballerQ and Pindyck 
(1992) for 29 countries. Their results also indicate a negative relationship that is in 
greater magnitude for developing countries. In a less ambitious reduced form model, 
using US aggregate-level data and the risk premium embedded in the term structure 
of interest rates to measure the uncertainty, Ferderer (1993) concludes that 
uncertainty has a negative and statistically significant effect on investment 
decisions. In another aggregate-level reduced form study, Bell and Campa (1997) 
report a significant negative effect of exchange rate volatility in Europe for chemical 
plant investments, but they find that input prices and product demand volatility do 
not appear to have a significant effect in either Europe or US. 
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This chapter investigates the effects of aggregate uncertainty on aggregate 
investment for the UK in a reduced-form relation. The employed methodology is 
V AR analysis and innovation decomposition techniques as developed in Sims 
(1980). The effects of long-term interest rate uncertainty, exchange rate 
uncertainty and inflation uncertainty on investment decisions will be investigated. 
Uncertainty estimations will be carried out by using the conditional volatility 
models developed in the financial econometrics literature. Moreover, uncertainty 
may have different impacts on different categories of investment. These effects 
will be considered separately on machinery and equipment investment and 
construction investment. 
The next section explains the V AR analysis. The third section explains the 
estimations of conditional volatility. Section four presents the simulation results, 
and the final section concludes. 
Section 7.2 V AR Analysis and Innovation Accounting 
To investigate the investment-uncertainty relationship statistically, a V AR model 
will be employed and simulations will be carried out by giving shocks to the 
model. The relation between investment and uncertainty measures is described by 
a four dimensional linear dynamic stochastic system in the following form 
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p p p p 
ULT1, = L'~'n.IlNY,-1 + L'~'12,1UINF,-1 + L\f'n,IUFX,_I + L'l'l4,1ULT11-1 +ul,t 
/=0 1=0 /=0 l=l 
p p p p 
UFX, = L'¥21,/nvv,-/ + L'¥22,/UINF,-1 + L\{123,/UFXt-l + L\f'24,/ULTII-/ +zl2,1 
1=0 /=0 l=l 1=0 ( 1) 
p p p p 
UINF, = L'¥31,/nvv,-1 + L'¥32,/UINF,-1 + L'¥33,/UFXt-1 + L'~'34,/ULT1t-/ + II:J,, 
/=0 l=l /=0 1=0 
p p p p 
lNY, = L'l'4l,I1NY,-I + L'¥42./UINF,-1 + L'¥43,/UFX,_I + L'l'44,/ULT1,_1 +u4,t 
l=l 1=0 /=0 1=0 
where INV, UINF, UFX and ULTI denote the investment, the inflation 
uncertainty, the foreign exchange uncertainty and the long-term interest rate 
uncertainty, respectively. Thus, the investment equation employed takes the form 
of an autoregressive model, augmented with the uncertainty effects. The error 
terms u are assumed to be white noise disturbances which are uncorrelated with 
each other. For notational simplicity, the constant terms and other deterministic 
variables such as time dummies are not included in the system. The system links 
all variables since the contemporaneous values of the variables are allowed to 
affect each other. In addition to that, error terms will be pure innovations for each 
related variable but will have indirect contemporaneous effects on other variables 
through the right-hand side time t values. 
The system given in (1) is a four dimensional pth-order VAR, and we can also 
write anN dimensional system in short-hand as 
(2) 
where each H represents N* N coefficients for the N dimensional system. The 
terms Y and u represent N* 1 vector of variables and N* 1 vector·· of uncorrelated 
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error terms with zero means and constant variances. Thus, the covariance matrix 
of the error term can be written as E(u1 u;) =IN, where IN is an N dimensional 
diagonal matrix. Moreover, under the assumption of unit variance, it can also be 
taken as an N dimensional identity matrix. As in a univariate case, a V AR(p) 
process can be converted to a vector moving-average (VMA) form by iteration, 
and the variables can be expressed in terms of the values of innovations to trace 
the time paths of various shocks on the variables. As shown in Li.itkepohl (1993), 
a VMA form can be also expressed in the lag operator notation as 
I'; = F(L)u,. (3) 
where F(L) =[I- H(L)r1• The F(L) matrix of coefficients on the structural error 
terms are called impulse response functions. They can be used to generate the 
effects of u1 shocks on the N* 1 vector of Y variables. The elements of this matrix 
are known as impact multipliers at time zero and long-run multipliers for the 
accumulated effects of the impulses. Moreover, using the F(L) matrix of 
coefficients, the forecast error variance of a variable can be decomposed to obtain 
the proportion of movements due to its own shocks versus shocks to other 
variables. Thus, one can quantify the proportions of the effects of shocks on each 
variable. As discussed in Sims (1980), impulse response functions, together with 
the forecast error variance decomposition, can be used as a very effective tool to 
investigate the effects and the interrelationships between variables within a V AR 
framework. 
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However, observe that the structural V AR(p) in equation (2) is not in the reduced 
form, and it cannot be estimated. For the purposes of estimation, a transformation 
is required, and the system in equation {2) can be rewritten in the reduced form as 
(4) 
where R1 = AH1 and A= [I- H 0r 1 fori= 1,2, .. ,p. This reduced form is known 
as the standard form, and it can be estimated by the OLS technique. OLS is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient since all the equations have the same 
predetermined regressors. The standard system is in an estimable form because the 
contemporaneous relations of the variables are now incorporated into the new 
error terms e1 by the term [J-H0]"1• This can be written in terms of the errors of the 
structural form as 
e1 = Au1 (5) 
Thus, the error terms will include all the shocks, and they will be correlated with 
each other according to the contemporaneous relations in the system, reflecting 
the transformation of the structural form. 
With the new transformation, the structural system in equation (2) will be under-
identified. To recover all the information, we need to impose N*(N-1)12 
restrictions on the structural system for exact identification. The number of 
restrictions implies the difference between the contemporaneous effect matrix of 
the structural form and the additional covariance terms of the standard form. For 
instance, for the structural model given in equation (1), we will have 12 
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coefficients for the contemporaneous effects of the variables and 6 additional 
covariance terms in its standard form. Thus, 6 constraints must be imposed on the 
primitive system in equation (1) to recover all the information. 
In practice, ftrst, the standard V AR process given in equation (4) can be estimated 
by OLS to obtain the necessary coefficients and the symmetric covariance matrix 
of the cross-correlated error terms e,. Then, the symmetric covariance matrix can 
be orthogonalised to obtain the diagonal covariance matrix of the structural form 
which will satisfy the desired properties. By that way, in the shock simulation 
process, the effects of the contemporaneous correlation can be eliminated and the 
forecast error variances can be decomposed into components attributable to each 
innovation. As can be seen from equation (5), for the orthogonalisation process, if 
we choose a matrix A such that: 
(6) 
then E(u,u;)=IN will be also satisfied. Hence, by using equations (4) and (5), 
we can calculate 
F(L) =[I- R(L)r1 A (7) 
to obtain the impulse response functions and the · forecast error vanance 
decomposition of the variables. A convenient way of imposing the necessary N(N-
1)/2 restrictions and obtaining the matrix A is to use the Cholesky decomposition 
technique. In this technique, the matrix A is assumed lower ti:iangle, thus the 
structural system given in equation (2) reduces to a recursive system. In this semi-
mechanical factorisation method, the ordering of the variables matters. For 
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instance, for the structural system given in equation (I), if the ordering is as 
ULTI, UFX, UINF, JNV, then we will be restricting the contemporaneous effects 
of UFX, UINF and INV on ULTI, the contemporaneous effects of UINF and INV 
on UFX, and the contemporaneous effect of INV on the variable UJNF. Exact 
identification will be achieved by imposing these 6 restrictions. However, one 
needs to be careful about the ordering, since the effect of it will increase as the 
correlation coefficients between the error terms of the standard form increase. One 
can decide the ordering according to the theory in hand and/or check the 
sensitivity of the impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decomposition of the variables to various orderings. 
Section 7.3 Volatility Estimates 
Although one cannot observe uncertainty, or in other terms volatility, it can be 
estimated by the appropriate techniques. For instance, in early studies Officer 
(1973) estimates the volatility at each point in time by using a rol~ing standard 
deviation, achieved by moving the sub-sample period for the returns. More recent 
studies starting with Engle (1982) model time varying volatility by past forecast 
errors, known as autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) processes. 
For financial series, large increases are often followed by larger increases, or 
large decreases are followed by larger decreases. Although it is difficult to observe 
significant behaviour in the first moments of these series, the volatility appears to 
be serially correlated. The basic idea in the ARCH techniques is to exploit this 
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correlation to model the changing volatility. Later, Bollerslev (1986) extends the 
ARCH process of Engle to a generalised autoregressive conditionally 
heteroscedastic (GARCH) process by including the past values 0f the estimated 
volatility. This can be viewed an extension of an autoregressive process to an 
autoregressive moving-average process. In an ARCH process too many lagged 
values of the squared error terms are often included, and the stability criterion 
requires all roots to be positive. The GARCH process can mimic the long lags 
with the MA term. Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) extend the GARCH model as 
GARCH-M (GARdH in mean) by making the conditional mean of the model 
linear in the conditional variance, implying a conditional mean-variance 
relationship. 
There are also some other extensions offered in the literature. For instance, Nelson 
(1990) offers an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model that does not require any 
parameter restrictions to ensure that the conditional volatility is always positive. 
Schwert (1989) estimates an absolute value ARCH model in which the 
conditional standard deviation becomes a linear function of the past standard 
deviations and the absolute values of the error terms. Hentschel (1995) gives a 
very general model which nests most of the models in the literature. In equation 
(9), a simplified version of this general model is presented which nests all the 
models described above. 
224 
Assume a stochastic functional relation between a variable y and a vector of 
independent variables x with a set of p parameters as 
Y1 =f(p,x,)+u, (8) 
where u represents the error term which is normally distributed with zero mean 
and a 2 variance. Thus, assuming that e is normally distributed with zero mean 
and unit variance, we can also express the error term as u1 = a,e,. A general 
model which nests the above-mentioned models can be given as 
(9) 
where 
In equation (9), apart from a and e, all other symbols represent constant 
parameters.lfwe assume()= 2, rp= 0, TJ = 2 and a= 0, we obtain the ARCH(1) 
model. As an extension to the ARCH(1) model, the GARCH(1,1) model can be 
obtained by setting a"* 0. If we assume that variable x represents a 2 in equation 
(8), then we can obtain the univariate ARCH-M and GARCH-M models. 
Moreover, by assuming () = 1, rp = 0 and TJ = 1, we can obtain the simplest 
version of the absolute value GARCH model, and setting () = 0, rp "* 0 and TJ = I 
gives the EGARCH model. Also, all models can be extended for longer Jags. 
Before modelling volatility, we have to make the series stationary. A variable can 
be trend or difference stationary, or it can already be stationary. Thus, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots were carried out at 5% levels by also 
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considering the possibility of seasonal unit roots. The three series, the LT! (long-
term interest rates), the logarithm of the FX (foreign exchange rate), and the 
logarithm of the RPJ (seasonally unadjusted price index) were tested both with 
and without a trend variable as 
where 
N 
t-.y, = Wt-l + Ifltt-.yH + &, 
;=t 
11 
y, = y,- a- J.d- Io;Dummy;. 
i=l 
(10) 
The results were contrasted with the required critical ratios which are higher than 
the standardised normal due to the spurious correlation. The long-term interest 
rate is the rate for 20-year UK government bonds, the exchange rate is the rate of 
the US dollar to the UK pound and the price index is the UK retail price index. 
Monthly data was obtained from 1972 to 1998 and the Datastream codes for the 
three series are, respectively, [UKOCLNG%], [UKOCEXCH] and [UKRP .... F]. 
In equation (l 0), r is the coefficient on the lagged value of y, a is the constant 
and f.J is the coefficient on the trend variable. y was obtained by regressing the 
monthly levels of the variables on a constant, 11 dummy variables for each month 
and a trend variable. In the testing procedure, the idea is to test whether or not the 
coefficient r is significantly different from zero. In equation (10), since the first 
difference of the variable y is regressed on its own lagged-one level, the null 
hypothesis of a unit root should not be rejected if this coefficient is not 
significantly different than zero. The number of observations are more than 300, 
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and table 7.1 gives the obtained results for the three variables together with the 
5% critical values of the t-ratios for a sample size of 500. If the null hypothesis of 
a unit root was not rejected, to determine whether too many deterministic 
variables were included, the significance of the y coefficient was again tested by 
excluding the trend variable. For all variables, the null hypothesis of unit root was 
accepted. Thus, we concluded that three variables are difference stationary. 
Table 7.1 Unit Root Test Results 
n=500 LT/ FX RP/ CV:5% 
trend and constant included 
y -2.9747 -2.4838 -2.1397 [ -3 .42] 
only constant included 
r -1.5926 -2.1773 -1.4276 [-2.87] 
A general observation for financial time series is that ARCH effects are mostly 
present in high frequency data, such as daily and weekly data. Since we have 
monthly data, before trying to model the volatility for each series, it is helpful to 
test the normality and ARCH effects formally. In addition, it is useful to test the 
fourth moments of the variables because large variances increase the mass in the 
tails. Thus, if we have a leptokurtic (excess kurtosis) distribution, it is possible to 
estimate the volatility by generalised ARCH models. Moreover, one can also 
check the autocorrelation function of the squared residuals to obtain an additional 
information about the Jag structure of the conditional volatility. Table 7.2 presents 
the skewness and excess kurtosis measures for the variables DLTI, RFX and INF. 
They represent the monthly changes in the long-term interest rate at annual rates, 
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annualised monthly holding returns of the foreign exchange rate and the monthly 
retail price inflation rate at annual rates, respectively. For normality and ARCH 
effects, the Bera-Jarque tests and the ARCH(l) and ARCH(4) tests are carried 
out. The Bera-Jarque test compares the excess kurtosis and skewness of a 
distribution with the null hypothesis of a normal, and it is distributed as a chi-
squared with two degrees of freedom. In a normal distribution, both excess 
kurtosis and skewness are assumed to be zero. The test is carried out by 
computing .i='P'[(skewness)2/6+(Excess Kurtosis)2/24], where T is the number 
of observations. The ARCH(p) test is a Lagrange multiplier test which formally 
tests the autocorrelations of the squares of the residuals. The squared residuals can 
be obtained from a preliminary regression. They can then be regressed on a 
constant and p lagged values to test the null hypothesis of no ARCH(p) effects 
with a chi-squared distribution of p degrees of freedom. The test statistics is 
given as i=TR2, where T is the number of observations and R2 is obtained from 
the regression of the squared residuals. 
Table 7.2 Tests for Normality and ARCH Effects 
Bera-Jarque lC2) 
ARCH(1) :x\1) 
ARCH(4) :x2(4) 
Excess Kurtosis (Ku=O) 
Skewness (Sk=O) 
DLTI 
92.1672 
(0.0000) 
70.1399 
(0.0000) 
73.2922 
(0.0000) 
2.4556 
(0.0000) 
-0.3978 
(0.0032) 
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RFX 
53.9808 
(0.0000) 
73.6070 
(0.0000) 
81.2809 
(0.0000) 
1.9644 
(0.0000) 
-0.10413 
(0.4406) 
INF 
651.8288 
(0.0000) 
52.7753 
(0.0000) 
57.9918 
(0.0000) 
5.7344 
(0.0000) 
1.8866 
(0.0000) 
Figure 7.1 Distributions and Correlograms 
Frequency DLTI 
Frequency RFX 
Frequency INF 
Correlogram DL TIRES"2 
.• I I I I I I 
Correlogram RFXRES"2 
.• I I I 
Correlogram INFRES"2 
.. I I I I I I 
In table 7.2, parentheses show the significance levels of the tests. The results of 
the normality tests indicate that the distributions of all three variables are far from 
normality. Both the ARCH(l) and ARCH(4) tests reveal strong ARCH effects for 
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all variables. In a nonnal distribution, the skewness would be zero, thus we can 
see that the zero skewness hypothesis is only acceptable for the RFX variable, 
and the variable INF has a significantly skewed distribution. Consistent with the 
results of the ARCH tests, excess kurtosis measures show that all variables have a 
leptokurtic distribution. In Figure 7.1, the frequency distribution of the three 
variables are given, respectively, for DLTI, RFX and INF. Moreover, we also 
present the correlogram of the squared residuals which were obtained by 
regressing the variables on a constant and time dummies. Analysing the 
correlogram of the squared residuals gives important clues about the lag structure 
of the model. As found in table 7 .2, the inflation rate has a quite skewed 
distribution, and the three variables have fat tails due to the leptokurtic 
distribution. When we look at the correlograms of the squared residuals, it is 
possible to see positive autocorrelation in the long lags for all variables. Thus, a 
GARCH model is a good candidate to capture the effects of these long lags. 
Because of its stationarity and high capability of parsimonious approximation of 
heteroscedasticity, often the GARCH( I, 1) process is employed· in the empirical 
literature. Assuming interest rates and exchange rates as assets, we fit a 
GARCH(l,l)-M model in which the return becomes a linear function of the 
conditional variance. For inflation, after a preliminary stepwise regression, we fit 
a GARCH( I, I) model for an AR(2) process. From equations (8) and (9), using the 
joint density of the observations, the logarithm of the conditional likelihood 
function can be derived as 
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T 1 
L(<D)= 2:- - [log(o}(<D))+u~(<D)/ o}(<D)] 
1=1 2 
(11) 
where <D represents the vector of parameters to be estimated. For the 
GARCH(1,1)-M model, <D includes OJ, §and a as the GARCH(1 ,1) parameters, as 
in equation (9), and f3o and /31 parameters as the constant and the coefficient on the 
variance term, as in equation (8). For the inflation, j31 and /32 parameters become 
the coefficients for the AR(2) lags. Stationarity requires that (8 +a)<l. For the 
maximisation process, as suggested by Bollerslev (1986), the Bemdt, Hall, Hall, 
Hausman (1974) algorithm was used, and to ensure that the global maximum was 
obtained, different initial values were given for the parameters. 
Table 7.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Volatility 
Parameter 
OJ 
a 
f3o 
DLTI 
GARCH(1,1)-M 
0.000001 
(3.6041) 
0.1642 
(3.2124) 
0.7993 
(20.9708) 
-0.0003 
(-0.7761 ) 
-6.8742 
(-0.3498) 
RFX 
GARCH(1,1)-M 
0.0227 
(2.7060) 
0.0964 
(2.4903) 
0.7490 
(9.6680) 
0.0400 
(0.4705) 
-0.3780 
(-0.6183) 
INF 
AR(2), GARCH(1,1) 
0.0012 
(3.4964) 
0.1187 
(2.4216) 
0.6592 
(7.3719) 
0.0303 
(3.743 1) 
0.4200 
(5.6144) 
0.166 1 
(2.3938) 
Table 7.3 gives the estimation results for the three variables, and figure 7.2 shows 
the volatility estimations together with the series for comparison. The /31 
coefficients on the variance terms appear with insignificant negative signs for the 
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GARCH(l,l)-M models. For the inflation, both j31 and /h. parameters for the 
lagged values appear with positive significant values. The GARCH(l,l) 
parameters indicate that ( 8 +a)<l for all estimations, satisfying the stationarity 
conditions. More importantly, all coefficients appear with very significant t-ratios. 
Figure 7.2 Conditional Volatility Estimates 
DLTI - ULTI: 
. 9Z .999J.Z 
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INF- UII'IF= 
.6 .924 
. 9J.8 
.3 ~ .012 
9 -- . ··--
. 996 
-.3 9 
J.989 J.999 2 999 J.989 J.999 2999 
In figure 7.2, the variables ULTI, UFX and UINF represent the estimated 
uncertainty of the long-term interest rate, the exchange-rate and the inflation rate, 
respectively. As can be seen, for the three series, conditionally estimated 
measures successfully mimic the highly volatile periods. For instance, the highly 
volatile periods for the ULTI and UINF are the effects of the oil shocks in the 
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1970's. For the UFX, the high volatility in 1985 and in 1992 portray the turmoil in 
the world markets and the rise of the US dollar and the dropping of the UK from 
the ERM (exchange rate mechanism), respectively. 
Section 7.4 Simulation Results 
Before estimating the models and carrying out the simulations, possible unit roots 
were tested for the V AR variables. Investment figures were obtained at a 
quarterly frequency; thus, to obtain the quarterly figures for the conditional 
volatility measures, the monthly figures were averaged for each three-month 
period. The unit root tests were carried out as in the previous section by including 
quarterly dummies. However, the trend variable was not included f6r the volatility 
measures since the inclusion of the trend does not seem appropriate for any of the 
three variables from figure 7.2. The results in table 7.4 show that the three 
estimated volatility measures are stationary since the related t-ratios are above the 
critical 5% level. 
Table 7.4 Unit Root Test Results for the V AR Variables 
n=100 ULTI UFX UINF . CV:5% 
only constant included 
r -3 .2103 -4.6022 -4.3448 [-2.89] 
LINV LIPM LIED 
trend and constant included 
r -2.7743 -3 .1 669 -2. 1601 [-3.45] 
only constant included 
r -0.3230 -0.5956 -0.6352 [-2.89] 
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On the other hand, the logarithms of the fixed total investment (LINV), the 
machinery and equipment investment (LJPM) and the construction investment 
(LIED) appear to be difference stationary, since the t-ratios are all b.elow the 
critical ratio. The total fixed investment is the UK gross domes-tic fixed 
investment and the other two categories are the disintegrated version of this series. 
The Datastream codes for the investment variables are, respectively, 
[UKOCGDFID] , [UKOCMEQPD] and [UKOCCNSID], and they were obtained 
from the OECD database. 
Figure 7.3 V AR Variables 
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Since the three volatility measures are stationary, no cointegrati<?n relationship 
exists between the variables. Thus, the first difference of the investment variables 
were taken. Before analysing the investment-uncertainty relationship for the 
different categories of investment, we will first analyse the case for the total 
investment. Figure 7.3 shows the three volatility measures and the logarithmic 
difference of the total investment at annual rates for quarterly frequency from 
1972:Q3 to 1998:Ql. A VAR model will be quickly over-pararneterised with the 
additional lags. On the other hand, it is also important not to misspecify the model 
by including less lags than necessary. To decide the lag length of the system, 
formal tests were carried out. The results are presented in table 7.5 for 6, 4, 3, 2 
and 1 lags. 
Table 7.5 F-Tests for System Reduction 
System Reduction 
V AR(6) --) V AR(4) 
VAR(6) --) VAR(3) 
VAR(4) --) VAR(3) 
V AR(6) --) V AR(2) 
V AR(4) --) VAR(2) 
Signif. Level 
(0.2662) 
(0.3766) 
(0.6233) 
(0.5396) 
(0.8037) 
System Reduction 
VAR(3) --) VAR(2) 
V AR( 6) --) V AR(l) 
V AR(4) --) V AR(l) 
VAR(3) --) VAR(1) 
VAR(2) --) VAR(1) 
Signif. Level 
(0.7889) 
(0.0327) 
(0.0244) 
(0.0051) 
(0.0001) 
The test is the F-test version of likelihood ratio test for the system as given in 
Anderson (1984). We test the significance of the additional lags by comparing the 
residual sums of squares of the restricted and the unrestricted forms where the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients of the additional lags are zero. The significance 
levels of the F-tests reveal that the lag reductions are acceptable up to 2 lags, and 
the reduction to 1 lag is rejected from all systems. Thus, the V AR(2) system best 
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describes the dynamics of the system according to the tests. To satisfy that the 
given shocks are not explosive, the eigenvalues of the system given in equation 
(4) should be in the unit circle. Table 7.6 gives the eigenvalues of the V AR(2) 
system which also includes quarterly dummies. As can be seen, all roots are 
complex and the modulus is less than unity, satisfying the stability condition. 
Table 7.6 Eigenvalues of the V AR(2) System 
Eigenvalues Real 
-0.1598 
0.7324 
0.4773 
-0.0342 
Complex 
±0.3702 
±0.0770 
±0.1853 
±0.0840 
Modulus 
0.4032 
0.7364 
0.5121 
0.0907 
In the shock simulation process, possible effects of structural policy changes were 
also considered. For that purpose, two impulse dummies were incorporated into 
the model. The first one is for the first quarter of 1985, for the effect of change in 
the UK corporate tax system on investment. The second one is for the third 
quarter of 1992, for the effect of Exchange Rate Mechanism on exchange rate 
volatility. 
As a fmal step, to ensure that the parameters of the system are stable, predictive 
Chow (1960) tests were carried out recursively. The null hypothesis in this test is 
that the parameters are constant. First, the estimations can be carried out for a 
period, and then the predictions can be obtained for the next period. The idea is to 
test the difference between the two residual sums of squares of two different 
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periods by using an F-test. In figure 7.4, the results of the recursive F-tests are 
given at 5% level. The first graph shows the results of the forward recursive tests. 
The second graph reverses the role of the samples and gives. the backward 
recursive tests. As can be seen, the results of both recursive tests are below the 
critical 5% line indicating that the parameters of the V AR(2) system are constant. 
Figure 7.4 Recursive Chow Tests for System Stability at 5% Level 
Forward Backward 
As explained in the second section, when Choleski decomposition is employed, 
depending on the structure of the error correlation matrix of the reduced form 
V AR system, the ordering of the variables can matter. Since we are investigating 
the effects of various forms of uncertainty on investment decisions, it is 
reasonable to place the investment variable as the last variable in the ordering. 
Thus, the contemporaneous effects of the investment variable on the three 
volatility measures are assumed zero. If one considers a policy driven shock, then 
it is logical to place the interest rate uncertainty as the first variable. However, one 
may also want to consider an initial price shock by placing the inflation volatility 
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as the first variable. Table 7.7 gives the error correlation matrix for the four 
dimensional V AR(2) system. As can be seen, except for the negative correlation 
between the error terms of the interest rate volatility and the exchange rate 
volatility, the correlation measures between the error terms of the volatility 
measures are quite small. Thus, the ordering of the three volatility measures 
should not change the simulation results significantly. 
Table 7.7 Error Correlation Matrix of the V AR(2) Model 
Variables ULTI UFX UINF INV 
ULTI 1.0000 
UFX -0.2490 1.0000 
UINF 0.0611 0.0261 1.0000 
INV 0.0543 -0.3605 -0.1186 1.0000 
Figure 7.5 shows the impulse response functions of the system ULTI, UFX, UINF, 
INV in the given order for a horizon of 12 quarters. The V AR(2) system includes a 
constant, quarterly dummies and the two impulse dummies. Each row in the figure 
traces out the effects of a unit shock to the error term of a variable on the time 
paths of the whole system. The diagonal shows the response of the variables to 
their own shocks. The values of the variables converge to their long-run levels, 
and this convergence is assured by the eigenvalues given in table 7.6. The first 
row in figure 7.5 plots the impulse response functions of the variables to a unit 
shock in ULTI. After a unit shock in the interest rate uncertainty, the effect of the 
shock on itself decays slowly. The exchange rate uncertainty gives a negative 
response initially, and the effect converges to its long-run level after the third 
238 
-------------------------------
Figure 7.5 Impulse Response Functions of the System ULTI-7UFX-7UINF-7INV 
=~~~~ m ~i:~r.;:;:_::~ -~::~~~ 
-.3t 1 "" 1 "" I .4~=== 1 ' I' I '-.1St.~" 
5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 
9 ~UFx --> ULti 1 ~=rUFx --> UFx _ 18 ~UFx --> Uinf _ 2 ~UFx --> Inv 
- • '"' 
0 
.. \ ~ ~= ~=--: -= mm -~ 2 r::__ _.,.,.,.,,  
--04 , , I 9 ......... ~~...._._..a..;::....__._  .J.I_.,~..._._.,_.,-. 96 _:= 'I '-~-'-'I I -. 4-L' I I I I I -
5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 
Uinf --> ULti Uinf --> UFx Uinf - - > Uinf Uinf --> Inv 
.12f .95~ 1.2f 9 f~ ~::: ~ -~ .. ,.~mm ::_~ - =:::-V • 
9 I -.1- I 9 -~'I '-.27'- pplpop I pp! 
5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 
Inv --> ULti Inv --> UFx Inv --> Uinf Inv --> Inv 
~::~ .99f .96~ 1.2~ :::-~~--- ::~::~mm llmm ~: J------
9 ' I I-.18- - o 41..._.......,,_,...._._, ...... !~ ........ ~ .......... ~.......__. 
5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 5 19 15 
quarter. On the other hand, the inflation uncertainty gives an increasing positive 
response which attains a very high level at the second quarter and vanishes slowly. 
Interestingly, although small, the initial impact of the shock in the interest rate 
uncertainty on the total fixed investment is positive. This effect becomes negative 
after the third quarter, reaches the minimum at the fourth quarter, and then slowly 
converges to the long-run level. The second row, plots the impulse response 
functions of the variables to a unit shock in UFX. Because of .the Cholesky 
decomposition and the imposed ordering, the contemporaneous effect of UFX on 
ULTI was assumed zero. Thus, the initial impact on ULTI is zero. Although small, 
the overall effect is negative, and starts to converge after the fifth quarter. The 
effect on the inflation uncertainty is positive, reaching the maximum in the second 
quarter, and then converging. Unlike the response to the shock in the interest rate 
volatility, the total fixed investment initially gives a negative and higher response 
to a shock in the foreign exchange rate uncertainty, and the adjustment to the 
.. 
long-run level happens quickly with an oscillatory movement after the second 
quarter. 
As can be seen from the third row, because of the ordering, the initial responses of 
ULTI and UFX to the shock in UJNF are zero. The interest rate uncertainty gives 
a positive response, and the effect diminishes slowly. The foreign exchange rate 
uncertainty gives a positive response, but later the effect becomes negative and 
then converges. Although not very high, initially the effect on the investment is 
negative. After the second quarter, the negative effect worsens and dies slowly 
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after the third quarter. The final row in figure 7.5 plots the impulse response 
functions of the variables to a unit shock in the error term of the total investment. 
Because of the imposed ordering, the initial impacts are zero except on itself. 
Both ULTJ and UFX give positive responses to this shock. On the other hand, in 
the first three quarters, the effect on the UINF is negative, converging with an 
oscillatory movement thereafter. 
Table 7.8 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the System 
ULTI~UFX~UINF~INV (%) 
Variables ULTI UFX UINF INV 
ULTI 96.54 0.30 1.70 1.46 
UFX 4.59 92.36 1.92 1.13 
UINF 47.36 0.70 51.36 0.58 
INV 3.57 11.78 9.11 75.54 
Table 7.8 presents the forecast error variance decomposition for the system ULTI, 
UFX, UINF, INV for a horizon of 12 quarters. It shows the proportion of the 
movements of a variable due to its own shocks versus shocks to the other 
variables, and each row adds to 100%. Generally, for the three volatility measures, 
their explanatory power on each other's error variance decomposition results are 
quite low. Only in the case of UJNF does an innovation in the interest rate 
uncertainty explain 47.36% of the forecast error variance of UINF. The fmal row 
reports the percentage movements of INV due to four different shocks given to 
the system. Its forecast error variance explained by an innovation in the long-term 
interest rate uncertainty is only 3.57%. On the other side, this is 11.78% and 
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9.11 %, respectively, for the exchange rate uncertainty and the inflation 
uncertainty. 
Overall, although not large, the impulse response functions and the forecast error 
variance decomposition results reveal that increases in the volatility of the foreign 
exchange rate and the inflation rate cause reductions in the total investment, and 
the negative effect of the former is slightly higher than the latter. Obviously, this 
statistical fmding supports the irreversibility argument for the aggregate-level 
investment-uncertainty relationship. On the other hand, although small, total 
investment initially gives a positive response to a shock in the interest rate 
volatility. However, the effect becomes negative in the following periods and the 
overall effect is ambiguous. 
Simulations were also carried out for a different ordering of the same system. For 
that purpose, the V AR(2) system UINF, ULTI, UFX, INV was employed in the 
given order. Figure 7.6 plots the impulse response functions, and table 7.9 gives 
the forecast error variance decomposition results for a horizon of 12 quarters. As 
can be seen, neither the impulse response functions, nor the variance 
decomposition results for INV change significantly. To check the robustness of the 
results obtained, variance decomposition results were obtained for four further 
different orderings, and the obtained results are reported only for INV in table 
7.10. As can be seen, the results are also insensitive to these different orderings. 
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Figure 7.6 Impulse Response Functions of the System UINF-7 ULTI -7 UFX -7 INV 
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Table 7.9 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the System 
UINF--+ UL Tl--+ UFX --+INV (%) 
Variables UINF ULTI UFX INV 
UINF 55.57 43.39 0.46 0.58 
ULTI 3.01 95.17 0.36 1.46 
UFX 1.84 4.71 92.32 1.13 
INV 9.65 3.36 11.45 75.54 
Table 7.10 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Other Orderings(%) 
ULTI UINF UFX INV 
INV 3.57 9.44 11.45 75.54 
UINF UFX ULTI INV 
INV 9.65 11.44 3.37 75.54 
UFX ULTI UINF INV 
INV 11.61 3.74 9.ll 75.54 
UFX UINF ULTI INV 
INV 11.61 9.48 3.37 75.54 
Different investment categories require different decision making processes, thus, 
the uncertainty measures may have different effects on different categories. To 
investigate this, the same simulations were carried out for the machinery and 
equipment investment and the construction investment separately. Again, a 
V AR(2) model including a constant, quarterly dummies and the two impulse 
dummies was employed. Figures 7.7 and 7.8 plot the impulse response functions 
of the system including the three uncertainty measures and the machinery and 
equipment investment for two different orderings. Similarly, figures 7.9 and 7.10 
plot the impulse response functions of the system for the construction investment 
for two different orderings. Tables 7.11, 7 .12, 7.13 and 7.14 give the 
corresponding variance decomposition results. The fmal columns of figures 7.7 
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Figure 7.7 Impulse Response Functions of the System ULTI7UFX7UINF7IPM 
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and 7.8 trace the responses of !PM (logarithmic difference of the machinery and 
equipment investment) to the unit shocks given to the system via the error terms 
of the variables. Comparing the results with the total investment case from figures 
7.5 and 7.6 reveal that the effects are qualitatively similar. In this case, the initial 
negative response of !PM to the shocks in UFX is higher, and the initial positive 
response to the shocks in ULTI is lower. Also, the negative effect of UINF seems 
slightly less when compared to the total investment case. 
Table 7.11 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the System 
ULTI~UFX~UINF~IPM (%) 
Variables ULTI UFX UINF !PM 
ULTI 96.13 0.29 1.77 1.81 
UFX 5.33 90.48 1.81 2.38 
UINF 46.26 0.51 51.75 1.48 
!PM 1.79 14.13 5.82 78.26 
Table 7.12 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the System 
UINF~ULTI~UFX~IPM (%) 
Variables UINF ULTI UFX !PM 
UINF 54.95 43.25 0.32 1.48 
ULTI 2.72 95.12 0.35 1.81 
UFX 1.71 5.43 90.48 2.38 
INV 6.27 1.66 13.81 78.26 
The forecast error variance decomposition results in tables 7.11 and 7.12 confirm 
the differences between the observed patterns of the impulse response functions of 
INV and !PM. In the case of the machinery and equipment investment, the 
negative effect of inflation uncertainty becomes less important. On the other hand, 
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the negative effect of the exchange rate uncertainty is higher, as the proportions in 
the variance decomposition results are 14.13% and 13.81% for the two different 
orderings. Although not reported here, the obtained results were insensitive to the 
other orderings. 
The final columns of figures 7.9 and 7.10 plot the responses of !BD (logarithmic 
difference of the construction investment) to the unit shocks given to the system 
for two different orderings. Unlike the impulse response functions of !PM, the 
impulse response functions of !BD exhibit different patterns when compared to 
the total investment case. Interestingly, in both orderings, the initial positive 
response of !BD to the shocks in ULTI is quite high when compared to the 
responses of INV. This positive effect only becomes negative after the third 
quarter, converging immediately after the fifth quarter. Similar to the !PM case, 
the inflation uncertainty effect becomes less important when compared to the INV 
case, but the effect is still negative regardless of the ordering. The most important 
difference in the case of UFX is that, although the response of !BD have similar 
patterns as the responses of INV and JP M, the amount of the initial impact and the 
responses in the following quarters are about 10 times less than the other cases. 
As the fmal rows of tables 7.13 and 7.14 reveal, the proportion of ULTI in the 
variance decomposition of !BD increases to 4.8%. The effect is still very small, 
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Table 7.13 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the System 
ULTI~UFX~UINF~mD (%) 
Variables ULTJ UFX UINF !BD 
ULTI 97.50 0.15 2.17 0.18 
UFX 3.81 93.47 1.43 1.29 
UINF 47.02 0.46 50.87 1.65 
!BD 4.82 0.30 5.01 89.87 
Table 7.14 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the System 
UINF~ULTI~UFX~mD (%) 
Variables UINF ULTI UFX !BD 
UINF 53.90 44 .. 11 0.34 1.65 
ULTI 3.16 96.48 0.18 0.18 
UFX 1.38 3.88 93.45 1.29 
!BD 5.05 4.79 0.29 89.87 
and this increment is due mainly to the higher initial positive responses in the 
first three quarters. This finding for the long-term interest rate uncertainty effect 
on the aggregate-level construction investment does not support the irreversibility 
argument. The proportion of UINF in the variance decomposition of !BD is 
around 5%. Although the effect is small, it is negative and deteriorates the 
construction investment. As can be seen, the proportion of UFX is around 0.3%, 
supporting the comparative impulse response analysis. Although negative, unlike 
the case for machinery and equipment investment, the exchange rate uncertainty 
does not seem to affect the aggregate-level construction investment in a 
significant way. These findings were again robust to different orderings of the 
uncertainty variables. 
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Section 7.5 Concluding Remarks 
Using the V AR methodology and employing quarterly data for the period 
1972:Q3-1998:Ql, this fmal chapter gave a statistical account of the aggregate-
level investment-uncertainty relation for the UK. In particular, the effects of long-
term interest rate uncertainty, exchange rate uncertainty and inflation uncertainty 
were analysed. The uncertainty measures were estimated by employing 
conditional volatility models. Although small, impulse response functions and 
forecast error variance decomposition analyses revealed negative effects of the 
volatility of exchange rate and inflation rate on the aggregate-level investment. 
The effect of the exchange rate uncertainty was higher in magnitude when 
compared to the inflation uncertainty. On the other hand, interest rate volatility 
did not appear to have a significant effect. These statistical findings do not support 
the convexity argument, but the irreversibility effect for the aggregate-level 
investment-uncertainty relationship. The analyses were taken one step further by 
investigating the effects of the uncertainty measures separately for the machinery 
and equipment and the construction investment. The simulation results revealed 
stronger negative effects of exchange rate volatility on the machinery and 
equipment investment, however, it had almost no effect on the construction 
investment. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this thesis, using large-company panel data, we empirically analysed capital 
investment decisions in major European countries. We particularly focused on 
three issues: the taxation of capital in the EU, the role of agency costs of debt on 
investment decisions, and the empirical analyses of the investment-uncertainty 
relationship. 
Harmonisation of tax rules in the EU has been an important argument. Some 
studies argued in favour of independent tax systems for demand management and 
economic stabilisation and adjustment. On the other hand, some argued in favour 
of harmonisation to prevent discrimination and distortion in investment decisions 
which will result in inefficient location decisions. 
In chapter 2, a dynamic tax simulation analysis was conducted to understand the 
role of corporate tax policy changes on investment decisions. The theoretical 
framework was limited by the q model of investment, but this had certain 
advantages. It was based on the augmented neo-classical model, so it was a 
structural approach which enabled a study of various tax policy effects. It was a 
forward-looking model, free of an expectations problem, and also the estimated 
investment equation was not subject to a direct rational expectations criticism. The 
analyses were oriented on four major European countries: the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. First, we aimed to measure the dynamic 
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effects of various corporate tax policy changes to see whether the effects are 
important, and which policy affects which country more. As a second aim, the 
policy effects were contrasted between the countries which has important 
implications for the tax harmonisation issue in the EU. 
Simulation results revealed that tax policies affect investment decisions. It was 
observed that investment was more sensitive to investment tax credit changes 
relative to other policy effects. Substantial differences were observed for the tax 
policy effects on investment between the UK and France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands as a group, and also differences within this group in terms of different 
policy effects. Among the countries, investment was found least sensitive to all 
policy shock effects in the UK. More importantly, the harmonisation of the 
corporate tax rules reduced the observed asymmetry only by a limited amount. 
As observed in the Literature, the adjustment costs implied by the model were 
unreasonably high. To overcome this problem, one could introduce a more 
complicated adjustment cost function. For instance, the irreversibility effect could 
be introduced implicitly in the model by way of an augmented adjustment cost 
function as in Eberly (1997). Additionally, the approach taken here was limited to 
the permanent tax policy shock effects. As an extension of the approach taken here, 
temporary tax policy effects can be studied. Also, the ignored role of personal 
taxation can be introduced to the model. 
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In chapter 3, we analysed the joint effects of income uncertainty and irreversibility 
of investment decisions on the domestic effective marginal tax rates. Effective tax 
rates are commonly employed to reveal the role of a tax system in the incentives 
or disincentives to invest given to firms. However, for simplicity, many studies 
using these measures ignore the role of uncertainty and irreversibility risks. See 
Ruding (1992), Devereu.x and Pearson (1995) and Chennells and Griffith (1997) 
for instance. Considering a zero loss offset income tax case, it was shown 
analytically that this joint effect greatly increases the tax distortion measures. By 
using actual data for the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands, we presented 
evidence that the joint effect of uncertainty and irreversibility would increase the 
commonly used marginal effective tax rates measures to much higher levels. As 
an extension to chapter 2, the effects of harmonising the corporate tax rules were 
also analysed. When the joint risk was incorporated, the reduction in the observed 
asymmetry was far less than the reduction in the case of certainty and reversibility. 
Similar to the findings in chapter 2 for the dynamic effects of tax policy changes, 
the results found in this chapter have important implications for the EU since it 
contradicts the tax competition view for the domestic investment case. 
In chapter 3, a fully irreversible case was assumed, whereas in reality not all 
expenditures can be treated as sunk costs. Investment expenditures would be at 
least partly reversible. Also, for simplicity, we assumed a no loss offsetting case. 
However, the assumption of no refundability was not realistiC' since many 
corporate income tax systems permit at least a partial refundability of losses. This 
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was because, the presence of carry-forwards or carry-backs of losses would greatly 
complicate the employed model. For instance, see Mayer (1986). Another 
important drawback was the assumption that stock market fluctuations will reflect 
changes in income which could only be partly true for a real-world case. A 
possible extension of the approach taken here would be to overcome the above-
mentioned drawbacks, at least at some level. Further, the model could be 
expanded to include personal taxation, other sources of uncertainty or an 
international investment case. 
Within the context of the models employed in chapters 2 and 3, we conclude that 
the obtained results cast doubt on the tax competition view in the EU for the 
domestic investment case. Thus, harmonising corporate tax rules may mean the 
loss of a fiscal tool which can be used for adjustments of asymmetric shocks or for 
national demand management and economic stabilisation of the member 
economies. 
In the literature, many studies proposed that information and incentive problems 
may create frictions in financial capital markets. Thus, unlike Modigliani and 
Miller's irrelevance result, financing conditions may have important implications 
for investment decisions. Studies testing the possible relations between 
investment and financing decisions mostly documented cash flow· and liquidity 
effects. However, existing empirical studies about the effects of incentive 
.. 
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problems on investment decisions are not numerous and find controversial results, 
showing that more empirical investigations of these effects are required. 
In chapter 4, using a Euler equation approach and based on the agency/fmancial 
distress costs of debt, an investment equation was derived to test the role of debt 
financing conditions on investment decisions. In the model, we also considered 
the possible beneficiary role of working capital on the asset side of the balance 
sheet to smooth these costs and pressures. The study covered large UK, German 
and French firms. The estimation results revealed that the perfect financial capital 
markets hypotheses were not acceptable. According to the develop~d model, the 
agency/financial distress costs of debt were important so that debt financing had a 
significant role in management's investment decisions. However, we also found 
that, to some extent, firms had the ability to smooth these costs and alleviate 
pressures through their working capital policy on the asset side of their balance 
sheets. Further analyses revealed that the agency/financial distress cost of debt 
had negative impacts on the investment behaviour of the high-leverage groups, 
whereas it was not significant for the low-leverage groups. 
In chapter 5, we derived an alternative model in a q theory framework to test the 
role of agency/fmancial distress costs of debt on investment. In this formulation, 
the investment equation included the debt-capital ratio under the hypothesis of 
incentive problems of debt and capital market imperfections. We tested this 
alternative model for the UK firms. Similar to the findings in chapter 4, the 
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estimation results revealed that the agency/fmancial distress costs of debt had a 
significant negative role in investment decisions of highly leveraged firms. To 
some extent, those firms had the ability to smooth these costs through their 
working capital policy. 
Overall, the results of chapters 4 and 5 showed that imperfections in the markets 
exist, financing and investment decisions interact, and the financing conditions 
have important implications for investment decisions. The findings imply 
important effects at the aggregate level since it was conducted by using only large 
industrial firms which constitute a very large fraction of the total investment in the 
economies. Leverage increases by corporations may increase the economy-wide 
costs, risk and fmancial distress. 
In chapters 4 and 5, we neglected the role of informational and incentive problems 
related to equity finance in the modelling process. However, in practice, there 
might be manager-shareholder conflicts in some firms. For instance, see Pike 
(1985), Chen (1995) and Cho (1998) for an argument and evidence of these 
effects on investment behaviour. As an extension to the models developed in 
chapters 4 and 5, one may consider the role of fixed capital on the asset side of the 
balance sheet to smooth the hypothesised agency costs. For instance, this can be 
the collateral role of fixed assets. The agency/financial distress costs of debt can 
be analysed in detail for short-term and long-term debt, and the smoothing 
benefits of working capital for cash, stock and debt policies. Additionally, to 
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improve the models, the irreversibility of investment decisions and tax issues can 
be considered. Also, as discussed in Oliner et al. ( 1996), the stability of the 
parameters of the Euler equations employed in chapter 4 can be tested as an 
additional misspecification test. 
At a fmn level analysis, the theoretical work on the investment-uncertainty 
relationship suggests that the direction of the sign of this relationship depends on 
the degree of competition faced by a fmn and/or the assumption about the 
technology that the firm adapts. Empirical studies are far behind the theoretical 
developments in this field. This is mainly due to the estimation problems involved 
in stochastic dynamic structural models. See for instance, Marcet (1994) and 
Pakes (1994). A small number of studies examined the sign of the investment-
uncertainty relationship at the fum level and found mostly negative effects. 
In chapter 6, we empirically examined the sign of the short-run investment-
uncertainty relationship for large UK industrial companies. We particularly 
considered the product market structure while studying this relation via the product 
specialisation criteria. We did not attempt to develop a specified structural model, 
however, to test the robustness of the fmdings, two different models and two 
different measures of uncertainty were employed. The fust uncertainty measure 
was based on conditional CAPM, and the second one was based directly on the 
conditional stock returns. The findings revealed that consideration of the product 
market structure confirmed the predictions of both theoretical works, and this result 
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was robust under different model specifications. Moreover, it was observed that one 
should be careful about the employed uncertainty measure before reaching a 
conclusion about the nature of this relationship. As a possible extension to the 
approach taken in chapter 6, other investment models could be considered and 
other uncertainty measures could be employed. Additionally, other splitting 
criteria could be used to consider the assumptions of the two opposing views. 
Using impulse response functions and forecast error vanance decomposition 
analyses of the vector autoregression methodology, chapter 7 gave a statistical 
account of the aggregate investment-uncertainty relation in the UK. In particular, 
the effects of long-term interest rate uncertainty, exchange rate uncertainty and 
inflation uncertainty were analysed. The uncertainty measures were estimated by 
employing conditional volatility models. Although they were not large, negative 
effects of exchange rate and inflation uncertainty were observed on the total 
investment. To some extent, these fmdings support the irreversibility argument at 
the aggregate level. We observed significant differences between the responses of 
machinery and equipment investment and the construction investment to the 
exchange rate volatility. The simulation results revealed stronger negative effects 
of exchange rate volatility on the machinery and equipment investment, however, 
it had almost no effect on the construction investment. This observed difference is 
most probably due to the different characteristics of the two types of investment. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix gives the names of the firms employed throughout chapters 2-6. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
United Kingdom (82 Firms) 
AGGREGATE INDUST. IBSTOCK 
ALLIED COLLOIDS IMI 
AMEC IMP.CHM.INDS. 
AMSTRAD JOHNSON MATTHEY 
ANTOF AGAST A HDG. LAIRD GROUP 
APV LAPORTE 
ARJO WIGGINS APL LONRHO 
AVON RUBBER LOW&BONAR 
BAIRD (WILLIAM) MARLEY 
BBAGROUP MCKECHNIE 
BIBBY (J) MEYERINTL." 
BLUE CIRCLE INDS. MORGAN CRUCIBLE 
BOCGROUP PENTLAND GROUP 
BOWTHORPE PILKINGTON 
BPB POWELL DUFFRYN 
BRIT.AEROSPACE RACAL ELECTRONIC 
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L --
BRIT.POL YTHENE RED LAND 
BRITISH STEEL REXAM 
BRITISH VIT A RMCGROUP 
BTP ROLLS-ROYCE 
BTR RUGBY GROUP 
BUNZL SCAPAGROUP 
CARADON SENIOR ENGR. 
CHARTER SIEBE 
COATS VIYELLA S.MITH (DA VID S) 
COB HAM S.MITHS INDS. 
COOKSON GROUP SPIRAX-SARCO 
COURTAULDS TEXT. ST.IVES 
CRODAINTL. T&N 
DANKA BUS.SYS. TARMAC 
DE LA RUE TA YLOR WOOD ROW 
DELTA TIGROUP 
FKI TOMKINS 
GENERAL ELEC. VICKERS 
GKN WADDINGTON 
GLYNWED WASSALL 
HANSON WATMOUGHS HDG. 
HARRISONS &CROS. WEIR GROUP 
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HEPWORTH 
HEWDEN-STUART 
HEYWOOD WILLIAMS 
ALCATEL ALSTHOM 
BERTRANDFAURE 
BOUYGUES 
CGIP 
CllviENTS FRANCAIS 
COLAS 
CS (CIE.DES SIN) 
DASSAUL TA VIA TIO 
DEGREMONT 
DEVANLAY 
DMC 
ECIA 
EIFFAGE 
FIVES LILLE 
GASCOGNE 
GROUPE AND RE 
GTM ENTREPOSE 
France (26 Firms) 
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WILLIAMS HOG. 
WIMPEY (GEORGE) 
WOLSELEY 
INTER TECHNIQUE 
LABINAL 
LAFARGE 
LE GRAND 
LEGRANDADP 
LEGRIS INDUSTRIE 
MANITOU 
METALEUROP 
MICHELIN 
NORD-EST 
PEUGEOTSA 
PLASTIC OMNIUM 
PRIMAGAZ 
ROCHETTE (LA) 
SAINT GOBAIN 
SAT 
SFIM 
!METAL 
INGENICO 
AGIV 
AHLERS ADOLF 
ASEA BROWN BOVER 
BASF 
BAYER 
BERLINER ELK.HLD 
BILFINGER & BERG 
BMW 
BOSS (HUGO) 
BOSS (HUGO) PREF. 
BUD ER US 
C.H.A.BAUELEMENT 
COMPUTER 2000 
CONTINENTAL 
DEGUSSA 
DEUTZ 
DIDIER-WERKE 
DRAEGERWERK PREF. 
Germany (76 Finns) 
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THOMSON-CSF 
VALEO 
HOCHTIEF 
HOECHST 
HOLZMANN (PHILIP) 
INDUSTR.VERWALT. 
IWKA 
JUNGHEINRICH PRE 
KAMPA-HAUS 
KLOECKNER-WERKE 
KM EUROPA METAL 
KOLBENSCHMIDT 
KRONES PREF. 
KSB 
KSBPREF. 
LINDE 
MAN 
MAN-ROLAND 
MANNESMANN 
PHOENIX 
DT.BABCOCK PORSCHE PREF. 
DUERRBET. PREUSSAG 
DYCKERHOFF PUMA 
DYCKERHOFF PREF. PWA 
DYCK & WIDMANN RHEINMET ALL BERL 
ESCADA RUETGERS 
ESCADA PREF. SALAMANDER 
FAG KUGELFISCHER SANDER (JIL) PRE 
FELTEN & GUILL. SCHMALBACH-LUBEC 
FPBHOLDING SCHNEIDER RUNDF. 
GEA SIEMENS 
GEAPREF. STRABAG 
GILDEMEISTER SUD-CHEMIE 
GLUNZPREF. THYSSEN 
GOLDSCHMIDT V ART A 
HARP EN VBH BAUBESCHLAG 
HEIDELB.ZEMENT VIAG 
HENKEL PREF. VOLKSWAGEN 
HERLITZ VOSSLOH 
HERLITZ INTL.TRA. ZANDERS FEINPAPI 
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AKZONOBEL 
BOSKALIS WESTMIN 
CATE. KON.TEN 
DSM 
GAMMA HOLDING 
GETRONICS 
HAGEMEYER 
HOEK'S MACHINE 
HOLLANDSCHE BETO 
HOOGOVENS 
AGGREGATE INDUST. 
ALLIED COLLOIDS 
APIGROUP 
AVON RUBBER 
BEMROSE CORP. 
BICC 
BLUE CIRCLE INDS. 
Netherlands (19 Finns) 
HUNTER DOUGLAS 
IHCCALAND 
KON.KNPBT 
KON.PAKHOED 
OCE VDR.GRINTEN 
PHILIPS ELTN. 
SAMAS CERT. 
STORK 
VOLKER STEVIN 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
United Kingdom (76 Finns) 
266 
LAIRD GROUP 
LAPORTE 
LONRHO 
LOW&BONAR 
MACFARLANE GROUP 
MARS HALLS 
MA YFLOWER CORP. 
BOCGROUP MCKECHNIE 
BODYCOTE INTL. MEGGITT 
BOWTHORPE MORGAN CRUCffiLE 
BPB PILKINGTON 
BRIT.AEROSPACE POWELL DUFFRYN 
BRIT.POL YTHENE RACAL ELECTRONIC 
BRIT AX INTERNATI RENOLD 
BRITISH VIT A REXAM 
BUNZL RMCGROUP 
CHARTER ROTORK 
COB HAM RUGBY GROUP 
COOKSON GROUP SCAPAGROUP 
COURTAULDS SENIOR ENGR. 
CRODAINTL. SIEBE 
DE LA RUE SMITH (DA YID S) 
DELTA SMITHS INDS. 
EIS GROUP STAVELEY INDS. 
ELLIS & EVERARD T&N 
EUROTHERM TARMAC 
GENERAL ELEC. TIGROUP 
GKN TT GROUP 
GLYNWED VICKERS 
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HALMA 
HANSON 
HENL YS GROUP 
HEPWORTH 
HEWDEN-STUART 
ID STOCK 
IMI 
IMP.CHM.INDS. 
JOHNSON MA TTHEY 
ASEA BROWN BOVER 
BASF 
BAYER 
BILFINGER + BERG 
BUD ER US 
CONTINENTAL 
DEGUSSA 
DEUTZ 
DT.BABCOCK 
DYCKERHOFF 
DYCKERHOFF PREF. 
Germany (38 Firms) 
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VITECGROUP 
WADDINGTON 
WAGON IND.HDG. 
WASSALL 
WATMOUGHS HDG. 
WEIR GROUP 
WIMPEY (GEORGE) 
WOLSELEY 
YULECATTO 
INDUSTR.VERWALT. 
KLOECKNER-WERKE 
KRONES PREF. 
KSPIERBURG 
KSB 
KSBPREF. 
LINDE 
MAN 
MANNESMANN 
PREUSSAG 
PREUSSAG ST AHL 
FEL TEN & GUILL. 
FPBHOLDING 
GERRESHEIMER GLA 
HEIDELB.ZEMENT 
HENKEL PREF. 
HERLITZ 
HOCHTIEF 
HOECHST 
AIRLIQUIDE 
BERTRAND F AURE 
BOUYGUES 
CARBONE-LORRAINE 
CGIP 
COLAS 
DEDIETRICH 
ECIA 
GASCOGNE 
IMETAL 
LABINAL 
LAFARGE 
France (26 Firms) 
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PWA 
RHEINMET ALL BERL 
RWE-DEA 
SIEMENS 
STRABAG 
THYSSEN 
THYSSEN INDUSTRI 
VARTA 
LEGRIS INDUSTRIE 
METALEUROP 
MICHELIN 
NORD-EST 
PLASTIC OMNIUM 
PRIMAGAZ 
ROCHETTE (LA) 
SAINT GOBAIN 
SAT 
SFIM 
SOMMER-ALLIBERT 
STRAFOR FACOM 
LE GRAND 
APIGROUP 
AVON RUBBER 
BEMROSE CORP. 
BICC 
BLUE CIRCLE INDS. 
BOCGROUP 
BODYCOTE INTL. 
BPB 
BRITISH VIT A 
BUNZL 
BOWTHORPE 
CHARTER 
COB HAM 
COOKSON GROUP 
COURTAULDS 
CRODA INTL. 
DE LA RUE 
VALEO 
Chapter6 
United Kingdom (66 Firms) 
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LONRHO 
LOW&BONAR 
MACFARLANE GROUP 
MARS HALLS 
MA YFLOWER CORP. 
MCKECHNIE 
MEGGITT 
MORGAN CRUCffiLE 
PILKINGTON 
POWELL DUFFRYN 
RACAL ELECTRONIC 
RENOLD 
REXAM 
RMCGROUP 
ROTORK 
RUGBY GROUP 
SCAPAGROUP 
DELTA SENIOR ENGR. 
EIS GROUP SMITH (DA YID S) 
ELLIS & EVERARD SMITHINDS. 
GENERAL ELEC. STAVELEY INDS. 
GKN TARMAC 
GLYNWED TIGROUP 
HANSON TT GROUP 
HENLEYS GROUP VICKERS 
HEPWORTH VITECGROUP 
HEWDEN-STUART WADDINGTON 
IBSTOCK WAGON IND. HDG. 
IMI WASSALL 
IMP. CHM. INDS. WEIR GROUP 
JOHNSON MA TTEY WIMPEY (GEORGE) 
LAIRD GROUP WOLSELEY 
LAPORTE 
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